Open/Closed: To receive testimony on United States Special Operations Command in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2026 and the Future Years Defense Program

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

The Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee meets today to review the posture of our special operations enterprise. Thank you to our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. I want to take a moment to welcome Senator Slotkin as the subcommittee's new ranking member. I look forward to working closely together. For the members' information, today's hearing will begin in open session and then transition to a closed session in SVC 217 in the Office of Senate Security no later than 3:45 p.m. For years, I have worked closely with our Special Operations Forces community to ensure they have the resources to counter evolving threats. SOF is more than a counterterrorism force. They are indispensable in countering the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party, Russia, and their authoritarian allies. SOCOM has operated under stagnant budgets. The limitation of SOF end strength was a very shortsighted decision at a time when SOF capabilities are needed more than ever. We must change course now. That is why I intend to work with the DOD to rebuild SOCOM's budget. Given SOF's critical role in national security, this is a wise and cost-effective investment. Additionally, we must update DOD policies and authorities to leverage SOF capabilities fully. Irregular warfare has been a core SOF mission since World War II, yet unnecessary restrictions have hampered their flexibility. We need to empower our combatant commanders to unleash SOF's full potential. President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and our witnesses today recognize the urgency of these threats and the vital role SOF plays. As chair of this subcommittee, I will prioritize these key forces, which are essential for this era of great power competition and for ensuring the security of the American people. This is not just about defense and deterrence. It's about ensuring the U.S. remains the preeminent global force. We have no time to waste. Now I would like to recognize Senator Slotkin for her opening comments.

Ranking Member Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)SPEAKER_02

Thank you, Chairwoman Ernst. Important hearing on readiness, but importantly, happy to be here with you in our first official hearing on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the 119th, my first-time ranking member in the Senate. So I'm happy to be here, and I look forward to maintaining a really strong, robust bipartisan approach. I think we want the same things, which is to make sure that our special operations forces have the resources, the, you know, potential, the acquisition, the the everything you need to deal with a world of of really changing, fast-changing threats and challenges. Welcome to our guests. We're happy to have you here, and I think we want to express our appreciation for everything you do every day, particularly in guiding the special operations forces, given that, as you were describing to us earlier, the precipitous increase in the missions you are being asked to do. I think that's that we are keenly aware of that. Obviously, the gray zone challenges in places like China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and enabling the joint force. But I think in particular, I think it's hard to have this conversation without thinking about Taiwan and sort of the scenarios we have going forward with Taiwan and the the important role you all will play. Space, cyber, information operations, you all are at the forefront of a very changing world on conflict. Conflict is just going to look different and continue to look different than it was when many of us were starting out. We want you to have those resources, and therefore I will just flag I'm very interested in what's going on right now and the cuts that are potentially on the table at the Defense Department. We've heard rumors of 80,000, 90,000 forces, for instance, from the Army being cut. I don't think anyone is against cutting actual fat on the bone, but being surgical and smart about it and not cutting the very operators that we need to perform this ever-expanding group of missions you're being asked to do. So with that, Madam Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. And I'd like to thank SASC Ranking Member Senator Reed for being here today. And Senator Reed, do you have any opening comments or thoughts?

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

I just want— i just want to commend you, Madam Chairman, and the Ranking Member. I have great

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

confidence. Okay, great. Thank you. We will go ahead and proceed to your opening statements. And Mr. Jenkins, we will start with you, and then we will proceed to General Fenton. So, gentlemen, you each have 5 minutes for your opening statements.

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Thank you, Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member Slotkin, Chairman Wicker when he comes, Ranking Member Reed, and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the global posture of our nation's Special Operations Forces, or SOF. I'm honored to testify alongside General Fenton. We are joined here today by two extraordinary Americans who I would like to take a moment to recognize: Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Director of the Special Operations Secretariat Dr. Sandra Hobson, seated behind me, as well as SOLIC's senior enlisted advisor, Command Master Chief Brad Rheinlander, also seated behind me. These dedicated servant leaders bring expertise and insights that have been invaluable as we advocate within the Department of Defense on behalf of of our SOF service members and their families. As a combat veteran Green Beret myself, the opportunity to work with these incredible teammates and represent our SOF enterprise is profoundly humbling and special. Today's global security environment has become increasingly complex. As AI and other technological advancements rapidly transform the character of warfare, threats from state and non-state actors continue to converge. Our global competitors actively seek to undermine the United States and our allies. Terrorist and transnational criminal networks continue to pose a serious threat to the homeland. In these turbulent times, my office, the Office of Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, or SOLIC, and the U.S. Special Operations Command remain at the forefront of our nation's strategic priorities. Representing less than 2% of the defense budget, our Special Operations Forces provide unique and outsized effects, adding exceptional value to the nation. Tasked with the most challenging and dangerous missions, SOF remain the world's most lethal, adaptable, and capable force. Our priorities for the SOF enterprise are squarely nested within Secretary Hegseth's priorities for the Joint Force: defend the homeland, strengthen deterrence, and increase burden sharing with U.S. allies and partners. Our elite warriors deter our adversaries by creating strategic, asymmetric advantages and maintaining irregular warfare superiority. Leveraging our close relationships with our foreign partners in critical regions, SOF are uniquely positioned to identify and counter our adversaries' malign and coercive activities. Whether in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Western Hemisphere, or near our own southern border, these low-cost, small-footprint efforts promote stability, empower partners and allies, and lead efforts against China, terrorists, drug traffickers, and other threats. Even with the global increase in demand, our Special Operations Forces face personnel cuts and resource constraints. In fact, armed conflict and regional instability have driven a 200% increase in our crisis response mission over the past three years, while at the same time operational and logistics costs for crisis response have increased 260%. We must ensure SOF's readiness while balancing operational demands and optimizing available resources. We must also promote accountability through rigorous analytics and data-driven decision-making. Congress wisely established civilian oversight of special operations to ensure that SOF remains strategically aligned, ethically grounded, and accountable. My office provides policy direction, resource advocacy, and oversight needed to ensure that SOF's initiatives and efforts stay focused on warfighter needs and national objectives without mission creep or undue strain on the force. This oversight is not bureaucratic. In fact, it is essential to effective warfighting. Our nation's security depends on a strong, agile, modern, modernized, and accountable SOF enterprise. With your support, we will continue ensuring that SOF is ready to deter, fight, and win anytime, anywhere. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I invite you to visit our SOF community around the globe to meet our service members and their families and to see firsthand the capabilities that we bring in defense of the nation. Your continued support is critical. I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Mr. Jenkins. And General Fenton, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Madam Chair Ernst, Ranking Member Slotkin, distinguished members of this subcommittee, Chairman Wicker when he comes, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. This month marks 38 years since the creation of Special Operations Command. We are thankful for Congress's incredible foresight in creating us and steadfast support ever since. I'm joined today by Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter. Shane exemplifies the unmatched caliber of our noncommissioned officer corps. If you look at the hardest problems facing our nation in the darkest corners of this earth, you will find our special operations noncommissioned officers solving them. Our NCOs exemplify the precision, lethality of your special operations teams and demonstrate our competitive and comparative advantage. They are the reason we are envied by militaries around the globe. It's the honor of a lifetime for Shane and me to represent the uniformed and civilian members of your Special Operations Command, as well as our U.S. interagency partners and the global SOF warriors from 28 nations who are stationed at our SOCOM headquarters in Tampa. I'm also honored today to testify alongside Secretary Jenkins from ASD SO/LIC. We rely on SO/LIC's partnership, support, and advocacy to ensure your special operations warriors and their families who serve alongside them continue to thrive and win. We are in an era of serious national security challenges: the border, Communist China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and terrorist organizations all pose significant threats in isolation. However, we're increasingly seeing these threats converge across the globe. Meanwhile, the changing character of war is changing at a rate faster than we've ever seen. The innovation cycle now turns in days and weeks, not months and years. Our adversaries use $10,000 one-way drones that we shoot down with $2 million missiles. That cost-benefit curve is upside down. To summarize, this is the most complex, asymmetric, and hybrid threat security environment I've seen in 38 years of service. Contending with these challenges demands more from your special operations forces. That requires tough choices, forcing trade-offs as we strike to balance an increase in operations, readiness, and the need for modernization. Your elite SOCOM team provides an outsized return on any investment. However, with only 3% of DOD's forces and less than 2% of DOD's budget, we are now playing a zero-sum game. Yet I'd submit your special operations forces are tailor-made for this era: rapidly responding to crisis, disrupting terrorist organizations, and asymmetrically deterring our adversaries. Employed expressly at the direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, SOCOM's crisis response mission is the nation's most lethal and surgical tool to eliminate threats to the homeland, rescue American citizens, protect our diplomats, all at a moment's notice. In the past 3 and a half years, the frequency of these presidentially directed missions significantly increased by 200%. Yet for this sacred obligation, we will accept no risk in today's crisis response mission. Some may think we're done fighting terror. I'd submit terror is not done with us. SOCOM's mission to degrade terrorist groups starts at our border, spans the globe. In recent months, your special operations team eliminated over 500 terrorists who had the intent and capability to strike the homeland. Alongside our global special operations partners, we've captured over 600. Aligned with the department's priorities, deterrence has long been a part of SOCOM's DNA. We are America's irregular warfare experts. We deter war by altering our adversaries' decision below the threshold of conflict, in the gray zone. We stand ready to prevail if deterrence fails. As combatant commands seek to strengthen deterrence, requests for SOCOM capabilities have increased by more than 35% in the last 2 years alone. Against that backdrop, we continue to grapple with years of flat budgets, a 14% decrease in buying power, significant personnel reductions, and the requirement to evolve our technology and authorities. All this forces trade-offs, tough choices that challenge current missions and puts modernization at risk. Yet SOCOM remains the world's premier special operations force. I pledge to always provide the nation with the best special operations capability for the fiscal and personnel resources we receive. We will never compromise on standards and lethality. We are grateful for this subcommittee's work on novel approaches to SOF funding and authorities. I look forward to taking your questions. Thank you.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, General Fenton. And we will start now with the senators' questions. I'll start with 5 minutes of questions and go on to the ranking member. If we have other members join, we will have them ask questions as well. If we don't have other members join, we will recess briefly and move to the closed hearing. So this may be a very speedy round, but I will go ahead and start. And General Fenton, so you mentioned the personnel reductions, reductions in force, and since the announcement of SOF personnel cuts under the previous administration, I have been very firmly and vocally opposed to that. The return on investment our nation gets from our special operations forces is not only measurable, it is absolutely unmatched. Despite those reductions, SOF continues to do what it does best. It's adapting, innovating, and overcoming. So General Fenton, can you speak to how SOF is adapting its training pipelines to enable future operators to integrate high-tech capabilities like AI, cyber, and electronic warfare more effectively?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I can. I would start by saying I think you know your SOF very well in terms of that we innovate, and I like to think we innovate for today and we modernize for tomorrow. And as we think about tomorrow, that's certainly through the lens of the lessons learned that we're watching vis-à-vis the events in Ukraine. And I think it's more important to not just observe those lessons, but as you laid out, institutionalize them. I think in the instance of institutionalization of those lessons, I would offer U.S. Army Special Operations, ARSOF, has undergone two what I think are pretty significant efforts against these changing character of war. First is they've created a brand new course, the Remote Uncrewed Systems Integration Course, down at Fort Bragg, a course that is about a six-week program of instruction bringing together everything from learning how to build the drone, fly drones, and then certainly adapt them as we have seen on the battlefield. The second thing they've done, I would characterize in terms of institutionalizing, is they've created a brand new military occupational specialty, or MOS, or job title, and that job title is Remote Systems Integrator, and they've created that around the backdrop of a Special Forces warrant officer, a Green Beret warrant officer. And after their training is complete, a multi-month program of instruction, they'll go back to the Special Forces groups and start to really take that as a master trainer and weave it into all group training. You would see that across many of our components, but I think, Senator, those are a couple of the examples I'd want to give you.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

No, that's great. And I think many of us recognize there's nothing more dangerous than a warrant officer. So appreciate that new MOS. So let's talk a little bit more about those cuts. A critical strength of SOF is their ability to lead on emerging technologies and developing those capabilities that kind of ripple across the broader force, and it speaks directly to the indispensable role that they play in today's complex threat environment. So any additional reductions that we might see in SOF wouldn't just impact our SOF; they would degrade our ability to project power around the globe. So General Fenton, from an operational perspective, how would further force reductions impact SOF's ability to respond to emerging threats in regions like INDOPACOM, Europe, and of course the Middle East?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Well, Senator, I would offer right out the gate that that would absolutely hurt. It would hurt fairly significantly, especially against the backdrop of, I think, over the last 3, 3 and a half years, we've seen a 5,000-person teammate reduction inside of SOCOM already. And that's against the backdrop of communications, logistics, intelligence, civil affairs, and PSYOP, and of course operators. I think all of those are the type of capabilities that you see combatant commanders, as I mentioned in my opening statement, asking for more and more, to the tune of about 35%, and I think that would absolutely impact that. We're already forced to make tough choices and trade-offs. Those would amplify those tough choices and trade-offs and really put us in a place where I mentioned earlier in the statement, we're already at a zero-sum game.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, and just in the time that I have remaining, can you please characterize the the situation that unfolds when we have SOF teams that are out on the ground as force multipliers? And one example that I'm thinking about, this is many years ago in Africa, when we had ODAs there, we were able to bring together many different nations. Those nations had teams on the ground as well, but they could not get along with the populations that exist in some of those regions. It took Americans and the leadership that these teams brought into Africa to bring all of these nationalities together into a collaborative force. Can you speak to how SOF really can provide that leadership in small teams, small numbers, without a huge footprint, and be able to bring different nations together?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

I can, Senator. Small teams, small footprints, big impact is the way I like to think about it. And I think that starts with the fact that in our DNA is partnering, and SOF is known as a premier partner force. That's what we do across the globe, and maybe even today, to the tune of about 7,000 folks in about 80 different countries. It's all about beginning partnerships, and those partnerships then evolve into trust. And once you get trust, then we're able to do everything: build partner capacity, develop some level of competency and capability, and I think it just goes on from there, and even do exactly as you just described, bring folks together who otherwise may not be together. And I think, at the end of the day, amplify capability and capacity for any combatant commander or for the Secretary of Defense.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, General Fenton. Ranking Member Slotkin.

Ranking Member Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. The senator had very similar questions to the ones I had about what are the trade-offs of these cuts, right? And for me, it's hard to miss that Space Force got excluded from having to take cuts, and I'm happy for them. That's a mission that's extremely important, but just would hope that if there's someone who's picking and choosing missions that are going to be cut versus protected, that I know you're advocating, but that sort of we realize that the units that are in highest demand should not be taking the same haircut as everybody else across the force. So hope that that's happening, and thank you for illustrating some of those trade-offs that you would have. I do want to understand what missions you have been tasked to do in recent months. As someone who is a CIA officer and a Middle East specialist and did three tours in Iraq, I am 100% with you that just because you don't hear about threats in the news every day doesn't mean they're not still out there plotting to kill Americans, attack the homeland, and do really devastating things. And we, of course, have nation-states that are causing all kinds of problems. But I did see that the president designated Mexican cartels, a number of named cartels, as foreign terrorist organizations, restricting in a positive way American citizens from providing support, materiel, leadership in any way to those organizations. Can you describe what, if any, guidance you've been getting and giving on lethal force against cartels on the southern border, given the buildup of about 10,000 U.S. forces down there?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Thank you. I can, I can begin with that, and then we can talk the details. The, the designation of foreign terrorist organization does not grant us any new authorities as a DOD entity. Is what it really does is it helps us unlock the doors to whole-of-government approach. Our foreign— our threat finance analysts can now better provide their target packets to our, our counterparts in the, in the whole-of-government approach. But what it— but what we do What we are doing now is making sure that we provide options, that we can be ready, lethal, and prepared should the president need us to continue to seal and protect the border. But, but to answer your question directly, it does not grant us any new authorities to take direct action or so forth.

Ranking Member Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)SPEAKER_02

So you would need commander-in-chief authority to go, for instance, and pursue drone attacks inside Mexico against cartels? I'm just asking. Mr. Musk said publicly that that foreign terrorist designation authorizes drone strikes against Mexican cartels inside Mexico. I'm just trying to understand fact from fiction here. Do you believe you have that authority today, understanding the designation alone may not give it to you? Do you believe you have the authority today to cross over the Mexican border and use drone strikes to go after cartels?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

No, ma'am. The designation of FTO does not grant us any new authority.

Ranking Member Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)SPEAKER_02

Separate from the FTO designation, do you, as the service secretary, believe you have that? I'm just trying to understand. I'm not I have no problem with them being designated. I have no problem going against them and their financing, right? Their materiel. But I think, certainly, as part of this committee, we want to understand use of lethal force in a neighboring state. So is there, in any way, separate from FTO designation, do you currently have the authority to shoot down, shoot at Mexican cartels over the border right now?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

No, ma'am.

Ranking Member Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)SPEAKER_02

Okay. Thank you for clarifying. And then, I think a lot of us on the committee are very worried about Taiwan and a potential problem with China over the next few years. I'm the co-chair of the Taiwan Caucus, so we think about this a lot. Can you give me your best assessment of what our security assistance activities there, our training—maybe we have to go into classified session, but would appreciate your role in deterrence, understanding the role you're playing in that issue?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, we'll absolutely have to go into a closed session to provide details. What I would offer is that, in support of INDOPACOM, you would see your special operations forces doing many of the missions you described earlier, certainly always being prepared for crisis response inside that AOR through our theater Special Operations Command, Special Ops Command Pacific. That is a sacred obligation. I think you would also see us in a counterterrorism way, making sure that any CT threats, in this case ISIS East Asia, we're doing in a partnered way with teammates in that region. And then I think you would see us certainly in deterrence. And the way we present ourselves is presence, is placement and access. It builds relationships and partnerships and capability. And all that, I think, is very valuable to Sam Paparo, any COCOM commander, because it provides options and opportunities they wouldn't otherwise have, and dilemmas and challenges to the adversary.

Ranking Member Elissa Slotkin (D-MI)SPEAKER_02

Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. And next we will go to Senator Budd. Thank you.

Senator Ted Budd (R-NC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Chairman. Again, thank you all for being here. General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins, thank you both for testifying before the committee on SOF. So, I was grateful for the opportunity to travel with Chairman Wicker last year to JSOC at Fort Bragg and to talk about the important work that SOF is doing, not only in North Carolina, but around the world. General Fenton, how would you characterize the demand and requirements for Special Operations Forces, particularly in crisis response? General Fenton.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, first, thanks for visiting our forces, and thanks for allowing us to be in the great state of North Carolina. Our

Senator Ted Budd (R-NC)SPEAKER_05

honor.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

appreciate all the hospitality there. I know all our forces do. I would offer, in my opening statement, I laid out a couple. I think in terms of crisis response, we have seen a pace and a scale and duration that I frankly have not seen in my 20 to 30 years in the special operations community. It is called on more, so there's a requirement that's gone up by 200% in the last 3 and 1/2 years. That's on or about 15 missions where we've been asked to get out very quickly and do the type of missions that I mentioned: either recover diplomats, protect an embassy, or at some point maybe even recover a U.S. citizen. I think I don't anticipate the world to get any less volatile, and that looks like a pattern to me. And so I think that demand has certainly gone up. In deterrence, the combatant commanders have asked for special operations in the last 2 years at an increase of about 35% to do the type of missions that they're looking for us to do that could involve anything from partner-based training to unilateral operations that would give them additional opportunities and advantages, maybe an unfair, outsized advantage, and give the adversaries a bunch of dilemmas and challenges. So I think I anticipate that going up. And then I just mentioned earlier, terrorism is not done with us, and I think we absolutely have to stay focused on the threat that ISIS, al-Qaeda, and now Shabaab pose. And those all three of those missions are absolutely in SOF wheelhouse.

Senator Ted Budd (R-NC)SPEAKER_05

General, talk a little bit about, you gave some numbers, 35% increase in area, 200% in another area. When you're called upon, how often do you have to say no because of that increased demand and perhaps the lack of readiness or rest or requirements that are needed?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I think that that question is at the heart of something the command sergeant major and I think about every day. That's risk. And I think, in this case, that risk is a combination of operational risk, do we have the capability and the capacity, and then, for the first time, certainly in my memory, fiscal constraint risk, can we actually do it? I think that drives to the heart of I've had to say no in some instances in deterrence where I feel like I am taking risk almost 41 times in the last year to combatant commanders that would want Special Forces operational detachments, so 12 Green Berets, folks who may want command and control nodes. And I could go on and on and give you additional examples in a closed session. But I think it's certainly way too often, and my sense is that, first, that is risk. We're not meeting the combatant commanders' demands in a special ops-peculiar way. I'm also taking risk in modernization. And, in a sense, I feel like I'm saying no to the SOCOM enterprise when we don't have the top-line increase in the budget needed to modernize not only technology, but certainly our humans. So we think about education for an uncertain world, that's modernization, and on top of that, certainly, even our authorities. So I think I say no way too much, and in those two categories: to combatant commanders and deterrence, and frankly, to where we need to be as a SOCOM enterprise to win tomorrow, just like we've been winning today and in the past years.

Senator Ted Budd (R-NC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you for that, and lots of other questions either for the record or the closed session. Mr. Jenkins, again, thank you for being here. See if you're tracking this provision in the Senate fiscal year '26 NDAA includes a provision requiring the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC and the commander of Special Operations to ensure the annual Defense Planning Guidance includes specific guidance for requirements and employments of Special Operation Forces across the spectrum of conflict. Are you tracking that, sir, and care to elaborate?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Yes, and thank you for that very much. So, with our interim national defense strategic guidance, we have three lines of effort: defend the homeland, deter China, and increased burden-sharing. And the only force that can fill in or blend across all three lines of effort there is the special operations force. And in my service-like capacity, I've been able to advocate and make sure that as the defense planning guidance goes forward and now gets underway in earnest, that my peers, my counterparts, ensure that SOF is adequately and thoroughly accounted for in all three lines of effort there, and not just as an asterisk, that we play a major part.

Senator Ted Budd (R-NC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you both again. It appears I'm out of time. Chairman Reed, you're recognized.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

Thank you very much, Senator Budd. Gentlemen, thank you for your service and your sacrifice and that of your family. And I endorse your tribute to the noncommissioned officers, General Fenton.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

yeah,

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

I would be in Fort Leavenworth, not the military side, the other side, without my NCO. So thank you.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

I think we all would.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

Yes, sir. Mr. Jenkins, SOLIC is a work in progress, and I think we're making great progress. We want, as we envisioned, a service secretary-like civilian overlooking those special operations. And I would note in the prepared posture statement for today, it says, "SOLIC requires the requisite tools, workforce, and resources to accelerate the implementation of these priorities and enable special operations to be the most effective, disciplined, and strategically relevant force it can be." Could you tell us what additional tools, workforce, and resources you need?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

First, thank you, and thank you to Congress for having the vision and foresight to make sure that SOLIC exists, that we do have the tools that we do have right now. And I'd just like to point out, thanks to Section 922 and Congress's vision, you can see the physical manifestation back here with Dr. Sandra Hobson, who's the first to sit in that position that 922 facilitated. So we are underway in establishing the service secretariat side of special operations, and that's thanks to Congress. So we welcome your continued engagement and reinforcement. In terms of additional authorities or funding that we would need, we certainly welcome that, your continued engagement. One area that comes to mind is in the realm of talent management. We want to make sure that SOF officers and enlisted leaders, that we have the ability as SOF enterprise leaders to advocate for their advancement just like our service counterparts would for theirs as well. As a Green Beret, I come from the Army, but I'm also a SOF officer, and so we want to make sure that we have that. Then in terms of acquisition authorities, we welcome additional discussion on how we can have more agile, more abundant acquisition authority so that we can answer the need of those quick problems that we encounter out on the battlefield and be able to innovate and modernize and fund those accordingly.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

Thank you very much. And General Fenton, from your perspective, have you seen the benefits of this empowered senior civilian like Secretary

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, absolutely. I think this will be my third time at this table saying how critical it is, how much we appreciate the work this Congress has done in that arena. I think the first thing I I offered you before, and maybe even yesterday, and thank you for the office call, was that having Secretary Jenkins at the service secretary tables along with the SecDef, representing special operations and SOCOM issues, is critical. And I think about that on the service side of the of the SOCOM organization. Also, advocating for issues that support our service members, our civilians, and our family members, and those run the gamut: certainly the Human Performance Program, Preservation of the Force and Family, and many other items that we have inside of our enterprise. I would also offer, in terms of thinking through modernization and, certainly, transformation, so I think there's a great deal that we've been able to achieve together as a team of teams in the SOF enterprise.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

Well, thank you very much. After some notable civilian casualties several years ago, the Department of Defense set up the Civilian Harm Center of Excellence. In last year's prepared statement submitted, it pointed out that, These policies and procedures outlined by the department through the center assist with counter-violent extremist organizations' efforts, as they prevent the underlying dynamics from creating more extremism. I think, in layman's terms, it means if you're out there and you're hurting a lot of civilians, the reaction is the enemy gets more recruits, essentially. But I've heard public indications that the department is considering to rescind the policy guidance and to eliminate the Center of Excellence. Mr. Jenkins, what's your understanding of that?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Well, first, Senator, thank you for pointing that out. We, we agree that the ability and requirement to, to mitigate and limit civilian harm on the battlefield is our paramount responsibility for us. And, and, and second, it's the law. It's the law. And so we, we have to be responded to that. I can also say there have been no decisions made on, on what, what the program may be called or the form that it will take, but, but the requirement and the, and the need to report back and make sure that we are always mitigating civilian harm will always be present, no matter what it's called or how it looks.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

And again, let me emphasize the point, it's not only the law and the sense of humanity, it's also a very practical situation because by antagonizing the population you lose ground against irregulars, you don't gain it. Just general final question, can you say if SOCOM has received adequate support from the center and that you've had— it's been an asset to your operations?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I'm not sure— from the center?

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

From the center.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I think certainly, as we've thought through it, I go back to Secretary Jenkins' piece. We absolutely, as your SOCOM team, always aim to do the mission, especially in the kinetic ops that you're referring to, and then protect noncombatants and civilians, as part of who we are and what we stand for. And I think to your point, that sends a very powerful message across the globe that we're there to eliminate or disrupt the bad actor, yet, at the same time, protect innocents and vulnerable and noncombatants. That's a very different signal from a nation, and that's what your SOCOM team works for every day.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jack Reed (D-RI)SPEAKER_06

Madam Chairman, thank you.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Ranking Member. We'll recognize now Senator Kelly for five minutes of questions.

Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ)SPEAKER_07

Thank you, Madam Chair. General Fenton, in your opening statement, you highlighted your flat budget since 2019, which appears to be a 14% decrease in purchasing power. And SOCOM has also faced some significant personnel cuts over the past years. Is it fair to say right now that the demand for special operations forces continues to increase? Is that a fair observation?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, Senator, that's absolutely a fair characterization, as I've laid out in the opening statement.

Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ)SPEAKER_07

And so where, with this flat budget, then where have you assumed any additional risk because of budgetary and personnel constraints?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I'd actually offer two places. In the operational arena, we've assumed risk in deterrence. As I mentioned in the opening statement, I'll assume no risk in crisis response today. That is a sacred obligation. And as we go across the spectrum in deterrence, as I've laid out, there have been instances where I've had to say no to combatant commander requirements because of operational risk and fiscal constraints in a way I haven't seen before. So first in operations deterrence. Second is in modernization, working to have the SOCOM team, and at times tying it to the joint force for sure, be able to win in the future environment like we have won for years and years and years in an increasingly contested and congested environment. We're taking risks there. The inability to get after the things I think that are asymmetric, that are part of the changing character of war, do it at speed—you could add anything uncrewed, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, autonomy, all that—I think we're accruing high risk because we at SOCOM are not able to get after that, based on a flat top line. On five years, $1 billion in lost buying power, that is reflective of that 14% lost buying power.

Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ)SPEAKER_07

Would it be fair for me to say then that a risk in deterrence, because of the— if you're not deterring our adversaries, there's a higher chance you're going to have to put some of your troops in harm's way, that the risk to your forces personally, risk to them being injured or killed in combat, that that has gone up? And I think it's probably fair to say the same thing on the modernization side of this, if you're using— if you don't have the equipment you need and you're facing a more challenging adversary, that that's possibly putting folks at risk as well?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I'll take it from the modernization piece first. I think, first and foremost, the risk is not winning, not being able to complete the mission in the future environment. Again, against the backdrop of what we're seeing in Ukraine, with the changing character of war that has—I call it a version of symmetry and asymmetry. Symmetry being all the things, and certainly the Russian Federation had, that any nation needs to go to war—tanks and missiles and airplanes and helicopters—and then asymmetry where Ukraine did not have that and has imposed costs on the Russian Federation through all things that we're observing, institutionalizing, operationalizing. I think we're taking risks there, and that risk is about winning. It certainly has a force protection component to it, because if you're unable to get through the contested and congested battlespace of integrated air-missile defense, radio frequency spectrums knocking your things down, electronic warfare, there is a force protection component for sure to that. And I look at both, but I think it's both of those in modernization. In deterrence, I think it's more about aggregated risk, us not being able to fulfill parts of a campaign plan or an OPLAN that the combatant commanders absolutely would rely on, and that probably at some point has aggregated risk for his end states and certainly their operations.

Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ)SPEAKER_07

All right, thank you, General. And Mr. Jenkins, on China gray-zone operations, they execute this all the time as an instrument of national power and in their effort to supplant us as the world's preeminent superpower. So, what adjustments in, just quickly, in statute or fiscal authorities would you need to better compete and deter the PRC?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

In terms of authorities, we we are working sufficiently and and efficiently with with what we have right now. It comes down to what what the general outlined in terms of resources. We clearly recognize that deterring China is not just in the South China Sea or the first island chain. It's everywhere. And in the closed session, we'll be able to give you some good vignettes on where we are going head-to-head to deter in the irregular warfare arena to make sure that we not only meet China where they are, but where they want to be, where they where they're trying to be. And so in terms of authorities, we're we're moving out and executing on what we have, but we're always looking to to evolve with them as well.

Senator Mark Kelly (D-AZ)SPEAKER_07

All right, if you identify something, please come to us with that. Thank you. Thank

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

you, Madam Chair.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Senator Kelly. And now I recognize SASC Chairman Senator Wicker.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

Well, thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Senator Kelly, as you leave, because I'm going to follow up on the very important lines of questioning that you pursued. I was planning on asking about what extra things your command has been required to do for less buying power, but let's talk about the gray zone and follow up if we can on that. Do you find that there's not enough coordination in the irregular warfare field, and would you recommend any changes in the way our Defense Department is organized with regard to no one having a particular domain over that particular issue and coordinating it across the various commands?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Well, thank you for pointing that out. Certainly over the last 20 years plus, we've seen our counterterrorism muscle be exercised tremendously and our irregular warfare muscle not so much, but nowadays we are certainly exercising that muscle and meeting and deterring, as the senator alluded, China where they are and where they're trying to be. SOLIC itself—

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

okay, what are they— tell, uh, tell us and those listening what sort of things specifically, some examples of what the Chinese are doing.

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Well, Senator, certainly we can get into more details in the closed session, but it's safe to say where areas where you would not think China is, they are. They're trying to be there, not only in the South China Sea, the first island chain, but in the Southern Hemisphere. And we have specific examples that we can point to to show where we have met, deterred, and even ejected their influence from certain areas. And so it's incumbent upon us to not only just be counter-terrorist experts, but also irregular warfare specialists.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

You can talk about the economic warfare in, in this hearing, can you not?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

For sure. Yes, sir. And that's, as you alluded to, it's in China, it's a whole-of-government approach when it comes to economic warfare, and that's what General Fenton's actually starting a new program to bring that together, to harness not only attention amongst our economic machines here in the United States, but to show them where they could draw their power to help our nation as well.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

Okay. So are we organized sufficiently in this area, or should one office, one person be in charge of coordinating this, for either of you?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

in the irregular warfare arena, we are sufficiently organized within SOLIC. We have a team, an actual DASD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, that has irregular warfare within its charter that it's responsible for, and leads through the department in terms of helping combatant commands draw campaign plans that involve irregular warfare, and educating throughout the joint force in terms of irregular warfare is not just a SOF opportunity, it's a whole-of-Department of Defense opportunity.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I would add, I think for now sufficiently organized, as we talk and work through this, it's through Secretary Jenkins on their policy side, and I think for SOCOM, it's unequivocal that we do irregular warfare, and our components and our operational elements know it, they go back to the SOCOM headquarters or geographic combatant commanders. What I would offer is I think it's always worth relooking because of the pace of the world and the way the world's changing at all type of levels, and I talk about modernizing authorities, and I think it's always good to keep an eye on things so we're not complacent, or even as we think about technology, how fast it's moved, my sense is there's certainly a need to relook authorities to make sure that they have not stayed stagnant or they have moved as fast as we need them.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

Okay. Well, I might want to have a conversation, an ongoing conversation with you, General, and for as long as I can, Mr. Jenkins, about how we could perhaps make the coordination better in this area. We're We're intruding on the time, Madam Chair, but let me just say, there's been a 35% increase from the COCOMs for your capabilities in the last 3 years. Is that right, General?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

That's correct, Senator.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

and a 170% increase in, in SOCOM crisis response missions, including but not limited to hostage rescues.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Yes, sir. In fact, we just updated the numbers after we got a chance to see, and I think today I reported 200% in 3 and a half years.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

Okay, all right, instead of 170%. And then manpower cuts of nearly 5,000 personnel in recent years, how have those come about?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Well, Senator, a couple things. I think through the lens of the defense planning scenario and the work that the service has to do along with the department against any potential scenario, and I'll leave it at that because we could talk more in a classified session, my sense is that services took a look at the lens that they were given through those scenarios and came away with, we don't need x number of SOF. And over time, my sense is that that continued certainly to gain traction in the department. And as a result, I think you're very aware of a point last year where Secretary of Defense Austin made a decision to reduce SOF by 3,000 people.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

Well, have these crisis response requests gone unanswered,

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator?

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

That is the thing you're facing with the lack of funding and the lack of purchasing power and cuts of 5,000.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

As I said in my opening statement, crisis response is the one place that I'm taking no risk. So we put everything we have against the crisis response today because our sense is that is a sacred obligation, presidentially directed, SecDef directed. We cannot fail.

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

And so the other things that you, that you might put behind those crisis response things might be, for example?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I feel like we are absolutely taking risks in 2 places: modernization, and deterrence. Deterrence would be that mission that we are taking risk in, and we're taking risk because in my sense we are unable to answer the combatant commander's requirements to the level that they have requested and certainly need, and when I look at that, that is risk to them and certainly risk to your soft forces, and that we're not bringing the value that we could be bringing to the combatant commands. In preventing, great power conflict and certainly preparing for

Full Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R-MS)SPEAKER_04

it. One other thing, Madam Chair, I just hope the General understands the committee's position on both sides of the dais, that we need to hear fully from you on your unfunded requirements. Tell us what you need, be honest about it, and we'll try to get it for you, but we have found that some places within within our defense establishment. They're reluctant to actually be honest with us about all the requirements that remain unfunded. And thank you for your indulgence, Madam Chair.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Chairman. You got

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

my commitment to that, Senator.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, General Fenton. Next, I will recognize Senator Shaheen. Five minutes.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Madam Chair. So, Mr. Jenkins, you talked about feeling confident about our irregular warfare capacity. Where do you put information operations in that irregular warfare?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Thank you for pointing that out, because irregular warfare is just like when you think about a kinetic strike. There are irregular warfare strikes that are just as potent or valuable or important and need to be timed accordingly. And so, the coordination for information operations actually resides within SOLIC, within my organization. And so we have the unique opportunity to coordinate across the combatant commands, not only within DOD, but also with our sister agencies, with the Agency, with Department of State. And so those information operation plans are coordinated so that messages are comprehensive and complementary—was the word I was trying to think of—instead of getting each other off track, and timed accordingly. So it's very important.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

Well, I understand that you have the ability to coordinate. I'm concerned, General Fenton, you talked about the 3,000-person cuts to SOF, and my understanding is that many of those were enablers for the Military Information Support Operations, or MISO. Is that correct?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

That's correct, Senator.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

I am concerned about our ability to compete in those information operations. We had a hearing in the Foreign Relations Committee at the beginning of the year where our China experts said that China is spending $1.1 billion a year on information operations, disinformation, misinformation. And right now we've completely dismantled our humanitarian and foreign aid presence in the regions where China has a foothold. We don't have anybody in charge of information operations across, as far as I can tell, now maybe we do and I just don't know about it, across Defense, State, and the administration. And the president just fired General Haugh, the head of Cyber Command. So help me understand how we're able to compete in the information arena when we don't have anybody in charge and when we've lost a lot of our people who are doing that work?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Yes, ma'am. In terms of that, who's actually in charge and in coordination for the Department of Defense, that would fall by by default to my organization because I'm I I support the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who is the principal information operation advisor to the SecDef. And so we do we do have a coordination body and ability to do that. And And I have a a full-time team that that's organizing organizing and actively engaging with the combatant commands in terms of funding, also in messaging. And then they work outwardly with our state and agency partners so that if one mess- if one agency is going to employ a a message or an information operation, it's adequately coordinated with the others so that we don't have fracticide.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

So, if China's spending over a billion dollars a year on their messaging strategy, how much are we spending in the Department of Defense on our messaging strategy?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Ma'am, I'd have to get back to you with that, that specific number. But what we are doing is we're trying to make sure that we are good stewards.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

Is it fair to say we're not spending $1 billion a year?

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Correct. Yes, ma'am, that is fair.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

Significantly less.

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Significantly less. We are trying to be smart with every penny for sure.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

It's not likely that we're able to match the operations that China is doing despite our intention and the fact that we think we can do it better, because we don't have the infrastructure to do that. We've dismantled our Global Engagement Center at the Department of State. We're dismantling Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, all of the media that we've relied on really since the Cold War to get messaging across to accurately reflect the position of the United States against our adversaries. So again, I would ask you, General Fenton, do you think you have—should we be doing more to resource those information operations?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Well, Senator, you and I have talked about this for quite some time. My sense, I'll start with information operations are absolutely critical. There's a sense of you may not win a war with information operations like you could with artillery, you can certainly lose it if you're not a key part of that and putting out the messages. And I would offer, I think as the United States of America, we've got a great message to tell, and my sense is that there is a void, you mentioned misinformation, disinformation by any adversary, there's a void out there that's not being filled by our message. I think we take it certainly in Special Operations Command with our information ops professionals to really work at that, in concert with more often than not our country teams, our embassy country teams, to put those messages out that assure populations or reassure and also, at points in time, deter adversaries. That is also part of the information operations space. So thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH)SPEAKER_03

Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Senator Shaheen. We'll move to Senator Rosen.

Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)SPEAKER_00

Well, thank you, Chairwoman Ernst, Ranking Member Slotkin, for holding this hearing. It's very important. I'd also like to thank General Fenton and Mr. Jenkins for testifying today and for your service— excuse me, I'm going to scoot in a little bit here— service to our nation. I want to talk about Special Operations Forces in Syria, because the U.S. and Syria— Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF, they share an interest in preventing an ISIS resurgence in northeastern Syria. Any escalation in the region, which is Turkish-backed Syrian National Army and the central government in Damascus engage militarily with the SDF, would lead to instability that we know ISIS could exploit. That is extremely concerning, as is the possibility that such instability, combined with destabilizing efforts from Iran and its proxies, could cause SDF personnel guarding ISIS prisons and displaced persons camps to leave their posts in order to defend their territory. This would open the door to the possible escape of captured ISIS fighters and their families, as we saw that just play out in 2019. So, General Fenton, given our SOF partnership with the SDF in the Defeat ISIS campaign, including security training and assistance, what are SOF and the SDF doing to prevent breakouts from SDF-run prisons and displaced persons camps to ensure that captured ISIS fighters and their families do not return to the battlespace? I know this is a question that geographically pertains to CENTCOM, but our troops performing these counterterrorism missions are Special Operations Forces.

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I think the very first thing we do is partner with our SDF partners. It's almost a decade now, and I can get back and certainly provide written, on the record, how long we've done it, but I think it's about a decade, is disrupt, degrade, and work to defeat ISIS in Syria. It's a threat certainly to the United States, as we've laid out before and many of the committees that have come before you have talked about it. But I think the first thing we do is disrupt and degrade ISIS along with the SDF counterparts. That certainly vectors into protecting the prisons and the camps, and I think that, if you look at it, that's keeping improvised explosive ISIS bombers from attacking those, creating a level of or opportunities for breakout, that is taking action in places that may not be close to the camps, but we know have planning going on in the camps. So, I think there's many things your SOF team is doing along with our SDF partners to first and foremost, and that is the mission, disrupt and degrade and diminish ISIS as per the CENTCOM and SecDef direction, and also protect those camps from a breakout, and a prison as well.

Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)SPEAKER_00

Thank you, and I'm going to direct this question to both of you staying on the same topic, because how does the continued elimination of ISIS leadership, and which SOF you have accomplished time and time again, impact ISIS's ability to plan and carry out attacks on U.S. forces and SDF-run prisons and displaced persons camps? And what are we doing more specifically to degrade Iranian-aligned militias from attacking or attempting to attack U.S. and coalition forces? And Mr. Jenkins, we can start with you and go on to the general, please.

Colby C. JenkinsSPEAKER_08

Thank you, ma'am. And we we see all those those problems clear-eyed for sure, and thank you for sharing that that concern with us. As General Fenton alluded to, looking at what SOF can control, what we can do in this space, we take that very seriously. We are at the leading edge to make sure that our SDF partners can can maintain control of those prisons, that they can repatriate where appropriate and when possible so that we can decrease the population of potential breakout under under difficult situations. And then in terms of decreasing malign influence, we we have to make sure that, similar to China, that we are deterring wherever possible, whether it's at the at the level of armed conflict or below with irregular warfare. We have the ability and lots of tools across the spectrum to make sure that we are deterring them from being in the battlespace where they want to be and where they're trying to be.

Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)SPEAKER_00

Thank you. General Fenton, anything to add?

General Bryan P. FentonSPEAKER_09

Senator, I would offer on on the ISIS piece, I think is very important, as you've alluded to, to keep the pressure on ISIS by degrading their leadership, their operational the operationally experienced personnel, the communicators, financiers. All these things come together for attacks not only in the Middle East against our forces, and that is force protection as we take it, but also in Europe and and against our homeland. ISIS is an EXOPS threat, so I think that's that is the the the multiple responsibility for your special operations teammates. Not only ISIS, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda, but getting after these layers is really important to keep any of those terrorist groups from being able to plan and execute a attack on the homeland.

Senator Jacky Rosen (D-NV)SPEAKER_00

Thank you. I'll yield back, but I'm going to actually ask a question for the record about the Houthi relations with al-Shabaab. So I'm glad you brought that up because it's critically important we discuss that as well. Thank you.

Chairman Joni Ernst (R-IA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Senator Rosen. And at this time, we will recess for about 7 minutes, which will give us time to move over to the SVC-217, and we will go into a closed hearing at that point. So I call a recess.