Unmanned and Unchecked: Confronting the Rising Threat of Malicious Drone Use in America

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Order. Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare recess at any time. I apologize to everyone for starting a little over an hour late. We had votes that kind of took up more time than we thought.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Welcome, everyone, to today's hearing on the rising threat of malicious drone use in America. And I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls, to lead us in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

If you please stand and join me in honoring our nation's flag.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

Thank you.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I appreciate everyone being here today. In this hearing we have before us, we're focusing on unmanned aerial systems and how these systems are being exploited by criminal elements. This issue is no longer confined to science fiction or battlefield environments. It's now increasingly disrupting daily life in America. Over the past several years, UAS technology has rapidly advanced, becoming more affordable, more accessible, and more capable. While this has fueled innovation in commerce, public safety, and emergency response, it has also led to opportunities for abuse by criminals and adversaries alike. The threats we face today from drones are not theoretical. They're real, and they demand urgent attention. Between January and June of this year, the FAA recorded more than 1,000 UAS incursions near U.S. airports, a nearly 13% increase from the same period last year. Each of these incidents represents not just a violation of restricted airspace, but a potential catastrophe for passenger safety. Despite some progress like Remote ID, our response architecture is fragmented. Remote ID helps with accountability, but it does not yet integrate into real-time air traffic management or provide automatic alerts to airport security. Additionally, most of our airports lack dedicated counter-UAS systems. Legal restrictions further complicate matters, limiting who can respond in real time. The problem does not end with aviation safety. Criminal networks are adapting UAS technology for nefarious purposes: dropping contraband into prisons, smuggling drugs and weapons across the U.S.-Mexican border, surveilling law enforcement, and in some cases experimenting with weaponization. Correctional facilities are continuing to face surging drone drops of drugs, phones, and weapons. The stealth, speed, and GPS-guided precision of modern drones make it difficult for correctional officers to detect or intercept them without specialized training or technology. These drops enable organized criminal activity within prison walls, disrupt inmate discipline, and threaten the safety of staff and inmates alike. U.S. Northern Command leadership reported that over 1,000 drones cross into U.S. airspace from the Mexican border each month, with CBP agents noting that in Texas along the Rio Grande Valley alone over 10,000 drone incursions and 25,000 drone sightings occurred in 2024. Unlike conventional smuggling methods, drones offer cartels a cost-effective and low-risk means to deliver small payloads while avoiding direct encounters with U.S. law enforcement. CBP and DOD recently recorded 70 incursions in 11 days around around Laredo, prompting the deployment of Stryker units to bolster surveillance. Equipped with features like night vision and the ability to operate below radar thresholds, these drones present a stealthy and persistent challenge to border security. Despite this growing threat, CBP lacks the authority to disable or intercept UAS in most circumstances, limiting its ability to respond effectively in real time. National Special Security Events, NSSEs, such as presidential inaugurations, political conventions, high-profile sporting events, are increasingly vulnerable to drone-based threats due to their symbolic value, dense crowds, and media visibility. While federal agencies like the U.S. Secret Service, FBI, and DHS are authorized to deploy counter-UAS capabilities at National Special Security Events under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, these efforts are intense and confined to a limited number of of events each year. DOJ officials testified that that counter-UAS protections are typically planned months in advance and require substantial coordination with the FAA to ensure legitimate airspace operations are not inadvertently affected. As a result, thousands of public events that fall outside the NSSE designation lack any UAS mitigation coverage, even as drone incidents rise nationally. The expanding use of drones in public spaces also introduces new risks for first responders. In active shooter, protest, or hazardous material scenarios, the presence of unauthorized drones can obstruct airspace, delay delay medevac or surveillance operations, and even be used to track responder positions or deliver harmful payloads. Many of these tools are restricted under federal law and cannot be used by state or local entities without explicit authorization. Additionally, these systems must be miniaturized, cost-effective, and interoperable with existing emergency response infrastructure to be viable at scale. The dominance of Chinese manufacturers, particularly DJI, in the global drone market raises significant espionage concerns. Under Chinese law, companies are legally obligated to cooperate with Chinese national intelligence authorities, which amplifies the risk that drones supplied by these firms can transmit sensitive data back to foreign governments. As of today, DJI holds nearly 90% of the consumer drone market and approximately 75% in commercial sectors. Multiple policy reviews and commentaries warn that adversarial actors may exploit these supply chain vulnerabilities to gather intelligence on U.S. critical infrastructure, military bases, research facilities, and emergency operations. The threat is persistent and accelerating, and it will take a coordinated alignment of resources, technology, and authorities to contain it. This hearing serves an important step to confront and combat malicious drone use across the country and beyond. I look forward to hearing what our witnesses say in a lively discussion. And now, without objection, I want to enter into the record an article entitled "Increasing Drone Incidents Near U.S. Airports, Stadiums Prompt Alarm, Officials Say," and Drones Lifting Inmates Out of Prisons: UK Inspector Says It's a Theoretical Possibility. Without objection. And now I yield back and recognize the ranking member of the entire committee, Mr. Raskin, for his opening statement.

Full Committee Ranking Member Jamie Raskin (D-MD)SPEAKER_04

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the rising threat posed by unmanned aircraft systems, commonly known as drones. The FAA reports that over a million drones are now registered in the U.S. for a broad range of commercial and recreational purposes. Government agencies also use them to improve diverse public safety operations, including search and rescue, disaster response, crime scene investigation, even traffic enforcement. But like any technology, including AI-enabled technology, which this subcommittee discussed earlier in the summer, drones can also be used for unlawful purposes like delivering contraband to inmates in prison or ferrying fentanyl across the northern and southern borders of our country. In 2023, in my home state in Maryland, 15 people were indicted as part of a criminal network that used drones to smuggle fentanyl and other drugs, cell phones, tools, and other contraband into the Roxbury Correctional Institution in Hagerstown. I'm sure that many of my colleagues have similar stories from their own states. The DOJ is one of five federal agencies with drone detection and mitigation authority, which allows the department to detect, track, and even destroy drones that pose a credible threat to federal courthouses, prisons, and large gatherings. The FBI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons are also able to utilize some counter-drone detection systems. In fact, earlier this year, BOP reported the agency has deployed such systems at 64 facilities, which have helped detect malicious drone use, better inform law enforcement of incoming threats, and locate suspected criminal drone operators. Today, as we discuss law enforcement efforts to respond to malicious drone activity and the use of drones to enhance public safety, we must be mindful of the risks associated with the detection and mitigation of drones, as well as the need to respect the privacy interests and civil liberties of the public in the process. We must make sure that law enforcement uses both drone and counter-drone technology correctly, safely, and always within the bounds of the law. That's why I was pleased to join the chairs and ranking members of the Transportation Infrastructure Committee and the Homeland Security Committee to introduce H.R. 5061, the Counter-UAS Authority, Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act. The bill, which was reported favorably by the Transportation Infrastructure Committee by a remarkable vote of 60 to 0, would reauthorize, reform, and expand the existing counter-unmanned aircraft system, or counter-UAS authorities of the Homeland Security Department and the DOJ. Among other provisions, the bipartisan bill would, for the first time, expand these authorities to state and local law enforcement through a carefully calibrated pilot program. The bill would also establish training standards for these agencies to meet before they can operate counter-UAS systems and minimum performance requirements for counter-UAS technology before it can be deployed, ensuring these systems are used safely and solely within the strictures of the law. I trust today's hearing will convince my colleagues of the need to support this bill, and that we will see swift, unanimous passage of it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of our witnesses for being here. I look forward to hearing from you, and I yield back.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

The gentleman yields. Thank you. Without objection, all other opening statements will be included in the record. And now we will introduce today's witnesses. We will begin with Dr. Catherine Cahill. Dr. Cahill is the director of the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration, ACUASI, and the Geophysical Institute at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA UAS test sites, heads the FAA's Alaska BEYOND site, and is a core university in the FAA's Center of Excellence for UAS Research. Dr. Cahill has served as a member of the FAA's Drone Advisory Committee and Advanced Aviation Advisory Committee. Thank you for being with us today, Dr. Cahill. Dr. Ryan Wallace is a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. His research focuses on UAS safety, security, human factors, and public policy. Dr. Wallace has conducted training seminars for federal agencies on the topics of UAS safety operations and counter-UAS techniques. He also serves as a representative on the FAA's Drone Safety Team and served in the U.S. Air Force. Thank you for being with us, Dr. Wallace. Mr. Brett Feddersen is the Vice President for Strategy and Government Affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a manufacturer of counter-drone systems for the military, law enforcement, and others. He also serves as the chair of the Security Industry Association's Drone Security Subcommittee. He previously served as the Executive Director for National Security Programs and Incident Response at the FAA and in various roles at the Pentagon, the White House, in the U.S. Army, and as a Pennsylvania state trooper. Thank you, Mr. Feddersen, for being with us today. And next is Sergeant Robert Dooley. Sergeant Dooley has served for more than 22 years with the Florida Highway Patrol, where he is currently the UAS and C-UAS program coordinator. He developed and has led the FHP's UAS program since its inception. Sergeant Dooley is an expert in law enforcement UAS operations, disaster response operations, and special event and high-value target UAS security operations. Thank you all for being with us today. We will begin by swearing you in, and ask that you would each rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear or affirm, under penalty of perjury, that the testimony you're about to give is true and correct, to the best of your knowledge, information, and belief, so help you God? The record will reflect that the witnesses have each answered in the affirmative. Thank you. Please be seated. Each of you should know that your written testimony will be entered into the record in its entirety. Accordingly, we ask that you summarize your testimony in 5 minutes, and we're going to begin today with Sergeant Dooley. So you're recognized for your 5 minutes. And I'll just tell you, you should see a clock in front of you, and when you're about 10 seconds before you hit five, I will start tapping like this, and then that means, please wrap it up. And we'll try to be a little bit lenient, because we appreciate you being here, but we would ask you to stay for 5 minutes because we all have your testimony. We've all read your testimony. So Sergeant Dooley, you're first.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Thank you and good afternoon. Again, I'm Sergeant Robert Dooley, Florida Highway Patrol. I'm our statewide coordinator for our unmanned operations. The critical importance of drone detection and mitigation for public safety: as unmanned aircraft systems continue to proliferate across recreational, commercial, and malicious domains, the ability of public safety agencies to detect and mitigate unauthorized or threatening drones has become a national imperative. This statement outlines the growing threat landscape associated with drones, to discuss the current challenges in detection and mitigation, and advocates for urgent integration of counter-UAS capabilities within a broader spectrum of public safety framework. The rapid evolution and accessibility of drone technology have transformed industries and revolutionized emergency response and public safety operations. However, with this growth comes an increasing threat of misuse, whether intentional or negligent. From contraband drops over prison yards, to surveillance of critical infrastructure and interruptions of emergency scenes, public safety agencies now face a complex airspace risk. The ability to detect, track, identify, and when necessary mitigate rogue drones is essential for protecting lives, preserving critical infrastructure, and ensuring operational integrity. Drones present a unique set of challenges to public safety. As you spoke earlier, criminal exploitation: criminal organizations increasingly use drones to smuggle drugs, weapons, and contraband into correctional facilities or across the borders. Terrorist use: adversarial state and non-state actors have experimented with drones for surveillance and weaponization, creating low-cost and low-detection threat vectors. Privacy violations and harassment: drones can be used to stalk, harass, or violate privacy of civilians and law enforcement officers, often in ways that are difficult to detect and prevent. Interference with public safety operations: unauthorized drones flying near traffic crashes, fire scenes, disaster zones can impede emergency response, creating hazardous conditions for both responders and civilians. The need for detection and mitigation capabilities: public safety agencies must be able to detect, identify, and, if authorized, mitigate UAS threats in real time. Without this capability, agencies operate blindly in shared airspace, increasing risk to both responders and the public. The key benefits of these capabilities include situational awareness. Drone detection systems enhance airspace awareness, allowing agencies to monitor aerial activity near sensitive locations or active scenes. Threat identification: identifying type, intent, and operator of drone is essential for appropriate response and legal action. Incident mitigation: in critical scenarios, stopping or redirecting a drone may be necessary to prevent harm or disruption, especially during mass gatherings, dignitary protection, or major disasters. Current limitations and legal barriers: despite the urgent need, most state, local, tribal, and territorial public safety agencies lack the legal authority to mitigate and often face limitations even detecting them. Only federal agencies currently possess this broad C-UAS authority under 6 USC 124n, leaving a gap in homeland security at the local level. Additionally, technology access: C-UAS systems are costly, complex, and often limited to military or federal use. Interagency coordination: there's a lack of real-time data sharing and standard operating procedures that could hinder unified responses, and policy gaps. Existing federal laws, including the FAA's Preemption of Airspace regulation, complicate the roles and responsibility of our SLTT agencies. Legislative reform is needed: granting limited, controlled UAS authority to vetted and trained public safety entities under federal oversight, as proposed in several legislative efforts. Training and standardization: create a standardized C-UAS training and certification programs, ensuring safety, accountability, and legal compliance. Technology deployment: fund and deploy scalable, non-kinetic drone detection systems to local agencies, particularly those responsible for critical infrastructure and mass events. Public and private collaboration: encourage partnerships between technology providers, law enforcement, and federal agencies to pilot C-UAS tools under lawful frameworks. And community engagement: educate the public on the responsible use of drones and build awareness of the risks associated with unauthorized operations. The ability to detect, mitigate rogue drones is no longer a futuristic concept. It's a present-day necessity. Public safety professionals stand on the front lines of both natural and man-made crises, and lack a C-UAS capability, which leaves a critical vulnerability in our national preparedness. With federal agencies play a vital role, empowering state, local responders with tools, training, and authority to protect their communities from aerial threats is the next essential step in securing the homeland. And I thank you, and I await your questions.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Sergeant Dooley. Chair now recognizes Mr. Feddersen for his 5 minutes. Mr. Feddersen, please.

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Good afternoon, Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the honor of appearing before you today. My name is Brett Feddersen. I am the Vice President of Strategy and Government Affairs at D-Fend Solutions, a leading counter-drone manufacturer. I also serve as the chair of the Security Industry Association's Drone Security Subcommittee, a group comprised of leading providers and end users of counter-drone technologies available in the world. I commend the subcommittee for its proactive focus on the threat that has quickly gone from a distant concern to clear and present danger to our national security, to our critical infrastructure, and to our public safety. The illegal use of drones has evolved from simple nuisance, akin trespassing, to sophisticated criminal and malicious activity. The accessible, affordability, and adaptability of this technology have given us new capabilities, most often used for good. However, they also have created significant vulnerabilities that we as a nation are not yet prepared to face. We can categorize these threats into three primary domains. First is criminal and illicit activities. The use of drones by criminal and terrorist organizations is no longer a hypothetical scenario. Incidents of drones being used to deliver contraband like drugs and weapons into correctional facilities are a daily occurrence across America. The weaponization of drones has been occurring in the United States for years. The internet has brought battlefield tactics to North America through shared lessons learned in conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. We continue to see rival cartels repeatedly conduct indiscriminate carpet bombing attacks against other cartels using explosive-laden drones. In 2021, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel created a dedicated unit of drone operators to attack rival groups in Mexico. Today, Mexican cartels are reportedly using one-way attack drones alongside the more traditional explosive-carrying quadcopters. And last year, U.S. federal authorities detected approximately 60,000 cartel drones near the border. The second category is physical and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure. The potential for drone attacks on critical infrastructure is alarming. A drone with a small payload could cause widespread disruption and economic turmoil by damaging power stations, water treatment plants, communication towers, or data centers. U.S. critical infrastructure is often protected by trained security professionals, not law enforcement. Any assumption that state and local law enforcement could fill the private security gap is a gross underestimation of reality of police resources. The third category is surveillance and espionage. Drones offer a low-cost, low-risk platform for persistent surveillance. They can be equipped with sophisticated cameras and sensors to gather intelligence from a distance without the need of physical access. Drones can bypass traditional security perimeters, making them a favored tool for illicit trade. Domestically, drones are being used to stalk, harass, and spy on people in their own homes. This invasion of privacy goes unchecked as police watch the drones fly away without leaving a physical footprint for them to follow. Our current legal and technological frameworks have not kept pace with these clear and growing dangers. The authority to detect and mitigate malicious drones is fragmented across the federal agencies, creating confusions and gaps in response. While safe and effective counter-drone technology exists today, its use is severely restricted by current laws. To address these challenges, I respectfully offer the following recommendations to the subcommittee for consideration: a comprehensive federal counter-drone legislation. We need clear and cohesive framework of nationwide counter-drone operations. Year after year, Congress continues to introduce counter-drone legislation, but never passes it. This legislation should immediately expand the legal authorities to detect, track, and identify drone threats to all federal agencies; state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement; and trained security professionals protecting our critical infrastructure. This legislation should also expand the existing 2018 federal pilot program for the mitigation of drone threats to those same federal, state, and local entities and trained security professionals. This pilot program must be launched in a robust manner to enable the rapid scaling of capabilities ahead of the World Cup, America's 250th anniversary celebration, next year's elections, and the 2028 Olympics. If these authorities are not granted by Congress quickly, then these mass gatherings will go unprotected and will require federal resources to be diverted from the border and other critical national infrastructure missions. In conclusion, the threat from malicious drone use is real, immediate, and growing. We must take decisive action now. I thank you for your time, look forward to your questions.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Mr. Feddersen. Chair now recognizes Dr. Wallace for his five minutes. Dr. Wallace.

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, and other distinguished committee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the important issue of protecting our nation from the misuse of unmanned aircraft systems, sometimes referred to as UAS or more colloquially as drones. My name is Ryan Wallace, and I currently serve as a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. And for the past 10 years, my research has focused primarily on UAS safety and security threats through the use of UAS detection equipment. The misuse of unmanned aircraft is not fundamentally a technology problem, but rather a people problem. What makes this problem particularly challenging is the unique aerial capabilities that UAS provide to their operators, capabilities previously limited only to those with the resources and training to operate manned aircraft. The accessibility, affordability, and automation have now placed these capabilities within the reach of anyone with a few hundred dollars. This creates a disproportionate force multiplier for bad actors. The destructive potential of consumer drones recently came to global attention in Ukraine during the famed Operation Spider's Web, where small drones were used to conduct rapid, surprising, accurate, and devastating attacks. These attacks were executed with near impunity, highlighting the critical vulnerability gap posed by UAS threats. The remote nature of these attacks left no one to arrest or hold accountable. Today, these tactics and technology are being employed both domestically and near our borders. The FAA estimates there are currently more than 2.8 million drones in the United States, nearly double the number of drones than in 2018, than when the Preventing Emerging Threats Act was signed into law. Today, UAS outnumber manned aircraft by nearly 13 to 1. The agency estimates that within 5 years, this number will grow a further 10%. Presently, drones are causing three major domestic problems: one, creating a collision risk with aircraft operating in the National Airspace System; two, contraband delivery into prisons and correctional institutions; and three, incursions along our borders. The potential consequences of a mid-air collision with a drone erode the safety of our skies. As the record— as of the second quarter of 2025, the FAA recorded a total of 1,022 sightings, approximately 170 per month, with aircrew reportedly taking evasive action in 2.8% of those cases. In January this year, a Canadair CL-415 conducting suppression operations struck a small drone operating at low altitude within a temporary flight restricted zone near the Palisades Fire. Air operations were suspended, allowing that fire to expand unabated, further enhancing the destruction and risk to response personnel. According to Michael Torphy of the FBI and Christopher Hardy of the Department of Justice, drone activity has proliferated to more than half of the Bureau of Prisons federal facilities, with incidents climbing to more than 479 in 2024, nearly 20 times the number since the agency started tracking in 2018. Similarly, Stephen Willoughby from the Department of Homeland Security highlighted the extent of the porous UAS activity along the U.S. border, stating, in the last 6 months of 2024, more than 27,000 drones were detected within 500 meters of the southern border. To effectively address these challenges, I offer several observations. Foremost, that all drone incidents are local incidents first. Often, first responders to these incidents will be sworn officers from one of the nation's nearly 18,000 state and local law enforcement agencies. Most of these agencies lack formal training for dealing with drone incidents. And even fewer are equipped with tools to support the detection, tracking, and identification of UAS. Currently, no state or local law enforcement agencies are equipped and authorized to forcibly take down a UAS threat without the compliance of the operator, who may be positioned miles away from the aerial vehicle. Testimony by Michael Torphy from the FBI underscored resource limitations in providing counter-UAS protection, highlighting the agency was only able to cover 0.05% of the more than 240,000 special events eligible for counter-UAS protection. Ultimately, the widespread, immediate need for counter-UAS protection should be a part of the calculus used to determine future authorities. Training is a vital element in protecting our public safety personnel to respond effectively to drone incidents. Foremost, it is essential to ensure both UAS detection and mitigation efforts do not create or exacerbate hazards within the National Airspace System through spectrum interference with navigation or communications infrastructure, or impede air traffic management functions. Training is also necessary to educate officers on how to effectively respond, investigate, document, and charge these incidents in a manner that leads to successful prosecutions. Moreover, such training ensures reinforcement of appropriate procedures designed to protect the rights, expression, privacy, and other civil liberties. There is no magic bullet technological solutions to this problem. Each type of technology has its own inherent capabilities and limitations. Finally, I would like to highlight the vital importance of continued research and development. Research consortiums like the Alliance for System Safety of UAS through Research Excellence, ASSURE, and its accompanying training arm are experienced, equipped, and ready to address these challenges affecting the National Airspace System.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Dr. Wallace. And now the chair recognizes Dr. Cahill for her 5-minute opening

Dr. Catherine F. CahillSPEAKER_00

Thank you. Chairman Biggs, Ranking Member Raskin, Ranking Member McBath, and esteemed members of the Subcommittee on Crime and Federal Government Surveillance, my name is Cathy Cahill, and I am the director of ACUASI, the Alaska Center for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration. ACUASI leads one of the seven FAA test sites, and we are a key player in many other FAA, DOJ, and DOD programs. We also partner with a variety of commercial and governmental entities on cutting-edge UAS and counter-UAS technologies required to safely integrate UAS into the National Airspace System. These facts uniquely position me to discuss the topic of malicious UAS. This written testimony is provided to you through my personal capacity as a private citizen and is based on my professional experience. It does not necessarily represent the views of the University of Alaska. ACUASI uses UAS for good, such as conducting medical supply delivery, cargo delivery to isolated communities, and emergency response. However, our team is very aware of how they can be used maliciously. I live in Alaska, but even in this remote location, our team has seen the malicious use of UAS. We have seen flights of unauthorized UAS in the flight path of Ted Stevens International Airport, one of the top five cargo airports in the world. Simultaneously, we have seen multiple UAS entering the restricted airspace of our military bases. We have observed the flight tracks of UAS dropping contraband into correctional facilities. I personally have seen UAS crossing the southern border bringing drugs from Mexico. All of these examples show that malicious UAS activities are widespread, and we need policies, procedures, training, and technologies to allow law enforcement to stop these activities without creating a hazard to people and property. The first question I always get asked when I talk to the public about the issue of malicious UAS is: Why can't we shoot them? The United States Code Section 49 defines UAS as aircraft, and all of the laws codified for traditional manned aircraft apply to them. Therefore, shooting a UAS is a federal offense with applicable jail time and fines. Only five agencies—DOD, DOE, DHS, DOJ, and to a limited extent, FAA—have relief from the United States Code sections applicable to shooting down or hacking or jamming UAS. So most law enforcement operators dealing with unauthorized UAS do not have the legal authority to do so. Also, it's unsafe to mitigate a UAS without knowing what is under it and what might get hit when the UAS falls. Additionally, the operator of a counter-UAS system needs to know if the UAS under observation is authorized to be flying in that location. These facts point to why we need highly trained professionals with appropriate statutory relief and good information making the risk-benefit calculations about whether and how a UAS should be mitigated. As the malicious use of UAS spreads, state and local law enforcement officers will be on the front lines for combating the threat from the rogue UAS because federal agents with counter-drone capacities cannot be everywhere. The aCUASI team has been studying the willingness of local law enforcement officers to engage with systems designed to detect, track, and identify malicious UAS. In Alaska, we have had trouble getting state and local law enforcement officers to address rogue UAS because they're overworked, understaffed, dealing with more urgent situations, and feel it is not their responsibility to do so. Additionally, many of the law enforcement participants in our study are unsure as to what laws are applicable to malicious UAS and do not know what they can legally do to build a case for the misuse of UAS. We need to provide our law enforcement officers with clear guidance on how to address rogue UAS, and that as the risk from malicious UAS increases, the potential to mitigate the UAS in certain circumstances. We cannot afford to allow criminals to use UAS maliciously or our adversaries to use UAS to endanger our military bases or personnel and conduct espionage. In my opinion, H.R. 5061, the Counter-UAS Authority, Security, Safety, and Reauthorization Act, is a good first step towards safely implementing counter-drone technology in the U.S. However, more needs to be done to accelerate our testing and implementation of these technologies and the required risk-benefit decision calculations needed before a UAS is mitigated. These investments will not only help our law enforcement organizations here at home, but also our military overseas as they deal with the malicious UAS threat. The UAS— the U.S. should be a world leader in the development and deployment of these technologies. If we do not move fast enough, the criminals and our adversaries will win the UAS war. This ends my prepared statement. I'd be happy to answer any questions you have.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you. Now, I now recognize the ranking member of the subcommittee, Ms. McBath, for her opening statement.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to our witnesses. I have read your testimonies, and I apologize that I'm just getting here. But thank you for convening today's hearing to provide us with an opportunity to learn more about how drones can be used to commit crimes, how law enforcement can respond to those crimes, and what we might do here in Congress to adapt our laws to meet the challenges that drones pose to our society and the challenges that you have expressed here today. As with the internet, artificial intelligence, and so many other technologies, drones can can really be a valuable tool. They can help first responders survive or survey a disaster area to search for survivors, or they can give law enforcement another vantage point from which to monitor a special event or a very sensitive location. And they can keep officers safe by allowing them to remotely investigate a dangerous situation or location. The rapid proliferation of drone technology has ushered in a new frontier of crime and many, many public safety challenges. In the wrong hands, drones can be used to invade privacy, smuggle contraband, as you just mentioned, or provide bad actors with information that can help them avoid detection. I've heard firsthand about these harms from many law enforcement officers, in particular, in my district in the state of Georgia, as they're working to keep us all safe. For example, Georgia prison officials have informed me that they are increasingly battling the use of drones to smuggle contraband into our prison facilities. Drones have been used to deliver illegal drugs, weapons, and cell phones, which can each pose a threat to the safety of our inmates and also the staff. Just last year, the Georgia Department of Corrections seized drones, dozens of them, that could be used to smuggle in contraband. And recently, officials at Washington State Prison in Davisboro, Georgia, they worked with the Washington County Sheriff to track drones that were being used in an attempt to smuggle methamphetamine and heroin into prison. By tracking the drones and using a K-9 unit, they were able to locate the drone operators, arrest them, and prevent the drugs from reaching the prison. While law enforcement succeeded in this effort using traditional tools, additional law enforcement tools may be may be needed to respond to the rising challenges that are presented by the drones. As with any new technology, we must exercise caution and proceed thoughtfully to avoid unintended consequences of detecting and mitigating drone activity. Disabling or intercepting drones presents very unique challenges. For example, an intercepted or disabled drone could fall, as was stated, and injure innocent bystanders on the ground or damage objects or property in its path. Similarly, many of the technologies used to combat drones rely on disrupting their communications systems of planes or emergency— these communication systems could disrupt aircraft or emergency responders. Testing, planning, training, and targeted deployment can all help ensure that counter-drone technologies are used in a way that promotes public safety, but also strengthens our national security. I'm so thankful to each of our experts today for your expert testimony, and thank you for coming here today to discuss how we can work together to respond to these challenges and opportunities that have been presented by drones and counter-drone technology in our ever-changing technological landscape. Thank each of you for sharing your expertise.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

gentlelady yields back. And now we'll go to questions from members of the subcommittee. We'll start first with the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Nehls.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

Uh, thank you, Chairman.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

you spoke so well about the issues that we see down at our southern border related to drones coming across with all the drugs, killing our people from the bad hombres we have on our southern border. We have to stop it. Um, I'd like to talk a little bit about drones in the airspace, specifically, you know, airports. Concerned about the airports, right? A bad actor with bad intentions Entering restricted airspace over one of our airports. And Sergeant Dooley, I'm looking at you. I'm thinking about Florida. You got about 400 airports, your responsibility, so what does a medium-sized airport do? You detect the airport, at the airport, drone comes in restricted airspace. What's your response?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

So normally, I'll give you an example. We've done some some really different things in South Florida, especially Miami International Airport, as an example, has a drone problem. And we've partnered with our FAA partners, DHS, etc., entities that are allowed without question to detect or mitigate because we recognized there was an issue, and we incorporate a lot of our our public safety in the area, Miami-Dade, etc., and we were involved as well. And we're able to go out there and start intercepting. But from a perspective of an airport that simply has the ability to detect, I mean, there's really nothing they can do other than watch it.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

Honestly, do you see how stupid that sounds?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

It does.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

It's stupid.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Yeah.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

So I, I like the idea we can detect We can detect all these airports. We can detect a drone. Well, if it's being operated by an individual with some bad intentions, you'll just catch it on video. The destruction of the— I mean, you're going to have it on. You can detect it, but there's nothing to mitigate that drone. And this is airports. Correct me if I'm wrong, sorry to do that, but, but this is airports across the entire country.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Yes, that's correct. There may be some that have specialized, but for the bulk, but no.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

Well, I think Ms. Cahill brought up a few of the agencies that have the ability to mitigate a drone. Dr. Wallace, is there— I hear these arguments. I'm on the Transportation Committee. I hear all these arguments about you can't mitigate the drone because it could interfere, it could interfere with commercial aviation, all this. Is there technology available out there that could mitigate a drone without interfering with our commercial air?

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

There are certainly several technologies that are available for mitigation. Sure. Each of those technologies have their own benefits and limitations.

Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX)SPEAKER_06

Sure, sure. But that's an excuse that I hear over and over again. It's going to interfere with the aircraft that are coming in. I said interfere with the aircraft coming in, the damn drone could take down one of our aircraft. You talked a little bit about what we're seeing in Ukraine with the complex missions that some of these drones are taking. I'm kind of I'm appalled over the fact that I was in Milwaukee, and I went to visit the airport. We were talking about drones, and I was inside there. And I said, Well, what happens if a drone gets into this red airspace or this restricted airspace? Well, we know it's there. I said, Well, what do we do? Well, we try to call somebody. Now what do you— Yeah, we try to find the guy. He could be a couple blocks, couple miles away in the backyard, and we'll knock on the door. I said, Well, what if that guy has bad intentions? But then, when we have a significant event, we'll bring in the Coast Guard, and the Coast Guard would have the ability to mitigate the drone and send it out to Lake Michigan or set it down. So the idea to say that, well, we have to be careful here that we don't the drone doesn't fall down and hit somebody in the head, I think the technology is there to take control of the damn drone and get it out of the restricted airspace. And the idea that we have to be worried about not offending somebody—it's in restricted airspace. And at some point in time, Mr. Feddersen, we're going to have a drone operated by some bad hombres over here interfering with some commercial airliners, running into the engines and causing problems. But then, maybe then is when we will actually get serious about mitigating the risks of these drones, cuz there's going to be millions of them out there. And the bad guys are understanding these are pretty—I mean, you can put some pretty good payload on some of these drones. They're relatively inexpensive, right? And so I am deeply concerned, Sergeant Dooley, about the US government's position on this, whether it's section 49, it's a federal offense. That just makes me sick to think this is a federal offense for state individuals, state officials to protect their own airports in their own state. We must change. We must change. I

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

yield. Gentleman yields. We appreciate that.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Chair recognizes now the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. McBath.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. We know that drones, as I've stated and many have stated in this hearing, drones have been used to smuggle drugs, weapons, and phones into prisons and across our borders. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, this is already happening in Georgia. Drones present a significant risk to the safety of inmates and staff. Dr. Cahill, your written testimony notes that your team has worked with Alaskan correctional facilities to detect, and to track, and to identify the drones that are being used to smuggle contraband into the prisons. So, but you also, you know, you said this is a widespread problem, but can you talk about—you said that you've had difficulty in getting law enforcement to address the rogue UAS, and so including at correctional facilities. So could you explain the the source of the hesitancy?

Dr. Catherine F. CahillSPEAKER_00

So, Ranking Member, the reality is when we have dealt with our law enforcement, they're skeptical of a new technology until it's proven because they have so many things on their plate that it's a challenge for them to learn something new and be able to work with it. So we had hesitancy in our correctional facilities for installing one of these systems. The moment we did and were able to confirm some of their intelligence that there was a contraband drop occurring and we were able to track the drone, identify where the hand controller for the operator was, we changed their opinion. As soon as we gave them that briefing, the answer was, could you please train us this afternoon? And we did. And they've spread that story to additional correctional facilities, and they've accepted it. So they have a very targeted, very limited area that they need to protect. The police who are—and the Alaska State Troopers who have much wider ranges, for them, they're—we are severely understaffed. And so a malicious drone doesn't mean anything compared to a wife beating or a major traffic accident in the middle of nowhere. So the priority is not there to be able to do these additional duties associated with monitoring the technologies and determining how to interact with them.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

Could you kind of explain to me when When the drones are seized in these crimes, what type of digital forensics can be performed on them, and what data can be extracted or recovered from a seized drone?

Dr. Catherine F. CahillSPEAKER_00

So, Ranking Member, we don't actually do the forensics on the drones. People do. For example, the Pacific Palisades case where the drone hit the Super Scooper firefighting aircraft. They were able to do a forensic analysis because the drone was stuck in the wing of the aircraft. But in a lot of these cases, all we see are the tracks, and we may know if it's a Group 1 or Group 2, which is a size category, but we don't know a whole lot about that aircraft because we have to obey Title 18 and Title 49, which means we cannot break into the communications link for that aircraft without permission, the 124n authority, for example. So we as a state university do not have that. But the partners we have who do, they are able to get more information in terms of what the serial number is, what type of aircraft it is. So they can say it's a DJI Mavic, for example. So it really is a function of what you have. What we are doing when we're using passive RF for triangularization is we are looking for basically somebody yelling. And we have a network of sensors, and we determine the direction from which the yelling is coming. And that lets us find the drone and the operator, and we will be able to track where the drone is and where the operator is. And in the recent case with the Juneau glacial outburst flooding, we set up a system. We were able to determine where the controller was, where the drone went and landed. Local law enforcement went to that location and knocked on doors and found the perpetrator.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

So then would you say that local law enforcement is able then to kind of, um, build a criminal case from the data that they're able to extract, but you can't do it, but they can?

Dr. Catherine F. CahillSPEAKER_00

Yes.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

Okay, thank you. Sergeant Dooley, what are the greatest legal and technical hurdles in actively countering a drone in real time?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

So, just to the doctor's point, again, we do have legal constraints. We would violate about 15 different U.S. codes by simply frequency jamming or mitigating, all kinds of FAA rules, regulations, FCC, etc. And most of those carry jail time and significant fines as well. And a lot of our colleagues would say, like, Oh, well, we're public safety. If we have to do it, we have to do it. The problem is, to your point earlier, mitigating a drone, and it may have had a legal right to be there and they made an honest mistake, there's still a tremendous amount of consequence that comes with that. But our biggest hurdle are all the existing codes. Our laws just simply do not keep up with the rate that technology progresses and the way that it can be manipulated for bad. So, those are some of the biggest hurdles we have is Title 18, pen trap, wiretapping laws, etc., that are of huge concern when we do want to not only detect that a drone is there, but be able to mitigate it away. We would be violating about 15 different title codes, and also Title 18 and 49 as well.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. Appreciate it.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin for five minutes, Mr. Tiffany.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we heard over the last few years, every state became a border state with the previous administration, and cartel members openly stated that they use our northern border to smuggle in narcotics. Mr. Feddersen, do you think it's equally important to implement these drone enforcement programs at both the southern border and the northern border?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Yes, sir, I do. And they are being implemented at the federal level, particularly CBP, on both the north and the southern sides. However, the lack of authorities for detection, track, identify, or even the mitigation piece does not extend to those local departments that are shoulder to shoulder with CBP taking action to address these issues. We're severely overmatched by the criminal element when it comes to it.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

Um, how should that change in your opinion?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

I think it's actually quite easy, sir. Detect, track, and identify authorities are Title 18. They're very vague, they're antiquated, and they honestly add a lot of confusion to law enforcement and commercial sectors and critical infrastructure that want to be able to see what's flying in their airspace. The information that goes from there into the counter-drone systems like ours are nothing more than Remote ID data. It's just data that is coming directly from the drone. The most personal information you may get from it is the serial number, which is akin to a license plate on a vehicle. Law enforcement still has to call the FAA in order to get the registry information from the FAA, and then from there, be able to take the leads. I think DTI should be a blanket open authority for critical infrastructure security, law enforcement, and honestly, all federal agencies, because they don't all have the authority right now.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

So with that authority, they could accomplish the mission that you were referring to that they're not able to fulfill at that— at this point, is that correct?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Correct. Most of it. Because at this point, you can figure out where the drone is, where it took off from, and where the pilot is in real time.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

And the cartels and others are light years ahead of law enforcement at this point, in part because of that?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Honestly, the rest of the world, sir. I mean, we're a global company in 33 countries. We do airports and law enforcement and military everywhere else, and they use our system quite a bit to mitigate.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

So mitigation looks much different in other places around the world than it does here in the United States.

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

It's only the policies and legislative piece. They have given authorities to their law enforcement and security entities.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

Do you think China may have had a hand in the drone activity around some of our military sites?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Yes, sir, absolutely. I believe that, uh, you know, that it's— drones are a tool. They're a tool by criminal networks, and they're a tool for federal or for foreign adversaries. So absolutely, they're being used.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

Sergeant Dooley, are you familiar with the Guangpan Cape Canaveral incident that happened earlier this year in Florida?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Vaguely, yes.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

In the case, a Chinese-born Canadian citizen, Guang Pan, was found to be using a drone to take unauthorized photographs at Patrick Air Force Base, a submarine wharf in Cape Canaveral. Have you seen increased activity of drones around U.S. military bases in Florida?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

So, military bases, not so much. We don't support them as often. It's normally during large-scale events, but we went from literally detecting a few hundred per month in those general areas where they're restricted airspace like a DOD site or military base to thousands, in particular when DJI in particular drones turned off their geofencing for the most part. So our principal workhorse years ago in the state of Florida, which we used, was DJI drones. That's how we got started. Now we're not allowed to use them anymore, but back then you had to have special permission. The drone told you, You're not allowed to fly here or take off from here. Now that's not the case. Now it's simply a check box where you turn on your drone, and it could be right next to an airport runway, and before it would say you can't fly here. Now it says you're taking responsibility. You touch a check box, and it takes off and flies wherever you want it to fly now. So we've seen a dramatic increase over the past, I'd say, 8 to 9 months of going from a handful of detections to in the thousands of detections in these areas or within range of our detection equipment because there's no more geofencing. So yes, it has increased dramatically in a lot of these areas, not just our critical infrastructure, but our military sites and other places.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

And isn't it correct that we do not produce a lot of drones in the United States, principally produced in China? Is that accurate?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

That's correct. The principal ones that are produced here are normally purchased by DOD or law enforcement or areas like Florida where we restrict the type of drones we're allowed to purchase.

Rep. Thomas Tiffany (R-WI)SPEAKER_11

for national security purposes, do you think that we should make that a priority to be able to produce them in the United States?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

I'm a proud American for sure. I would love to, to be prideful of us producing those types of things here. Yes. But I also don't want to stifle some of the things where people need to buy a certain product because it's the correct tool for the correct job, if that makes sense. But buying American should be preferred. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

gentleman yields back. Before we go to the next one, I want to submit for the record documentation called entitled "Cartels Drop Bombs from Drones Near Southern Border." So ordered.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

Great.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. And there's no doubt that drones, particularly for law enforcement, have changed the game for surveillance, for search and rescue, to assist in active SWAT operations. They can save not only civilian lives, but also protect our men and women in law enforcement. And the sergeant just alluded to a problem that we've run into, which is that cheaper Chinese components have made it much more affordable for law enforcement agencies to have these capabilities. And we all know the risk that comes along with having Chinese components in our drones, which is that they could be pinging back to mainland China and affecting our own national security in the way that they could be gathering intelligence on behalf of the Chinese government. And certainly no law enforcement agency wants that. But Sergeant Dooley, I imagine you would tell me that when you're making decisions to protect the people who work with you and to protect the public, you have to think about what can bring public safety and how you can stretch your dollars the best. Is that right? I mean, is that a kind of some of the tension you have to deal with in making a decision like that?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Not anymore. The state of Florida legislated that, so we don't have to worry about. We just pick what we need. And they also supply funding now to help us reach those goals of transitioning everything away.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

And my goal, just as yours stated earlier, is that we would have entirely an affordable, American-made supply chain. In fact, in California, there's a company—I think it's made up of former Navy SEALs—called Inspired Flight, which is American-made components. It sounds like you're familiar with Inspired Flight.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Oh yeah, they're good people. I like them.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

Yeah, same. So my question for Dr. Wallace is, knowing that 86% of the drones— I'm sorry, knowing that a high percentage of drones are made in China and that the overconcentration can affect our national security, what can we do in the near term to make sure that law enforcement has affordable drones, but on the manufacturing side, that we're able to expedite our ability to produce American-made components?

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

It's an excellent question. I can tell you I'm not a manufacturing expert. I can tell you that from a capabilities perspective, currently Chinese-made drones have a capability that can't be matched at the same dollar value. I do think that, given that limitation, the choice that ultimately has to be made with regards to especially public safety is one of lives, because at the end of the day, if a public safety agency doesn't have access to the tool they need to protect that public at the capability they need to accomplish what they need to do, the ultimate price will be either a law enforcement member's life or potentially a citizen's life. So, I think that is a metric that should be taken into account.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

Agreed. And Sergeant Dooley, are there any examples that you have not given the committee as to how a drone facilitated saving life or protecting the officers who work with you that you think could animate the need for giving law enforcement more resources in this area?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

For the counter side, or just a success story from, from having drones in public safety?

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

Both.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Okay, so from a success side, I'll give you an example, and I give it all the time. I work very closely with the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office in South Florida, and there was a deputy and I were eating lunch, and we get this call of a stabbing inside a home, and everybody fled. And, unfortunately, the person that was the criminal in this particular case was off his medication, recognizing that we may have had some type of mental episode, and we approach it differently. And as soon as we arrived there, the deputy gets permission to put his drone, and I supported him by making sure everything was squared away. He put his drone into the house, and within 3 minutes, he located the suspect. We recovered the suspect. They're in custody. No one got shot. No one got dog bit. Everybody went on about their day, and the person who had been stabbed was getting medical attention. And this was solved in minutes versus like an hour standoff with a SWAT team without this type of technology. And from the other side of not having detection or counter-UAS, that's been hindering is a bulk of what we get is like careless and clueless individuals where they're just as dangerous at times as someone with bad intent. For example, the person in California, they gave the example of of hitting the the seaplane that was— I forget the name of it. That person didn't do it on purpose. They were just careless and clueless. Same thing in Texas during the flooding: We had someone strike a helicopter. They didn't do it on purpose. Sometimes careless and clueless individuals are just as dangerous as those that have those negative intentions. And I think that having this technology both for public safety provides a tremendous value of being able to save lives and protect lives. But more importantly, having the ability to detect and potentially mitigate, if needed, also could provide those values where we can keep manned aviation safe. We harp on that that terrorist side and, okay, the careless and clueless can be just as dangerous as those individuals that intended and planned something versus someone just popping up trying to make a YouTube video, and they actually hit an airplane or violate airspace.

Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA)SPEAKER_02

Thank you for your service, Sergeant, and, uh, to the men and women that you serve with, I'll say what we say in our law

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

enforcement family, uh, be safe.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, gentleman. Time has expired. I have two more documents that I am introducing into the record: Drones in the Wrong Hands: How Criminals Use UAVs to Threaten Prisons and Jails and another one entitled, "New State Drone Laws Set Strict Operational Boundaries." Without objection, so ordered. And now I recognize the gentleman from North Carolina.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To the witnesses, thank you for being here, and I'll piggyback on one of those submissions. As a when I was working in law enforcement, the problem has already arrived in many respects. We would send some of the most dangerous people in the country away to jail for sometimes 20, 30, 40 years, but there would be no interruption in the criminal enterprises that these folks led, in large part because of devices and capabilities that made it into the Bureau of Prisons because of the drones. And it seemed like just a lumbering bureaucracy and inefficiency that it could not keep up with the technology. And I am curious, Mr. Feddersen, you mentioned that the United States seems to be overwhelmed at this particular juncture. And is the posture of being overwhelmed, is that from just a volume standpoint of all of the drones that are in circulation? Is it a technology standpoint, or is it just the layers of bureaucracy that prohibit effective deterrence?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Thank you for the question. So it is a policy, legislative, and bureaucracy issue. Technology is out there today from many companies that have been tested by the FAA, tested by TSA, deemed safe to use at airports. But the confusion over detect, track, and identify has hesitancy across the across the land. And the fact that the mitigation authorities haven't been expanded in a quick enough manner is

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

what makes sense to, to remedy this? Because a drone is not an airplane. The fact that they're being regulated as such in many respects does not make much sense in terms of placing the same value on a drone as it does an airplane. So should we have a facility-specific code for unmanned aircraft?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

So they— I don't think so, sir. I disagree that labeling it an aircraft hinders anything. It actually gives both operators and those that are working around drones more protection and coverage into what they're doing. It gives better regulatory understanding and what these drones can and cannot do when they're flying. Because honestly, as it's been said before, I mean, there are drones that are as small as the coffee cup, but some that are as big as a car. And so you have to be able to safely manage that, and aircraft is the right designation for that.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

In terms of fixing the issues that we see though, how can we fix the bureaucracy uh, and the, I would say, the, the ineffective legislative posture we have with drones?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Yes, sir. I'm going to have to, uh, point the finger back to all of you on the panel. Um,

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

well, you're the expert. I'm just, I'm just— I'm

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Now, that's that's exactly what it is. We had a 5-year pilot program for a very small sect of federal law enforcement that started in 2018. We're now in the eighth year of that 5-year program. No authorities have been expanded. We've seen that that technology can be used safely and without issue. We've had those departments and agencies ask for an expansion of authorities to get them some relief off of their responsibility. And honestly, especially from being a former state trooper, to say that an FBI agent is smarter and more apt at using this equipment than a state trooper or local law enforcement isn't the right isn't the right way. So the delay is simply understanding the technology and giving trust back to the process and the system.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

And what does the technology do specifically?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Uh, so it gives you the basic remote— remote ID information, tells you where the drone is, what the drone serial number is, where it's flying, which way it's heading, and where the pilot is in real time. That information can be used for a ground interdiction without even having to worry about the airspace, to talk to the pilot and have them bring it down. There are technologies like ours, which is cyber takeover, which takes control of the drone and lands safely where it needs to be, which then allows for the officer to either give it back to the child and parent with a warning, undamaged, no collateral damage, or go ahead and submit for a search warrant to get the information out of the drone.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

Do you think there is a, is a space in the legal construct to have emergency authorization to remove a drone, whether it's shooting it down, taking control of it, or, or some other means?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

No, sir. I mean, these drones are flying at 30, 60 miles per hour. The decision cycle for law enforcement or a security individual is literally seconds and minutes. It's not weeks or hours. If it is to be that type of system, then I think it has to be preemptively done to say that a search warrant is going to cover a large area for a large period of time.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

So, just the emphasis of my question is, let's say a drone is flying over an airport or over a Bureau of Prisons facility. Should there not be the authorization to remove that drone

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Yes,

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

immediately. And do we lack that currently? Is that correct? We

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

do.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

Okay. And the technology is there to remove that drone?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

The technology is available to remove the drone and remove it safely, and the technology has been tested by the FAA and TSA. A prime example though is federal air marshals who are using the Chinese equipment at our major airports to assess what the situation is, but they don't have authority to use other equipment or use mitigation.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

Mr. Chairman, I have more, more room, but that's— I'll yield back.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you. Gentleman's time has expired. Yes, no not recognized. Thank you. We've got lots of questions still. Yes, a gentleman from California, Mr. Kiley, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Rep. Kevin Kiley (I-CA)SPEAKER_10

Thanks, Mr. Chair. Clearly the problems being discussed at this hearing are extremely serious when it comes to the malicious and unauthorized uses of drones. Of course, there are a lot of good and authorized uses of drones as well, for agriculture, for hobbyists, for security, and so forth. And increasingly, actually, for delivery. If you look at companies like Walmart and Amazon, have actually been expanding their use of drones to do almost instantaneous or very quick deliveries, at least of smaller parcels at this point, and I think that many believe this will become quite widespread in the coming years. But this sort of problem of the unauthorized uses of drones, I think, sort of threatens the ability to have that process go smoothly, both from the perspective of of having the regulatory process or framework work correctly and in terms of sort of public perception and support for these sort of things. So maybe I'll ask Dr. Wallace, and if any of the other panelists want to add to this, how do we sort of address the malicious uses of drones in a way that does not threaten the productive and valuable uses of them?

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

It's an excellent question. I think the initial challenge is there's a misperception that it's easy to identify the misuse of a drone, at least initially. So, if you're looking at a radar screen, for example, you're going to see a dot and an altitude. That doesn't really give you the ability to immediately distinguish that someone is doing something improperly. Typically, we leverage information contextually with other kinds of information to try to make some assertions about what is actually happening. Is the drone operating above the altitude that the FAA would permit? Are they operating at an unusual time? Are they operating near a facility that would be questionable? So, you never really know definitively if this drone is a threat or not. You only have indications.

Rep. Kevin Kiley (I-CA)SPEAKER_10

Thank you. Did any of the other panelists want to weigh in?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Uh, yeah, I, I, I think that the question is, uh, is, is a very good question, but it comes back into the fact that when we look at our, our nation's airspace, we look at it through 2 lenses: safety and security. And so air domain awareness, which would allow you to see all the drones, is an essential part of the safety aspect of things. It's akin to telling police officers they can't look at certain vehicles that are flying around or driving around in areas that are off limits and not being able to react to it. It's the same. You either drive a car legally or you drive the car illegally. It's the same with the drone.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

When we do large-scale events, we do have to do a lot of deconfliction. To your point, like, how do you know which one is good and which one is bad? So we have briefings prior to large-scale events of our public safety professionals, Amazon, Walmart, if they're doing deliveries in those areas, and make sure that we understand that those are already authorized. And we can get a list because again, it's all about communication and reaching out. We reach out to our FAA partners and say who has been authorized to fly in this area because we're going to be their eyes and ears. So if we do have something that is authorized to be there, we're—to their point, we're not accidentally intercepting or mitigating. With our federal partners, we know that they're supposed to be there, or we already have those clearances ahead of time. But communication is key, and getting out of your silo and talking to the other entities that can do that is key.

Rep. Kevin Kiley (I-CA)SPEAKER_10

Yeah, I think that's very important. And if this is going to become more common, deliveries being done in this way, we want folks to have the assurance that these drones are supposed to be there and that they're safe and that they're doing just a routine delivery as opposed to some of the other encounters that people might have in other contexts with drones. So appreciate the work you're doing and appreciate the chair for bringing attention to this issue. I yield back. I'd be happy to yield to my colleague, Mr. Knott.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Kiley. Sergeant, I noticed that you waved me down when I was talking about the ability to shoot down drones in emergent situations that's not currently within the legal construct. Do you have any insight into how we can best achieve that across, I would say, the sensitive areas, whether they're airports, bases, Bureau of Prisons, what have you?

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Well, the idea means it would be non-kinetic. You don't want to like accidentally— a projectile goes up, it comes down. But there are some scenarios which we've seen overseas where people don't care that you're mitigating or jamming or GPS denying. They're using fiber optic and other things to cross these barriers and be very successful. And that may be something that we have to deal with at some point. And we don't want to box our public safety into just non-kinetic, um, issues, which basically radio frequency jamming, etc. We want to be able to give them a full spectrum of what they feel is necessary to do, or based on their personal experience of what they've encountered, or maybe the intel that they're getting, be able to handle the situation accordingly. That's my biggest fear, is that we're going to authorize this but box them in so much

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

that

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

they

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

can't respond.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

And they can't— they're like, I wish I could do something. It'd be like me standing on the side of the road with a radar gun and I clock someone going 100 miles an hour, but they didn't give me a car to go chase them down and stop them from that dangerous speed. This is the same thing. We want to have multiple options available to us without being boxed in, but be doing it responsibly with a high level of accountability. I do think that if we do make a mistake, we should be held accountable. If we mitigate a drone that wasn't supposed to be mitigated, we figure out what went wrong and how we can fix it. But more importantly, document and justify to our federal partners if we mitigated a drone, why we made that decision and what was going on at the time. Not just, I hit the button, he's not supposed to be there, have a nice day. We have to have some level of that too. And I think that that will help with the trust part as well, and allowing committees like this to approve those type of authorities, because we're going to be able to explain when, where, and why we actually did some form of mitigation versus just hitting a button and trusting that everybody's doing what they're supposed supposed to be doing.

Rep. Brad Knott (R-NC)SPEAKER_03

Sergeant, thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you. Thank you. Gentleman yields back.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

I was— this was going to be like the last question I had if I had time, but you kind of touched on this here, and that, and that is, um, as a framework— and, and I know the answer, I think— has a framework been established, um, that clarifies indemnification and liability provisions for law enforcement interacting with drones? And my guess is no. I mean, other than just general qualified immunity.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

So, from an FAA perspective, there is a law enforcement toolkit that it gives you things that you're allowed to do if you have to interact with a drone pilot, that you can ask for their registration, you can ask for their TRUST certificate or Part But as far as the mitigation side and the detection side, right now,

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

that's, that's, I guess that's really my question is regarding mitigation detection, that there really is nothing right now

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

other than you can't do it unless you're one of the 4 federal entities,

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Right? And this leads to the next question, and you've kind of addressed it, Mr. Feddersen. So, may I ask all of you, what is the current framework under the pilot program? What agencies are given authority? What kind of authority are they given, and how do we effectively expand that nationwide?

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Yes, sir. So in DHS, there's only a small number of them, small components. There's components out there like HSI and ICE, the FAMS, TSA that don't have any authorities that probably should. Then on the DOJ side, U.S. Marshals, BOP, you've got DEA and FBI. All federal components that have authorities are using our system because of the methodology that it has. DOD also has it, and you've got, on DOE, falling short of how they're going to go ahead and use things because it's private contractors that particularly take care of power plants and nuclear plants. The authorities in 124N, I think, are fine because they actually go ahead and do the notwithstanding aspect and waive Title 18 and the Title 49 piece. I think the issue is training. As long as we have a good, solid training program, those authorities in 124N should be broadly spread across the rest of the federal agency, state and local law enforcement, and critical infrastructure security officers.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

So we have, for instance, in immigration law, we provide status for training for departments, sheriffs' departments, etc., so they could then enforce certain aspects of immigration law. Is that the kind of thing that might be be helpful? And I'm just going to go down, be very quick. Start with Dr. Cahill and go all the way down and finish Sergeant Dooley.

Dr. Catherine F. CahillSPEAKER_00

So I think that that would be very useful, Mr. Chairman, um, in terms of getting it to the people who need it.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

By the way, I did—and when I read your statement, I got a kick out of the people that are operating these things while they're drunk. I shouldn't get a kick out of that, but that you reported that kind of made me smile. Dr. Wallace?

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

I would generally agree.

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

Yes, sir, very helpful.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

Yeah, in fact, a lot of our federal partners have asked, but unfortunately that's not an authority they can delegate under those programs like a TFO program. So that would have to change to allow us to receive those authorities,

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

right? I mean, that would be new, new legislation we'd have to pass and, and to get those authorities in place. Um, and so right now I want to make sure everyone knows, if I understand correctly, if there is a drone, whether you know it's a malevolent actor or benign, and it's operating in a restricted airspace, you as local law enforcement, you can't do anything effectively to mitigate—

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

mitigating? No, that's it.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

You can make a phone call and say, hey,

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

yeah, we can go try to find the operator or try to deal with it. But if we're unsuccessful, that person gets away and we have no record of being able to go back and track it down of where it took off from, who was flying, etc.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

And so we've got major events coming up. We've got Olympics, we've got World Cup. And I guess the question is, are we prepared? Are we prepared? We'll just go down this way now.

Mr. Robert DooleySPEAKER_09

No, and I would say public safety could significantly fill those gaps within a— I'm not talking about moving fast and breaking things, but moving with a purpose and start filling those gaps pretty quickly.

Mr. Brett FeddersenSPEAKER_08

No, sir, we're not prepared. I think the crux of the issue is that in order to get systems and people trained and in place before the World Cup and the 250th anniversary, you have to be able to do an evaluation, determine what you want to buy, secure the funding, and then manufacturers have to get the equipment out and on time for the training. At that point, we're honestly—Christmas, I think, is the deadline for us to be able to do that. If we don't put the authorities in place and expand that to state and local law enforcement, then federal entities are going to have to do the job, but they're going to have to let something else go.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Yeah And, gosh, I'm out of time, because I'm I wanted to get to the next point, which is, and you kind of touched on it, what is the time lag to get equipment and train enough personnel to actually be effective for some of these big events coming up? Go ahead. Go ahead. My time is up, but you can answer, Dr. Wallace, Dr. Cahill, real quickly.

Dr. Ryan WallaceSPEAKER_07

I would agree with my colleagues, we're not prepared, and part of that critical need is the ability to detect, track, and identify.

Dr. Catherine F. CahillSPEAKER_00

I agree, we're not prepared. And one of the challenges, of course, is some of these events are very, very spread out. So the number of people and assets you need is going to be significant.

Chairman Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you. Well, it sounds to me like we need to get on our horse and get a piece of legislation passed very quickly, as quickly as we possibly can. Maybe Representative McBath and I can work together in maybe designating that just, I would say, correlative to the immigration authorities that we give. So with that, I thank all of you for coming today. Appreciate your testimony and again bearing with us as we started late. So thank you very much. With that, we are adjourned.

Ranking Member Lucy McBath (D-GA)SPEAKER_01

And thank you.