Building Bridges, Countering Rivals: Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

The Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific will come to order. This hearing aims to explore strategies for countering China's influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, while enhancing the United States' engagement in the region. I now recognize myself for opening statement. Again, welcome to the East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee's hearing titled, "Building Bridges, Countering Rivals: Strengthening U.S.-ASEAN Ties to Combat Chinese Influence." This hearing presents an opportunity for us to examine China's growing footprint in ASEAN and to discuss ways the U.S. can counter it by strengthening cooperation across economic, security, diplomatic, and law enforcement sectors. China has long prioritized Southeast Asia in its foreign policy, using diplomacy, infrastructure investment, and trade to entrench its influence. In contrast, U.S. economic engagement has stumbled. Initiatives like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity aimed high, but failed to deliver meaningful market access or address trade imbalances. Despite our inability to engage economically, we continue to build robust relationship with countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore. But we too often underestimate ASEAN's collective weight in our own Indo-Pacific strategy. We need to ensure the United States has a genuinely responsive and effective strategy to remain the partner of choice in ASEAN, and ask ourselves: Where have our past strategies in Southeast Asia fallen short? What legislative tools can strengthen our regional position? Are our frameworks aligned with ASEAN partners' priorities? Despite China's reach, the United States is the preferred long-term partner of choice for many ASEAN countries. In the 2025 State of Southeast Asia survey, 52.3% favored the United States over China, recognizing our leadership in investment, security, innovation, and shared values. On security, the United States has made real strides, expanding maritime security with the Philippines and partnering with other South China Sea nations on law enforcement, maritime safety, and capacity-building training, enhancing disaster response and maritime governance capabilities. Economically, however, we are underleveraged. While China remains ASEAN's top trading partner, the region is a $4 trillion market with enormous potential, especially in critical minerals, regional trade, and development financing. The threat of Chinese dominance isn't going away. China is aggressively pursuing deals, over 100 secured just this April with Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. These efforts reflect Beijing's recognition of growing U.S. engagement and its desire to blunt it. We must show ASEAN partners that China's promises rarely deliver lasting benefits. We also need a bold whole-of-government strategy, one that affirms our leadership, reinforces our alliances, and upholds the sovereignty and rules-based order that underpins a free and open Indo-Pacific. So, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and your expertise will guide us in crafting stronger, smarter U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. So, let me now recognize ranking member from California, Mr. Bera, for your opening statement.

Ranking Member Ami Bera (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to thank the witnesses for being here on what is a timely conversation in an important region, Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia is home to more than 650 million people, and has some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, critical sea lanes, and key partnerships in our interest as we look at peace and prosperity and sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific. Collectively, the Southeast Asian ASEAN nations represent the fifth largest economy in the world, and it's our fourth largest export market. So what we do here in Congress, the choices that we make, the partnerships and deals that we put together matter intensively. That's why I really do have some concerns about the Trump administration's approach. Obviously, these sweeping tariffs have created a lot of uncertainty in the region, but hopefully it creates some opportunities. Not each country has been looked at equally. And if I think about a country like Singapore, this is a country that we have a free trade agreement with, we have mechanisms to resolve issues, and we have a $2.8 billion trade surplus with Singapore. So we're doing quite well with a country like Singapore. I'd also think about the opportunities in my conversations with some of our ASEAN ambassadors. They don't want to be put into a position where they have to make a choice between China, which is in their neighborhood, or the United States. But the uncertainty that's been created by the Trump administration approach has brought into clear focus that they don't want the United States leaving their markets either. So this is a time to engage in trade negotiations and perhaps look for those opportunities where we can reduce those trade barriers. As someone who was a supporter of TPP, as much as I'd love to go back and see if we could join the CPTPP, that probably is a ways off. But can we do digital trade? We ought to be able to do digital trade. It's in our interest, and certainly it's in their interest. Can we, if Vietnam's willing to contemplate going to zero tariffs, let's engage in what that looks like. Can we work with countries in the region like Indonesia to help develop redundant supplies of critical minerals and develop their geothermal capabilities? We ought to think about that. Can we work with places like Vietnam that do have energy resources in their EEZ that are being harassed by the PRC? We ought to work there. And the Philippines, certainly, they've experienced the brunt of much of the harassment in the South China Sea. How do we work with nations like the Philippines and others to continue to deepen and return to where we historically have been with the Philippines? So there's many more opportunities. Again, the Trump administration's approach is not how I would go about doing this, but we are where we are. We've got to double down on our conversations, look for those partnerships, create those redundant supply chains, and bring the Southeast Asian nations closer together, not as a choice between China and the United States, but recognizing the unique assets, the unique opportunities, the vibrant young population, and the dynamic economies of the region. So with that, Madam Chairwoman, let me go ahead and yield back, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. And we are now pleased to have distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this very important topic. First, Mr. Gregory Poling is Director and Senior Fellow of the Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Thank you for joining us. Mrs. Barbara Weisel, nonresident scholar at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Thank you for being with us. And Dr. Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies at the Brookings Institution. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak to us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes to allow time for member questions. Let me now recognize Mr. Poling for your opening statement.

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

There we are. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Kim, Member Bera, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I'm honored to share my views before you today on the topic of U.S.-ASEAN cooperation to combat China's influence in the region. Before I begin, I should note that CSIS, my home institution, does not take policy positions, so the views represented are mine and mine alone. In my testimony, I've been asked to address both U.S. cooperation with ASEAN in the maritime domain, particularly the South China Sea, and more broadly on the geopolitical front. And I'm happy to say that, on the first, I think the U.S. and its allies and partners, particularly the Philippines, are doing a remarkable job of holding the line in the face of Chinese coercion. On the second, the broader competition for influence in the region, I worry that the U.S. is putting at risk what has traditionally been its stronger position over China in most of the countries of Southeast Asia. When it comes to the South China Sea, China seeks to control all activity, peacetime and military, in clear violation of international law. This is a direct threat to U.S. national interests, longstanding U.S. commitments to freedom of the seas, which has been an abiding U.S. interest since the earliest days of the Republic. It's also a direct threat to our oldest ally in the Indo-Pacific, the Philippines. This has been recognized by administration after administration, Republican and Democrat. And the U.S. has done a remarkable job in both showing its own flag, pushing back on Chinese coercion, and helping build the maritime capacity of partners and allies in the region to maintain their own presence in disputed waters, even in the face of what China now has, the largest navy, the largest coast guard, the largest missile force in the world. Under Xi Jinping's leadership, China, for the last decade-plus, has engaged in a campaign of coercion in what is often called the gray zone, just below the level of military force, using coast guard vessels and militia vessels to intentionally create risks of collision to bully and intimidate smaller states into giving way in the South China Sea. And that campaign had a great deal of success for the better part of a decade. For the last 3 years, that has not been the case. For the last 3 years, starting at the end of the Rodrigo Duterte administration in the Philippines, but accelerating under the current presidency of Ferdinand Marcos Jr., we have seen the Philippines stand tall for the first time in quite a while. The Philippines engaged in a nearly year-and-a-half-long standoff with China from 2023 to 2024 in order to resupply and repair its facility, the BRP Sierra Madre on Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater feature, despite the largest presence of Chinese militia and coast guard we have ever seen deployed in the South China Sea. By December 2023, the Philippines was sailing two to three ships up against 50 Chinese vessels. Didn't blink, managed to get through, often with a U.S. P-8 overhead, and with the U.S.'s repeatedly stated commitment to defend the Philippines should China use force. And it was China that blinked, not the Philippines, in that standoff. On the oil and gas front, we have seen Vietnam, for the first time in many years, developing new oil and gas fields despite a persistent Chinese coast guard presence in its waters. Malaysia, over the last 2 years, set new records for drilling offshore wells in disputed waters. Even Indonesia, which has traditionally not viewed itself as a part of this dispute, has begun to receive forceful bullying and coercion from the China Coast Guard because of new oil and gas fields it's developing, and it's done so anyway. What we see is a Chinese strategy that is clearly floundering. And all the U.S. really needs to do is continue course in order to make sure that China continues to flounder. Where I'm more worried is on our overall influence in the region. As Chairwoman Kim said, if you look at public opinion polling, elite opinion polling, U.N. voting records, educational data, the U.S. remains the partner of choice. The United States is more trusted. Its leadership is more sought-after globally. It is more popular in most places in Southeast Asia. In the Philippines and Vietnam, the U.S. has enormous leads over China in every metric you could imagine. In Indonesia, the largest country in the region, Indonesians are conflicted, but in general, they dislike China a great deal more than they dislike the U.S., although that did flip last year. And I worry that it will remain the case in the future, that China may begin to edge us out in Indonesia. While you have pro-Chinese elites in charge in places like the military junta in Burma or in Cambodia, when you look at public opinion polling, Cambodia and Burma are the third and fourth most pro-American publics in Asia. Even in Laos and Thailand, the U.S. holds its own. It's really only in Malaysia where we see China making any considerable ground on this issue of soft power, of influence, of whose leadership do you support. And to be clear, the U.S. cannot win a geopolitical strategic competition with China with military and economic might alone. At the end of the day, it's a competition over the rules and institutions of the international order. And that requires other countries to agree with us more often than agree with China. That means that we need to not forget the power of attraction, not just coercion and compulsion; that we have to be the preferred partner, not just the partner that one has to side with. And so as we've seen the winding down of U.S. support— sorry, yes, ma'am— on USAID, VOA, and Radio Free Asia, as we've seen the pauses on Fulbright and student visa interviews, I worry that we are undermining that multidecade, latent advantage we have in being the preferred partner. Thank you.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. I now recognize Mrs. Weisel for your opening statement.

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, and distinguished members of this subcommittee for the invitation to appear before you today. My name is Barbara Weisel, and I am currently a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but previously spent nearly two decades working on Southeast Asia at USTR and have many thoughts on your question on how the U.S. can strengthen ties to ASEAN to counter China. As well-recognized by members of this committee, Southeast Asia is an important U.S. economic partner. It is our fourth largest export market and a central player in global supply chains. U.S. businesses have long been invested in these dynamic markets, and their ties have expanded in recent years as businesses, with U.S. government encouragement, sought to diversify away from China. ASEAN countries stood to benefit directly from these diversification efforts in hope they would help strengthen economic ties to the U.S. commensurate with our expanding military relations. But the U.S. imposition of tariffs has created anger and confusion in ASEAN regarding their relations with the U.S. and resentment about the unilateral nature of U.S. actions. While ASEAN countries have long been concerned about China's dominance in the region, they see the imposition of tariffs as a much more immediate threat and direct assault on their economies. Facing a five-alarm fire set by the United States, they will not only avoid antagonizing China, their largest two-way trading partner, but welcome its overtures of greater economic cooperation. It is also likely that the U.S. will reach bilateral agreements with ASEAN in the coming weeks or months. To accommodate the U.S., Southeast Asian countries will commit to lower their tariffs and address longstanding trade barriers and increase purchases of U.S. LNG, agriculture, planes, and other goods. At the same time, they will pursue de-risking strategies that lessen their economic dependence on the U.S. and expand trade and investment ties to China and other partners. So, while the U.S. may see some immediate results from the tariff leverage it's exerted over Southeast Asian countries, if China is the threat about which the U.S. is most concerned, then we need to keep our eye on the ball. We need to build an affirmative ASEAN economic strategy that relies on carrots, not just sticks. This strategy should build trust and certainty and deepen our economic partnership. It also should capitalize on ASEAN's interest in keeping the U.S. engaged in the region, create room for Southeast Asian countries to work with the U.S. on curbing unfair trade practices from China, and foster ASEAN integration to promote regional stability and security. Let me briefly offer five proposals for deepening economic ties. First, we should promote development of the Southeast Asian critical minerals sector and U.S.-ASEAN critical mineral supply chains, even as we work to build our own capabilities in this sector. These efforts should include negotiation of critical minerals agreements with select Southeast Asian countries. These agreements should include criteria for trusted critical mineral supply chains and guaranteed supplies of critical mineral resources for U.S. industry, as the Japanese government has successfully done. Second, the U.S. should swiftly pursue a plurilateral digital agreement with Southeast Asian countries, drawing on the commitments the U.S. government is pursuing in its bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries. Maintaining U.S. leadership in setting digital trade rules is vital given this sector's role in U.S. innovation and economic growth, and to ensuring the U.S. remains at the forefront of the AI revolution. Doing so also would support U.S. efforts to counter China's model of digital authoritarianism. Third, the U.S. should propose a customs cooperation initiative that demonstrates its willingness to work in partnership with ASEAN as a group to tackle this priority issue. Many Southeast Asian governments already are strengthening rules in this area, but a U.S.-ASEAN Customs Cooperation Agreement would better position ASEAN to deal collectively with transshipment from China. Fourth, Congress should fully fund U.S. economic statecraft tools, including reauthorization of DFC this year. Similarly, to promote U.S. exports, Congress should reauthorize the Export-Import Bank next year and ensure adequate funding for the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. And lastly, the U.S. should consider regionalizing the trade commitments it is negotiating bilaterally with ASEAN countries, building out an ASEAN agreement with rules of origin that limit non-parties from benefiting and including rules in critical areas to U.S. competitiveness. In exchange, the U.S. should gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian parties to the agreement. A regional agreement with reciprocal commitments would incentivize Southeast Asian countries to deepen supply chains with the U.S. in ways that can promote U.S. manufacturing and exports. Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my views, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you, Mrs. Weisel. Let me now recognize Dr. Kuok for your opening statement.

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

Thank you so much, Chairwoman. Chairwoman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify. It's an honor to be able to contribute to this important conversation on strengthening US engagement with Southeast Asia, a region that is at the very heart, both the geographic as well as the strategic heart of the Indo-Pacific. You've both outlined why Southeast Asia matters. So, let me just say that despite its economic and strategic importance, I think the region remains a weak link in US Indo-Pacific engagement. US influence in the region is declining, and China is gaining ground. Both yourself, Chairwoman, and Greg mentioned how the United States is the partner of choice, but in a regional survey in 2024, the survey showed for the first time China actually— the majority of respondents in Southeast Asia actually choosing to align with China over the United States if they were forced to choose. Now, that margin was slim, overall 50.5% versus 49.5%, but support dropped dramatically in some countries, including all three Muslim-majority countries, by about 20 percentage points. The 2025 survey you mentioned reflected a modest US rebound, but it was conducted very early in the year, from early January to mid-February, and preceded several developments, most notably the April 2nd announcement of tariffs. This hit all countries in Southeast Asia, including some of its poorest. Cambodia, Laos, and war-torn Myanmar face a 49%, 48%, and 44% tariff level, respectively. These Liberation Day tariffs have triggered a strong backlash in the region. ASEAN leaders recently expressed deep concern over these unilateral tariff measures, and the Singapore prime minister warned that they undermine the global trading order that the United States helped build and declared bluntly that these are not actions that one does to a friend. What began as frustration over limited US engagement or limited US economic engagement in the region is now concern over counterproductive policies. Washington is not just missing in economic action in Southeast Asia, it is inflicting real damage. Tariffs, as well as aid cuts, are hurting Southeast Asia's countries. Now, for years, relatively weak US engagement was offset by the important security role it plays, but that, too, is increasingly cast in doubt as Washington recalibrates away from longstanding allies and partners in Europe, and the president openly questions defense commitments. Lack of clarity around US goals in the Indo-Pacific compounds these concerns, as the possibility of a grand bargain or even a more limited economic deal entailing concessions to Beijing on issues vital to allies and partners, such as the South China Sea or the US-Philippine alliance, sows further doubt about American intent, consistency, and staying power. US standing in the region has also been badly hurt by its handling of the Gaza crisis. Now, although a loss for the United States doesn't necessarily mean a win for China, Beijing has been very proactive about continuing to deepen its regional ties, through trade, through investment, through infrastructure, and through consistent diplomacy. And as you mentioned, Chairwoman, in the weeks after the April 2nd tariffs, Beijing visited Southeast Asia and concluded 113 deals. And even if few of those materialize, I think the signal was clear that China is a consistent and reliable economic partner while the United States throws a wrecking ball at the global trading system. Beijing's actions in the South China Sea are a serious irritant in its relations with its neighbors, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam, but I think China has been remarkably adept at containing the fallout, both through the use of economic incentives as well as through quiet diplomacy. Southeast Asia does not want to choose between the two countries, and they will continue to hedge for as long as possible, but China's growing sway hampers Washington's Washington's ability to engage bilaterally and multilaterally in the region to strategic effect. I've detailed policy recommendations for the US government as legislative proposals in my written testimony, but very broadly, these touch on three areas that the United States must act on. First, economic engagement. For the region, economics is security, and failing to understand this leaves Washington on the back foot. Congress can lead by, first, reviewing tariffs; second, advancing targeted trade agreements in strategic sectors like digital infrastructure and critical minerals; and third, bolstering funding support for infrastructure and development. The second main area that the United States needs to work on is strengthening its alliances and partnerships in Southeast Asia. It's done well with the Philippines, but I think what's necessary at the moment is commitment at the very highest levels to treaty commitments and expanding economic and strategic engagement with key regional players, including Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia. And finally, the third area, defending international law and maritime rights. International law reduces conflict risks and advances concrete US interests. The second Trump administration should maintain the strong stance that it adopted during its first term when it made regular, lawful assertions of passage rights and freedoms of the seas, and when it affirmed the merits of the 2016 tribunal decision, a step that the previous administration had failed to take. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee,

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Well, let's continue the conversation during the question and answer period. Thank you so much. I appreciate all of the witnesses giving your opening testimonies, and for the recommendations that you are making, and we can hopefully get into that more. And let me start with the first round of questioning. You know, as you all mentioned, we want to be the partner of choice, and our ASEAN partners are waiting for us to show up. And we need to provide a clear and consistent economic framework for the Indo-Pacific region. But unfortunately, we have— U.S. has struggled to regain momentum in economic engagement following its withdrawal from TPP. So, Ms. Weisel, what elements of the TPP and IPEF proved effective and ineffective, and how can future agreements demonstrate strong commitment to Southeast Asia's development goals while safeguarding our U.S. interests?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Thank you for the question. I think in terms of TPP, TPP is now in force. The U.S. is not a party to that agreement, so it was a successful agreement notwithstanding the fact that we are no longer a party. I think that what was successful about TPP was first that it was a very high-standard agreement and included a lot of issues that had not been part of previous trade agreements that advanced rules that were of importance to U.S. economic competitiveness, including on things like intellectual property, on state-owned enterprises and competition, and other areas. In looking back at what we would want to do were we to pursue a free trade agreement with the region, I think there are definitely additional areas, updates that you would want to consider, and things that we learned, for instance, over the last couple years about resilience of supply chains, about our competition with China, that you would want to add to an agreement like that that were not issues then. But as in all free trade agreements, there are new generations of agreements, new issues that you need to think about and incorporate in updated agreements. IPEF, I think, was, in my view, more of a political agreement than an economic agreement and that the purpose of that was to demonstrate to our trading partners that we were going to be engaged in the region. We wanted them to commit to a range of issues related to areas of mutual concern, including related to supply chains. But we were not prepared to discuss market access in any way, and I think that that really hobbled the effort. I also think that our decision not to engage on digital trade was problematic and something that we would want to revisit going forward.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. As we strengthen our strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific, particularly with ASEAN partners like the Philippines, Subic Bay, which I visited, is again emerging as a critical location for U.S. logistics and operational planning, and our defense cooperation agreement with the Philippines grants us access to sites like Subic, but we must balance our military presence with Philippines' constitutional limits on foreign bases and sensitivities to nationalist sentiment, which has historically complicated our security cooperation. Mr. Poling, keeping this delicate balance in mind, what specific capabilities or prepositioned assets would most enhance deterrence at Subic?

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

Thank you, Chairman. The most important thing for the Philippines—well, I suppose there's two. One, it needs asymmetric capabilities, much like Taiwan or anybody else facing a giant neighbor. This is not a footrace the Philippines can possibly win. So seeing more deployments like the NMESIS right now, Tomahawks paired with Philippines' own mid-range land-based capabilities, like the BrahMos missiles they bought from India, is key. It allows the Philippines to hold Chinese vessels in the South China Sea at risk in in a situation which there's no number of hulls that they could possibly be sold or loaned that would make up for the asymmetry they face. The second is presence. At the end of the day, there's no military solution to the South China Sea. The Philippines needs to be able to show the flag, and they've done a remarkably good job with a very limited Coast Guard and Navy. We need to see more uncrewed platforms. We need to see more cheap vessels. We need to see more support for Philippine basing in the islands. And that doesn't mean US boots on the ground, but the US could be providing more funding for the Philippines to build up its own facilities, as China and Vietnam do as well.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. One of the most pressing challenges in the region is China's dominant grip on critical mineral supply chains, especially for materials vital to clean energy and defense technologies. And we mentioned Indonesia is the world's top producer of nickel. This is critical for battery technologies. But it's alarming that Chinese companies control 75% of Indonesia's nickel refining capacity. Ms. Weisel, what are the implications of China's chokehold on critical mineral supply chains for the U.S. and allied nations?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Well, i think we're seeing the the results of that chokehold in in in our industries today where China can limit access to critical minerals, and then then it also controls these critical minerals from other countries. So I think all of this is quite disturbing and and just reinforces the need for the U.S. to establish its own supply chains with with the region. I think, as I mentioned in in my testimony, Japan has had quite a quite a deal a good deal of success in trying to limit its reliance on Chinese critical minerals by promoting its relationships with the region. They have an organization called the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security that has the purpose of ensuring stable supplies of critical minerals and energy for Japan. Thank

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

you.

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

The result of that, and it's something I think we should be looking at, is that they have been able to successfully diversify their sources of critical minerals. And the funding that they use for this organization that's known as JOGMEC,

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Yeah,

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

they have— sorry,

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

My time's up, so let me yield time to Ranking Member Bera for his questioning.

Ranking Member Ami Bera (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Great. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and we can stick to the topic of critical minerals. Japan built those redundant supplies after facing economic coercion and retaliation from from China, I think, in terms of choking off some of those. And we're certainly at risk and experiencing some of that potential risk right now. So there is an importance and expedience to not just develop our own domestic supplies, but also look at in a strategic way how we go into, whether that's Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and build redundant supplies. And I would argue in the Biden administration, the Minerals Security Partnership gives us some vehicles by which to work with countries like Japan, Korea, and others to help build those and perhaps even go into—the Koreans are going into Mongolia, perhaps go into other areas. But this is, I would agree with you, Ms. Weisel, that I think this is a key area where we can deepen our relationship in a positive way with Southeast Asian nations, and we should do so. And, Madam Chairwoman, I think we have a hearing actually coming up soon looking at at that particular issue. Let's go back to digital trade for a second. While I wish we could go back to TPP, I clearly thought digital trade was something that we would get under the Biden administration, and obviously it didn't happen. It's in our interest, certainly in the region's interest. We can work off some of the existing digital trade models, whether that's taking the digital trade chapter out of USMCA or looking at some bilateral pieces. But maybe each of you, if you wanted to just touch on the importance of getting a digital trade deal done, maybe we'll start with Dr. Kuok and then work to the left with the region.

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

Thank you very much. I think in terms of the importance of a digital trade agreement, China is embedding its digital norms in the region through its deals with countries like Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos, et cetera. And once those norms, the technology and the norms are embedded, I think it becomes quite difficult to reverse. So there's very little I doubt there's very there's very little downsides to moving quickly on this issue. And I think the US should be alert to it, lest it be in the same position as it is now in terms of critical minerals, where it allowed China to invest in Indonesia since Indonesia banned the export of nickel and allowed China to invest heavily in its nickel processing. I think the United States was asleep at the wheel in that respect, and I think it needs to redouble if it its its efforts in terms of reaching and arriving on a digital trade agreement with Southeast Asian countries.

Ranking Member Ami Bera (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Right. Ms. Weisel.

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Yeah, I would just add that China is active in this region. They have just recently updated their China-ASEAN agreement, which now includes additional digital commitments, and there's active cooperation between the two. So I think that's something that we really should keep a close eye on. But I also would note that the EU is engaged with a number of ASEAN regions, and the EU has a different approach to digital trade rules than we do. So absent U.S. direct engagement in the region, we're ceding it to others.

Ranking Member Ami Bera (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Mr. Poling.

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

I would just reinforce that, that last point. We have 325 million people in a world of 8 billion and growing. We can either help set rules in partnership with others, or we can end up taking the rules. What we've already seen is almost everybody in Southeast Asia has now adopted a European-style GDPR regime. They did that because we had no alternative, and they asked and asked and asked and we didn't present it. Later this year, ASEAN will likely release its own Digital Economic Framework Agreement. We don't know what rules will be in there, but they won't be rules that the U.S. helped set. And that will be the story as long as we decide to take our ball and go home.

Ranking Member Ami Bera (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

And while IPEF would not have been the approach that I would have taken, it was an approach that the Biden administration took. And in our conversations, we looked at it as a high-standard negotiation, but not each country could actually meet, whether it was the labor standards, environmental standards, etc. And I think how I pitched it to the administration, and I would pitch it to the Trump administration, was in a modular way, right there. It's easy for us to do a trade deal with Singapore and Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Korea. It's essential for us to do a trade agreement with Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia. And each of those countries may not, at this particular moment in time, be able to meet those high standards. But if we use a carrot approach, if we use—and I agree with you, it's not really a trade deal without market access, because, obviously, that's what folks want. If the Trump administration is listening, I would strongly urge us to, in a bipartisan way, to try to figure this out. And if we don't set the norms and the rules, somebody else is, and we may not like them when we wake up. I'll yield back.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. Let me now recognize Representative Moylan of Guam for 5 minutes.

Rep. James Moylan (R-GU)SPEAKER_07

Thank you, Mrs. Chairwoman. And as Guam often serves as the first point of contact with the US for many ASEAN countries, I'm very enthusiastic about further advancing our relationship with them. In the early 2024, the US surpassed China as ASEAN's largest export market. This dynamic economic development underscores the importance of strengthening our economy tie with the regional group. However, the potential benefits of ASEAN are not limited to economics alone. ASEAN also plays a critical role in promoting regional stability and maritime security, deepening, deepening the cooperation for natural disasters, and more. Given China's growing influence in the region, it's imperative that we develop a comprehensive strategy to enhance our engagement with ASEAN, counter China's influence, and secure our national interests in the region. As for the economic aspect, the US is the largest source of cumulative foreign district investments, FDI, in ASEAN, and overtook China as the largest export market this year. Now, while we need to address unfair trade practice in general, we also need to consider the potential ramifications of proposed tariff increase on ASEAN countries, since many of them have export-dependent economies. To avoid the risks of these countries deepening their economic dependence to China, we should update our strategic engagement with them to promote economic prosperity both in the region and the US, and to build a more resilient supply chain. When it comes to regional stability and maritime security, the most urgent issue is China's aggression in South China Sea. Many incident incidents of harassment against the Philippine ships by Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been reported. And although ASEAN members don't all share the same stance toward China, if we can encourage them to share the common position on this issue, it would serve a powerful voice to deter further aggression. Mr. Poling, could you describe how opinions among ASEAN members are divided on South China Sea disputes? Also, how can the US encourage them to adopt more unified position to secure freedom of navigation and maritime security?

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

Thank you, Congressman. The Philippines is obviously the farthest on this spectrum if we were to lay it out. It has been the most forward-leaning in defending its rights. It's been the clearest in articulating the legal nature of its rights and its objections to China's through its arbitral victory. Just behind the Philippines has been Vietnam. There's no country on Earth, when you look at polling, that has more skepticism or anxiety about China or views China more as a revisionist threat than Vietnam. And that's because of China's aggression toward Vietnam in the South China Sea. Vietnam has been quietly supportive of the Philippines' arbitral victory in 2016. It has forged bilateral, quiet bilateral coast guard cooperation with Manila. It has engaged in its own large buildup of its facilities in the Spratly Islands in order to contest Chinese control. After that, there's a steep drop-off, I'm afraid. Of the other claimants to the waters or islands of the South China Sea, Indonesia, which hasn't often considered itself a claimant, has probably been the most forward-leaning in contesting Chinese activity. And Indonesia has had the clearest articulation, other than the Philippines, of what is illegal about China's claims. Malaysia has tended to bury its head in the sand and try to ignore the issue, at least at the political level. Of course, Indonesian coast guard personnel and naval personnel are as frustrated by China as anybody. Of the non-claimants, Singapore has really been the only one that has taken a firm position on the illegality of China's claims. And I think we have to recognize that there will never be a coherent ASEAN position on the South China Sea. Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, they are not going to invite Chinese retaliation on themselves in support of the Philippines or Vietnam. And so there has to be a claimant grouping, but not an ASEAN grouping.

Rep. James Moylan (R-GU)SPEAKER_07

Thank you very much. Ms. Weisel, based on your experience in the U.S. government, including U.S. Trade Representative, how do you assess the potential impact of the proposed tariff increase on ASEAN members? What do you see as the most effective way to advance our economic interests in the region? Sorry, you have very little time.

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

I think that the actions, as I said in my statement, have really put the U.S. at a disadvantage. The U.S. is seen as kind of impulsive, unpredictable, unilateral actions that is causing ASEAN to reflect on what it needs to do to hedge the risk against the U.S. and is forcing them to lessen their reluctance to work with China because they have no other choice. If they are going to be threatened by the United States, then their other major partner, China, is they are going to put that in the position of working more closely with China. And we've put them in that position.

Rep. James Moylan (R-GU)SPEAKER_07

Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. Let me now recognize Representative Amo of Rhode Island for your 5 minutes questioning.

Rep. Gabe Amo (D-RI)SPEAKER_10

Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, and thank you to our witnesses for being here. You know, as we've discussed, ASEAN is just an essential partner to the United States. It is an opportunity for American power, but also for global collaboration. And I believe the Biden administration understood this and made ASEAN central to our Indo-Pacific strategy. But I'm concerned about the Trump administration's foreign assistance freeze, chaotic tariffs, and what that's done to really take an axe to our relationship with ASEAN nations. And of course, as we've discussed already today, this really works against our efforts to counter China's influence in the region. And Trump's chaos and uncertainty has undermined our credibility as a partner while doing its part to hurt American businesses. Even worse, China is already stepping in to fill the void that we've left behind. And one particular way I want to highlight in my time today: I'm worried about a potential axe to the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, as we all know, the DFC. The DFC provides an enormous return on investment to the American taxpayer, advancing the United States's foreign policy goals and our economic interests, a true definition of a win-win. And the United States private sector is consistently the largest source of foreign direct investment in the ASEAN region. The DFC is also a perfect counter to China's Belt and Road Initiative, providing an alternative to that coercive financing scheme. In the first three and a half years of the Biden administration alone, the DFC advanced over $1.4 billion in private sector investments in the ASEAN countries. So, Dr. Kuok, as we work on legislation to reauthorize the DFC, how do you think we can ensure that the DFC continues working successfully in the ASEAN region to support our allies and combat China's growing influence?

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

Thank you very much, Congressman. I think you're right to point out the strategic strategic damage that the withdrawal of aid has done to the United States. Two caveats on aid: First, having aid in and of itself is, it might have hurt in some respects U.S. ability to engage with some of the regional governments who saw aid as meddling from the United States States, or some forms of aid as meddling from the United States. And there are some reports that suggest that the strategic return on U.S. aid was unclear. Nonetheless, the sudden and abrupt withdrawal of of aid from the United States to some of these countries sends an unfortunate message of U.S. callousness, especially when it impacts programs that mean the difference of life and death, between life and death in these countries, such as humanitarian assistance, health programs, and demining, which, as you pointed out, China has already stepped in to fill. On development finance, I think this is clearly something that the United States needs to step up on, and I urge I urge greater focus in this respect. China's Belt and Road Initiative, which you mentioned, was initiated in 2013. Amendments or revisions to the BUILD Act came in 2018, some 5 years after China's Belt and Road Initiative. Since then, the United States has had various infrastructure initiatives, development and infrastructure initiatives, including the Build Back Better World, which was then repackaged as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. And all of this is all well and good and very much appreciated in Southeast Asia, but it hasn't shown yet any concrete developments in Southeast Asia. So, I think urgency is the key here. Otherwise, it starts to feel like old wine in new bottles. So, certainly, the region is is in urgent need of infrastructure development, and all of this should be happened should have happened yesterday. If not, today or tomorrow would be great. This is not just in the region's interest. It's in the U.S. interest as well, as it seeks to reduce regional regional reliance on China as well as increase U.S. access in the region as well.

Rep. Gabe Amo (D-RI)SPEAKER_10

Well, thank you. Uh, I see my time is close to expired, so I will yield back. Thank you.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. I'd like to now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Representative Mackenzie, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Ryan Mackenzie (R-PA)SPEAKER_08

Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the testimony today. It's a very important topic as we seek to combat the rising influence of China, and I think we all would like to make sure that we have greater bonds between the U.S. and the ASEAN countries that we're talking about here today. So, for Ms. Weisel, we have seen in the trade disputes between the U.S. and China the restrictions that have been placed by China on critical minerals coming into the U.S. And what that means for our economic vibrancy is felt all across our economy, potentially. And so are there opportunities that you see for us to build greater relationships with other countries in the region so that we could have a diversified supply chain in this area?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Thank you for the question, Congressman. I think there absolutely are opportunities to build closer ties and stronger supply chains. We know this from going back to the first Trump administration when the U.S. was encouraging companies to build China Plus One strategies, and ASEAN understood that they were going to be a beneficiary of that. Several of the ASEAN countries have important critical minerals and are looking to develop their supply chains. They see the United States as an important partner in helping them build both their, build out their critical mineral supply chains, and they are quite interested in partnering with us. I think that what we need to show here is consistency. Some of the signals that we sent, for instance, that we want to build our own supply chains, but we have a 232 investigation going on on critical minerals. So, if they partner with us, are they then going to be subjected to 232 tariffs that are going to undermine the cooperation that we're seeking to build? If we can overcome some of those kinds of concerns and come up with the kind of financing that we need to support industry in building those supply chains, I think we have some very interested partners in ASEAN.

Rep. Ryan Mackenzie (R-PA)SPEAKER_08

And that's great to hear because I think we saw that coming out of the the trade and tariff disputes back in 2018, 2019, is that the countries were willing to take on supply chain initiatives outside of China, working with the U.S. And I think that was actually a good benefit from that trade dispute in 2018, 2019. I think we have the potential again this time. With tariffs, there are two different issues going on. There is certainly the reciprocity issue that we see across the board being dealt with in in a lot of countries. And then there is China, that is unique. The the tariffs that are being placed on China are significantly higher than in other countries. And I think we have the same potential ahead of us here because countries were shaken in 2018-19. Doing business with China, they started getting out. Those that stayed, anecdotally, have come to regret that. And they have said, you know what, we got the warning shot in 2018-19, we didn't fully listen to you, we didn't get out, we didn't move our supply chains fast enough. And I think that that has a potential to be something that is going to speed up here in this latest round of tariffs. So, if you're saying that that willingness is there, then the potential for that supply chain disruption with the higher tariffs placed on China, I think, is very real, and I think ASEAN countries should be ready to take on that that American business, get away from China, and and I think we have the opportunity to have stronger bonds going forward. I'll close with with one other question for you is, when we look at this disruption in trade going on right now, I would like to hear from you, what other opportunities outside of critical minerals do you see as the greatest opportunity for ASEAN countries to take on? Is it medical devices? Is it basic manufacturing, electronics? What do you see as the biggest opportunity for those economies to take on?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

I think that they are very interested in working with us on the digital economy and strengthening their digital trade with the United States, but also within each of these countries. They all are very committed. They have large numbers of young people who are really digitally educated and do see that as the future of their economies. I think that they see opportunities of working closely with our digital industries and in finding ways to align our regulatory approaches.

Rep. Ryan Mackenzie (R-PA)SPEAKER_08

All right. Well, I appreciate that, and thank you again for testifying. I think we have great opportunities that lie ahead for the U.S. and ASEAN relationship and look forward to working on those together with everybody interested. Thank you, and I yield back.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. And I now recognize gentleman from Texas, Representative Castro, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)SPEAKER_11

Thank you, Chairwoman. And, Chair Kim, I appreciated working with you to reintroduce the bipartisan Partner with ASEAN Act today. This bill would give ASEAN the same diplomatic privileges and immunities that other major multilateral institutions already enjoy, a step that I believe would strengthen ASEAN centrality and U.S. regional ties. So I wanted to ask Mr. Poling, how important is it for the U.S. to follow through on this legislation and demonstrate that we treat ASEAN as a strategic partner?

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

I think it is quite important, particularly at a time when ASEAN questions whether the US will follow through on a great many commitments it makes. The legislation has been pending for, I think, 3 years. It was first introduced 3 years ago. At a time when ASEAN fears that the US will withdraw from multilateral engagement, at a time when the State Department has suggested that it will shut down the multilateral affairs shop within EAP, which is in charge of ASEAN affairs, this can send an important countervailing message.

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)SPEAKER_11

Thank you. And I want to ask Dr. Kuok, recent polling suggests that public opinion of the United States has dipped in majority-Muslim Southeast Asian countries following Israel's war in Gaza. And so how has the war in Gaza affected the region's public opinion of the United States?

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

As mentioned earlier, the drop in support for the United States since the recent Gaza crisis has been precipitous in Muslim-majority countries, about a 20 percentage point drop in support for the United States since the Gaza crisis. And support for China in Muslim-majority countries is averaging about 70% amongst Muslim-majority countries. And this was in the most recent poll as well, the 2025 poll. So, a slight decrease in support for China and increase in support for the United States, but still very poor support for the United States amongst these Muslim-majority countries. Amongst even Singaporean respondents, because Singapore has a minority Muslim population, I think sentiment is also quite bleak about the United States and its either inaction or its active support of Israel. And so, that has hurt perceptions of the United States. And I think the poll has most clearly reflected the drop in support for the United States amongst Muslim-majority countries, but it hasn't been limited to Muslim-majority countries or even the Muslim population. I think the humanitarian crisis is clear for all to see.

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)SPEAKER_11

And I want to ask you, given those things, you know, what the long-term implications for US credibility and influence in the region are. Particularly the longer this goes on?

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

I think how much it impacts the United States' ability to influence the region will depend on the situation on the ground on the ground and the extent to which I guess humanitarian aid is able to reach victims of this crisis. So it will wax and wane accordingly. That said, I think countries in the region are very pragmatic. So regardless of that crisis, I think it'll hurt sentiment, but nonetheless, countries will seek to work with the United States. And we see that from, say, Malaysia, whose prime minister has been the loudest and most vocal against— in terms of criticizing the United States for its support of Israel. Before Malaysia took up the chair of ASEAN, it actually expressed that it would seek, as ASEAN chair, to work with various important partners, and it mentioned a whole list of partners, but left out the United States. Since then, Malaysia has sought to clarify that it seeks to continue to work with the United States. So I think, even then, it wants to work with the United States, but the U.S. has to be there to offer up economic and security options.

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)SPEAKER_11

Speaking of the economic part, I have 45 seconds left. Let me ask you about the effect of the tariffs on public opinion as well, because that's another major issue?

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

It's unclear at the moment what the effect of the tariffs have been on Southeast Asia. The 2025 poll I mentioned was conducted from early January to mid-February, so before the US disengagement from Europe, before the US aid aid cuts, as well as before the tariffs. But I think it cannot but hurt the United States, given the steep tariffs on, as I mentioned, on many of the poorest, some amounting to almost 50% tariff rate. And these countries cannot afford these tariffs rate. So it's not only going to have an economic impact on the region, but as the Singapore prime minister pointed out, an impact on the global trading system, which will then hurt these countries, and it will hurt the United States as well. It might win a little bit in terms of gain an inch, but lose a yard, because in terms of strategic ability to influence the region and get the region to align with it on issues important to it, the US

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)SPEAKER_11

out of time.

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

Yeah, we'll be on a back foot. Thank you.

Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)SPEAKER_11

Thank you.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. Let me now recognize gentlelady from South Carolina, Representative Biggs, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. So, my first question is for Mr. Poling. So, in your testimony, you emphasized the strategic utility of the U.S. Coast Guard in Southeast Asia, particularly in countering China's gray zone tactics through partnerships, capacity building, and shiprider agreements. Given the success of China's non-lethal coercion via its Coast Guard and maritime militia, what additional steps would you recommend the United States take beyond current initiatives to strengthen and expand the U.S. Coast Guard engagement in the region, and how can these efforts be better integrated with the needs of frontline states like the Philippines and Vietnam?

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

Thank you, Congresswoman. I do think that it has been important to see now a small presence of US Coast Guard cutter, usually one at a time, conducting training activities in Southeast Asia. The US Coast Guard is stretched too thin. We have to acknowledge that it is not going to play a direct role in helping support, say, Philippine activity in the South China Sea. That's going to remain a Navy role. But the more the Coast Guard can be funded to forward deploy to the Indo-Pacific, engage in ship riding in the Pacific Islands, and training and capacity building in Southeast Asia, the better. The Philippines has done a remarkable job in standing up to China. And so far, the threat of US intervention under the Mutual Defense Treaty has what has kept this in the gray zone, where so far the Philippines can handle it. The most important thing from my perspective is that we continue to reinforce the application of the Mutual Defense Treaty and that we continue to fund the 10-year security sector assistance roadmap that we have promised to help modernize the Philippine military.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you. So I would like to kind of continue our discussion. You point out to the Coast Guard's effectiveness in building regional trust and countering gray-zone tactics. Given the strategic importance of Southeast Asia, what political and operational challenges must be overcome to expand U.S. Coast Guard deployments and agreements, such as the Shiprider programs or forward-deployed cutters in the region, and what specific support should Congress provide to achieve this expansion?

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

I don't think it's possible for the US to negotiate a shiprider agreement for the South China Sea. The nature of the dispute, its multilateral nature, makes it all but impossible. It would be far too politically sensitive in the Philippines for, I think, even the Philippines, our closest and oldest ally in the region, to ask. But more Coast Guard presence to help the Philippines bolster its own capability would be welcomed. And the key there is simply funding. The last time we saw significant increases in Pentagon budgets, there were efforts to cut the Coast Guard's funding. We need to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is an important tool of US power and credibility, not just the Navy.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you so much for that insight. So my next question is for Mrs. Weisel. Your testimony emphasizes DFC's role in catalyzing private investment to advance both development goals and U.S. strategic interest, particularly in Southeast Asia. In that context, how can the U.S. interagency better integrate on-the-ground insights to improve risk mitigation and foster a more stable investment climate for DFC-supported projects across ASEAN?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Well, I think as we look to restructure the way that we're supporting companies in the region, there is going to be an important opportunity to ensure that agencies that are on the ground in ASEAN are working together and coordinating closely. So you have the Commerce Department playing a particular role, you have the State Department having at least traditionally played another role, and the aid agencies also on the ground in these various countries. I think this is—as we're thinking about restructuring all of this, it is really important that we have input from all of these various agencies about what the priorities are and the ways that all of them can contribute to support DFC and other other ways that the U.S. supports U.S. business going forward. I think we've talked about here how important it is to be able to rethink the way we are looking at this given the competition that we're facing, not just from China, but from other countries that are competing in the region. And so I think we we need to have a very serious look at the way we've been coordinating in the past and what we need to do going forward.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_05

Thank you so much for your insight. And with that, I yield back.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Representative Olszewski, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Johnny Olszewski (D-MD)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much, Chair Kim. Thank you to Ranking Member Bera and to all of our witnesses today. I just want to first say how much I completely agree that the U.S. must strengthen our support for our ASEAN partners in the Indo-Pacific. So, I really appreciate you all being here and your comments today. We know this means defending a free and open region in the face of security threats posed by the PRC. It also means offering a reliable economic alternative and developing financing for countries like Laos that are saddled with PRC debt. And it also means supplying the kind of foreign assistance that USAID and our other development agencies have delivered to ASEAN and its member states for more than four decades. So, just lifting up our actions and words, and so appreciate the opportunity for the conversation. I know there's been a lot of talk. I want to turn a little bit to solutions through people-to-people ties, and so I was hoping that we can focus on that. I believe that we should be building on the friendship shared by our combined 1 billion people, and I'm proud that Maryland's Johns Hopkins is leading the way. In 2023, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies launched the U.S.-ASEAN Institute for Rising Leaders. However, President Trump's budget request seeks to end this critical educational and cultural exchange. Ms. Kuok, perhaps you can speak to—or Dr. Kuok, I'm sorry. Could you speak to the importance of engaging with youth and emerging leaders in ASEAN countries and for the long-term U.S. relationship with the region? How would ending educational and cultural exchange programs in the region affect U.S. influence there and open doors for the PRC to expand its influence? And if there's time, I'd invite our other witnesses to answer as well.

Dr. Lynn KuokSPEAKER_04

Thank you very much. I have to admit not to have thought very much about this issue because it almost seems very obvious that the United States is inflicting a grievous act of self-harm when it ends educational programs for the young people of the region who will tomorrow be the leaders of their countries. So, I think, clearly, this is a wrong-footed move, and it will hurt the United States. I mean, if you look at the youths in the region today, I think just anecdotally, some of them have been put off from coming to the United States States because of some of these concerns. But more broadly, a couple of weeks ago, the Shangri-La Dialogue of defence ministers took place in Singapore. And at that dialogue, the Defence Secretary Hegseth, he actually talked about how our futures are tied together. So, the futures of the Indo-Pacific and the futures of the countries of the Indo-Pacific are tied together. Yet it feels so much like the region is under an onslaught from this part of the world. So, it doesn't feel very much like a shared future. And I cannot imagine that it feels very much like a shared future for the young people whose futures are thrown up into uncertainty by some of the more thoughtless actions of the administration.

Rep. Johnny Olszewski (D-MD)SPEAKER_00

Any other thoughts on that particular topic?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

I would just add that a good case study of this is Vietnam, which used to train all of its officials and send people to Russia for education. And then in a certain year, that ended and people started going to the United States. They started going to Europe. And you saw a change in the attitudes of those people toward improving relations with the United States and deepening cooperation. So you do have these case studies that underscore the importance of these educational links.

Mr. Gregory B. PolingSPEAKER_09

I would add that there is no country in Southeast Asia that reports in the ISEAS survey every year that they want to go study in China. There are several now where they have to go study in China; other doors close. In general, the U.S., Australia, and the UK are the preferred educational destinations, especially for Vietnam, which provides the third-largest group of foreign students in the U.S., and the Philippines. Pausing interviews for student visas, canceling Fulbright exchanges, this is only going to harm the U.S. in the long term.

Rep. Johnny Olszewski (D-MD)SPEAKER_00

I appreciate that. And, Madam Chair, I think that reinforces the lessons that we learned when we were all in the Pacific Islands recently together on a trip that you helped lead. So I appreciate our witnesses that, and I think it sort of speaks to our committee's obligation to lift up these kinds programs for— particularly for— I loved the comment about the leaders of tomorrow and thinking about our engagement in that way. And with that, I yield back. Thank you.

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you. I recognize the gentleman from Kansas, Representative Barr, for 5 minutes. Kentucky. Kentucky.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Oh,

Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)SPEAKER_02

It's okay. It's okay. Thank you, Madam Chair, for your excellent leadership in holding this hearing. And let me key in on Dr. Kuok testimony when she talked about these ASEAN countries don't—or Southeast Asian countries, they don't want to be forced to choose. They don't—this does corroborate some of the public comments and some of the analysis from our embassies when I traveled to Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines. But, privately, in our meetings with our counterparts, they do want to choose. They want to choose the United States. That has not changed from the Biden administration to the Trump administration. I would argue, especially Indonesia, a vibrant democracy, they want to choose, they want to choose the United States, and that hasn't changed from one administration to the other. In fact, I remember very vividly when we were in Jakarta hearing a very stern admonition from the foreign minister, Marsudi, how terribly upset the Indonesians were and other ASEAN country leaders were that President Biden skipped the ASEAN conference. So this sense of a vacuum, it's not unique to now. It existed before the Trump administration. I think I think it's not a change in policy on trade that has given us this challenge of needing to deepen our ties with them. In fact, I want to challenge the critics of the Trump administration's trade strategy a little bit when they claim that the president's efforts to negotiate more reciprocal deals are pushing ASEAN nations towards Beijing or making these nations more vulnerable to Xi Jinping's acts of coercion. In fact, what is the objective of the Trump trade policy? It's actually to deepen our economic ties. It's to reduce the trade barriers to American exporters. And so if the end goal of this is more reciprocal trade between the United States and ASEAN, this has enormous potential to reverse the sentiment expressed by Prime Minister—Foreign Minister Marsudi that the Biden administration was not paying enough attention to ASEAN. So, Ms. Weisel, I totally agree with your testimony when you talk about a regional agreement that should consolidate and expand ASEAN commitments to eliminate tariff and nontariff barriers in goods and services across the region. You say it also should require new commitments on customs and trade remedies. And then you say, in exchange, the United States should gradually eliminate tariffs on imports from Southeast Asian partners to the agreement. That sounds exactly like the America First trade policy. We're asking them to lower their trade barriers to American exporters, and in exchange, we will reduce tariffs on them. Why is this not—why does this policy not create an opportunity for greater economic integration between the United States and ASEAN to the detriment of the malign influence of Beijing?

Mrs. Barbara WeiselSPEAKER_01

Well, as I said at the outset, I think that they feel that the tariff threat hanging over them is a five-alarm fire. It has caused potentially tremendous damage to their economies with all of the uncertainty and the threats. I think that all of the ASEAN countries do indeed want to engage more deeply with the United States. They want to have greater economic cooperation, but they want to do so as equal partners in this negotiation. So, as we look to see areas where we can cooperate, they would like to see reciprocal access. In other words, they would take on the rules that we are pushing and in areas that are really important to us across the range of economic areas, when we talk about customs and digital trade and all of these areas that are important to the United States, but in exchange they would like something in return.

Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)SPEAKER_02

And I'm running out of time, but I, and I take your testimony in good faith that you argue that the Trump policy does have the opportunity to open up U.S. exports to Southeast Asia, but you still maintain that they will de-risk from the United States as a result of this. I'm not sure that's necessarily true. If we get better, more integrated economic deals as a result of the policy, I think they will de-risk from China. I don't have much time left, but I would love, maybe in a second round, Madam Chair, to talk about outbound investment into China, and what's going to replace that if we restrict outbound investment in China? Does that create opportunities for more U.S. investment into ASEAN as a way to relocate supply chains?

Chairman Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_06

My ranking member has just left for another engagement, and I wasn't planning on doing a second round, if you don't mind. So you can submit your questions, and hopefully our witnesses may be able to respond in writing. But I do have some closing comments, if I may. It's really evident from today's hearing that we need to do more to create a responsive and effective Southeast Asia-focused strategy. That begins with bolstering and strengthening our bilateral and multilateral relationship with ASEAN members. Our witnesses today, you've all charted out key suggestions, and thank you so much for that, on how we can advance our interests diplomatically, economically, and militarily. So it is imperative moving forward that we are able to deliver results in a whole-of-the-government manner if we are going to be the counterbalance that the region is counting on us to be. Success can be achieved to the extent our strategies, policies, and frameworks align with the needs of our regional partners. Additionally, we need results showing that a viable alternative to the CCP's state-driven economic model is available. We cannot allow Southeast Asia to be dictated by Beijing standards, and we must use every available tool to advance our economic agenda while punishing China's unfair trade practices. And now is the time for action. I encourage the administration and my colleagues across the aisle to work together to ensure that our policies would put us in a position to be the trusted partner in the region. So I want to thank you again for your valuable testimony and answering our members' questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witness, like Rep. Barr has, and we'll ask you to respond to those in writing. And pursuant to the committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations. So without objection, I declare the committee stands adjourned.