Surveillance, Sabotage, and Strikes: Industry Perspectives on How Drone Warfare Abroad Is Transforming Threats at Home

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security, will come to order. Without objection, the chair may declare the subcommittee in recess at any point. Today's hearings examine how drone warfare tactics used abroad are transforming threats to our homeland. From Ukraine to the Middle East, our adversaries are deploying increasingly sophisticated drone capabilities that can be adapted by terrorists, lone actors, or state proxies within the United States. This hearing will explore how industry leaders are innovating to help close critical security gaps and better protect our transportation systems and infrastructure. Without objection, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger, is permitted to sit with the subcommittee and ask questions of the witnesses. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. Good morning. I want to thank everyone for joining us today at today's hearing, which will examine how drone warfare overseas is reshaping the threat environment here at home. In recent years, the use of unmanned aircraft systems, or drones, by foreign adversaries, terrorist groups, and proxy forces has grown significantly. Once confined to distant battlefields, these platforms are now being deployed in ways that challenge traditional security assumptions and expose critical vulnerabilities across our homeland. Drones have become essential tools of modern warfare. On the battlefields of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian forces are deploying thousands of drones not only for surveillance and artillery targeting, but for direct offensive operations. These include quadcopters assembled from commercial parts, long-range loitering munitions, and first-person-view kamikaze drones enhanced by open-source software. They are low-cost, they are adaptable, and increasingly precise. Just weeks ago, Ukraine launched a deep strike inside Russian territory using a coordinated wave of drones, damaging strategic bombers thousands of miles from the front lines. Russia continues to rely on Iranian-made Shahed drones to bombard Ukrainian energy infrastructure, saturate air defenses, and inflict lasting psychological and economic harm. In the Middle East, Iranian-backed groups such as Hezbollah and the Houthis have demonstrated the operational reach and lethality of these systems. They have targeted U.S. service members, international shipping, and critical infrastructure. The drone strike that killed three American service members in Jordan in early 2024 underscored just how dangerous and asymmetric this threat has become. More recently, during a 12-day conflict last month, Israel launched a series of drones and missile strikes against Iranian military sites, some originating from launch points within Iran itself, illustrating how even layered air defense systems can be bypassed using prepositioned commercial technologies. What makes these developments more alarming is the accessibility of the technology. Many of the systems deployed abroad are constructed using commercially available components and open-source software. These tools are not limited to nation-states. Lone actors, extremists, networks, and transnational criminal organizations can easily acquire and weaponize drones with minimal cost and training. Here in the United States, the warning signs are emerging. Reports of unauthorized drone activity near airports and other critical infrastructure are becoming more frequent. Hundreds of sightings have been documented near military installations and sensitive energy facilities in the past year alone. The potential for a coordinated drone attack on our— in an airport, seaport, or mass gathering is a credible and growing threat. My home district in South Florida is particularly exposed. In major transportation hubs like Miami International Airport, the Port of Miami, and a dense network of energy and telecommunications infrastructure, we are a high-profile target. A single drone equipped with an explosive device or electronic warfare payload could cause significant disruption, physical damage, and widespread panic. We cannot afford to be reactive. The time to act is now. Another concern is the widespread presence of Chinese-manufactured drones operating within the United States. DJI, a company based in Communist China, commands a significant share of both the global and U.S. commercial drone market. Its platforms are used by private industry, hobbyists, and even some public safety agencies. In fact, even several DHS components have explicitly used DJI's AeroScope system to monitor drone activity near sensitive locations. While AeroScope may offer affordable situational awareness, it also raises serious concerns about the national security risks posed by Chinese-linked technology, especially regarding data access, remote-control capabilities, and potential sabotage during a future crisis or conflict with China. Today's hearings will explore what private sector is experiencing on the front lines of drone security, the counter-UAS tools that are currently available, and the extent to which federal, state, and local authorities are equipped with the legal and operational capabilities to address these threats. At present, the Department of Homeland Security has limited authorities to disrupt or disable malicious drone activity. Most state and local law enforcement agencies have no authority whatsoever. This is a glaring gap in our national preparedness, one that we must urgently address as we prepare to host globally significant events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics. We'll also hear testimony on the broader risks posed by Chinese-made drones collecting sensitive location data across the United States. These systems could be used for surveillance or even carry out attacks. This is not simply a question of data privacy; it's a matter of homeland security. Our adversaries are adapting rapidly. Our defenses must keep pace. That means updating our legal authorities, investing in next-generation detection and mitigation tools, and partnering closely with industry and state and local stakeholders. I want to thank our witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today and for their continued efforts to keep our nation secure. Your perspectives will help inform the committee's work as we seek to close dangerous gaps before they are exploited. I look forward to your testimony and to a productive discussion. And thank you. And I recognize the ranking member, the gentlewoman from New Jersey, Ms. McIver, for her opening statements.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Good morning. Thank you so much, Chairman. Thank you to our witnesses for joining us today. Before turning to the topic of today's hearing, I want to offer my condolences to the families, friends, and loved ones of the children and other victims lost in the devastating floods in Texas this last week. My thoughts and prayers are with are with all those impacted. As the affected communities begin to recover from this tragedy, I hope our committee will soon have the opportunity to examine what went wrong and ensure our government can better respond to future disasters. I also want to thank the brave first responders who helped prevent further loss of life, including Coast Guard Petty Officer Third Class Scott Ruskin of New Jersey and the other Coast Guard members on board Helicopter 6553, who helped save many lives from the floodwaters. The emergency response in Texas is actually relevant to today's hearing, as one helicopter involved in the rescue and recovery operations had to be grounded after a collision with a private drone flying in restricted airspace. The incident goes to show the threats drones can pose, even when operators have no ill intent, and the need for more robust government capabilities to address such threats. In recent years, drone usage has become commonplace across a wide range of applications, from emergency response response to farming to photography and news coverage. Drone operations provide benefits to businesses and hobbyists alike. As drone activity increases, we must ensure the government has the authorities and resources necessary to take action against drone operators who do not follow the rules, including both careless and clueless operators, as well as those who may seek to use drones to carry out attacks. Though such large-scale attacks have yet to occur within the United States, our critical infrastructure, mass gatherings, and government facilities are vulnerable to being targeted, especially by lone wolf actors. With the World Cup coming to the U.S. next year, including to MetLife Stadium in my home state of New Jersey, as well as the Olympics coming in 2028, the need for Congress to extend and expand the government's counter-drone authorities have never been more pressing. In October 2018, Congress passed legislation providing the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice with limited authorities to detect, track, intercept, and seize drones. However, just a few months later, incidents at Gatwick Airport in England and my home airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, displayed the inadequacy of C-UAS capabilities as drones shut down airport operations, disrupting travel for thousands of passengers. Given this subcommittee's jurisdiction over transportation security, I am hopeful that any expansion of authorities provides a path forward for protecting airports from drones. Last year, New Jersey was again the focus of media attention as the public reported spotting large numbers of drones and unknown aircraft flying over our state. Further investigation revealed that the aircraft were most likely authorized flights, but nevertheless, the incident revealed the government's lack of domain awareness and capabilities for protecting the national airspace. Moving forward, Congress must act to extend and expand authorities in a manner that provides the capabilities needed to counter the threats we face. At the same time, we must ensure counter-drone systems are operated in a safe and responsible manner that does not impact the safety of commercial flights or violate individual privacy rights and civil liberties. I hope the Republican majority will prioritize moving legislation to address counter-drone authorities soon. Thank you again for our witnesses for joining us today, and with that, I yield back.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

I want to thank the ranking member. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. Pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you, and please be seated. I would now like to formally formally introduce our witnesses. Mr. Church Hutton serves as AeroVironment's chief growth officer, a role he assumed in May of 2025 to lead the company's strategic expansion and long-term growth initiatives. Prior to this, he served as senior vice president of government relations, marketing, and communications beginning in 2024, where he played a key role in shaping AeroVironment's public profile and strengthening relationships with government stakeholders. A retired Army officer and combat veteran, Mr. Hutton spent a decade in senior staff positions on Capitol Hill, including on the professional staff of the Senate Appropriations and Senate Armed Services Committee. Mr. Tom Walker is the founder and chief executive officer of DroneUp, a leading U.S.-based drone technology company specializing in advanced American-made unmanned aerial systems and integration services. Under his leadership, DroneUp has become a key industry innovator, supporting a wide range of mission-critical operations, including border security, emergency response, infrastructure monitoring, and last-mile logistics. Prior to founding DroneUp, Mr. Walker served nearly 17 years as a U.S. Navy officer, where he led efforts to modernize digital systems and enhance operational support for the United States and allied special operations forces. Mr. Brett Feddersen serves as the vice president for strategy and governmental affairs at D-Fend Solutions, where he oversees the company's strategy, public policy, and engagement with the United States government agencies, policymakers, and regulators. Prior to joining the private sector, he held senior executive roles across the federal government, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the Department of Defense, and the White House. He is also a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and a former Pennsylvania state trooper. Mr. Michael Robbins is president and chief executive officer of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, the world's largest trade association for uncrewed systems, robotics, and autonomous technologies, representing companies in both the commercial and defense sectors. He joined the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International in 2020 and previously served as chief advocacy officer. Michael is also presently serving as an officer in the United States Navy Reserve. I thank each of our distinguished guests for being here today. I now recognize Mr. Hutton for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statements.

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on drone warfare abroad and how it's informing domestic investments that will help us prepare for threats here in the United States. I commend the committee's focus on these challenges and your efforts to enhance the safety of the American people and U.S. transportation systems. My name is Church Hutton. I serve as the Chief Growth Officer at AV, formerly AeroVironment. It's my pleasure to testify alongside my industry partners in highlighting the challenges and opportunities of providing effective capabilities to our servicemembers and first-line responders in light of the lessons learned from drone warfare abroad. By way of background, AV is a top producer and supplier by volume of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, to the Department of Defense, as well as a leading provider of counter-UAS solutions deployed overseas, actively protecting Americans, allies, and critical infrastructure abroad. This gives us a holistic view of UAS threats, mitigation tools, and the implications for both to U.S. homeland security. With major public events on the near horizon, including the World Cup, as you said, Chairman, America's 250th anniversary celebrations, and the 2028 Summer Olympics, we have a collective need to apply these lessons to address threats to U.S. infrastructure and public safety. Collaboration between Congress and industry is essential to ensure the safety of the American people and critical infrastructure from the evolving threat. Effective collaboration has a few basic tenets. The first is that we learn the lessons of the foreign drone experience, that authorities are granted to federal and state agencies to deploy safe and effective UAS solutions in what are clearly complex jurisdictional scenarios, and finally, that Congress provide flexible funding so that government agencies can validate and adopt technology quickly. State and non-state actors have increased access to drone capabilities and have demonstrated their ability to achieve lethal effects. The rapid evolution of small drone systems in conflicts, as demonstrated by Operation Spider's Web in Ukraine, of course, Israel's recent campaign against Iran, emphasized the need for agile, real-time collaboration to field detection and interdiction tools. These threats, of course, are not limited to overseas conflicts. UAS increasingly threaten U.S. critical infrastructure with techniques like drone swarming and GPS and radar jamming. Recent aerial intrusions highlight the need for advanced detection and mitigation technologies to protect our airspace and maritime domains. Additionally, acquisition processes must evolve to deliver necessary capabilities. We advocate for agile development and deployment of affordable, open systems, clear operational authorities, and government-industry partnerships to address these threats effectively. U.S.-based defense innovators have developed systems to detect, track, and counter these threats, which you'll hear about today. To meet these challenges, the defense industrial base requires strong demand signals, enabling policies, and streamlined authorities. We must act decisively to prevent foreign battlefield lessons from becoming domestic threats. AV and other innovative companies stand ready to collaborate and provide solutions, but policy inertia and acquisition drag remain significant obstacles. Collectively, we'll either address these issues now before we suffer a major drone attack in the homeland or we'll address them afterward, but certainly we will have to address them. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Thank you, Mr. Hutton. I now recognize Mr. Walker for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statements.

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify this morning. My name is Tom Walker. I am the CEO of DroneUp and a former U.S. naval officer. And I lead one of the nation's top drone technology companies. Over the past decade, I've been proud to play a part in the evolution of uncrewed systems from novelty tools to essential elements of our critical infrastructure. Today, we've all seen that these systems are also emerging as national security threats. DroneUp has operated one of the most significant drone services operations in the United States with tens of thousands of operators. We also built one of the most extensive drone delivery networks in the world. Through our work with the FAA and the national defense agencies, we have gained direct operational insight into both the extraordinary promise and the real dangers of drone technology. Today, our airspace faces an urgent threat. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the FAA recorded more than 400 illegal drone incursions over U.S. airports, representing a 25% increase over the same period last year. The military documented or reported 350 unauthorized flights over more than 100 bases. These are not isolated events. They are growing, sustained, and increasingly malicious. In one case, persistent hostile drone activity forced the relocation of F-22 Raptors at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. Despite weeks of investigation by the Pentagon, the FBI, and NASA, the operators were never identified. As a veteran, it scares the hell out of me to imagine if something like that had happened during Operation Midnight Hammer. And just two weeks ago, as the ranking member mentioned, during high-intensity search and rescue operations amid the July 4th flash floods in Texas, a privately operated drone struck a rescue helicopter over Kerr County, forcing it to land and taking it out of service while dozens were still missing. Fortunately, no one was injured in the accident. However, the incident could have had very different outcomes. It's the latest reminder that these are not hypothetical threats. They are happening now in active emergency zones and putting lives at risk. These threats now affect nearly every sector that is exposed to airspace misuse, including commercial aviation, critical infrastructure, prisons, and public events. Drones have recently collided with manned aircraft, and in some cases, have grounded emergency response efforts. Criminals have used drones to drop contraband into correctional facilities. They have conducted surveillance on energy facilities and seaports. This is no longer theoretical. The systems meant to stop this are simply not up to the task. The root problem is simple. We do not have an integrated national framework for drone oversight. The system we were promised still does not exist. We rely on fragmented tools, we rely on unconnected sensors, we rely on outdated approval processes, and this creates blind spots. It slows response time, and it leaves critical infrastructure exposed. But the solutions are within reach. The technology to keep Americans safe exists today. We must mandate a national real-time flight information exchange. We need a low-altitude airspace coordination system that provides law enforcement, regulators, and commercial operators with a real-time view of what is flying, where it is, and its intentions. We must unify all flight authorizations into a single secure process. We must bind pilot, drone, and mission data together using cryptographic credentials to prevent spoofing. All aircraft, manned and unmanned, should electronically broadcast their position to reduce collision risk and remain visible in our airspace. Remote ID signals must be authenticated and protected from spoofing. Detection systems such as radar, RF, and acoustic tools must be fused into a single integrated surveillance picture. The FAA should publish national mission priority tables. This must digitally be enforced by the authorization system so that emergency and critical flights are automatically prioritized. America must equip and empower local law enforcement by expanding its counter-UAS authority. Today, only a handful of federal agencies are authorized to act against rogue drones. That must change before the current authority sunsets in September. This is no longer a concern for the future. It's a present-day crisis. Each delay increases our exposure to a serious event. The technology is ready. What we need now is clear direction and decisive action. I stand ready to assist the committee in protecting our national airspace and ensuring the safe, responsible growth of uncrewed systems in the United States. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Thank you, Mr. Walker. And I recognize Mr. Feddersen for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statements.

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Good morning, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member McIver, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you on matters of critical importance to the national security and public safety of our country and our citizens. My name is Brett Feddersen. I am the Vice President of Strategy and Government Affairs at D-Fend Solutions, the leading counter-drone manufacturer of radio frequency cyber takeover solutions for drone threats, both domestically and internationally. I also serve as the chair of the Security Industry Association's Drone Security Subcommittee and have been working on the drone and counter-drone problem set since 2008. During my time in the military, as a federal civilian, and in the private sector, we've seen this problem grow. Today I hope to help the subcommittee better understand how overseas drones operations are transforming domestic risk factors, the status of the U.S. capabilities and legal frameworks, and offer targeted recommendations for Congress to bolster detection, interdiction, and resilience against drone-borne threats in the United States homeland. Drones have transitioned from niche reconnaissance tools to central components of modern warfare. Their wide availability, small size, low cost, and modular payloads make them attractive for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as destruction of critical infrastructure and effective delivery of ordnance. In conflicts outside the U.S., inexpensive, commercially available drones and do-it-yourself drones have become the weapon of choice. Alarmingly, these same drones are flown across the U.S. every day. There are over 1 million drones registered in the United States, according to the FAA, and that number is predicted to grow to 2.7 million by 2027. The weaponization of private drones in the United States is also a significant and growing concern. While drones have been beneficial application with public safety and various industries, their potential misuse, especially when armed, possess challenges for law enforcement and national security. Battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures for drones have proliferated through the internet and are ready to be used today. During my time at the FAA, we received several videos and briefings showcasing drones outfitted with chainsaws, flamethrowers, firearms, and makeshift chemical dispensers. Just weeks ago, the world witnessed a historic shift in small-drone warfare. Ukraine's planning and execution of Operation Spiderweb has rewritten the rule book on drone threats: distance, cost, and autonomy no longer constraining our adversaries. The audacious plan involved Ukrainians striking Russian air bases up to 3,100 miles from the battlefield using small, commercially available, AI-enabled drones. For context, this is equivalent to conducting an attack by drone in Los Angeles, California, from your home in Cape Cod, Massachusetts. This attack demonstrates the capability to build and deploy do-it-yourself drones at scale and at distance, accurately delivering ordnance to create strategic impact, vast destruction, significant assets. An attack like this can be prevented today using current safe and effective counter-drone technology, such as RF cyber takeover technology, which can detect, track, identify, and take control of the drone, then landing it safely when and where law enforcement or security want it to. The type of technology is legal and safe to use. It does not violate privacy laws, Fourth Amendment protections, and it does not implicate federal wiretap or pen trap statutes or regulations. According to the FAA data and previous DOD testimony, drone incursions have steadily increased since the establishment of the federal counter-drone authorities in 2018. That five-year pilot program is now in its seventh year. First responders report that drones are tailing SWAT teams, dropping contraband into prisons, spying on neighbors, and hovering over chemical plants. While the threat is local, the legal tools remain predominantly federal in nature. DHS, DOJ, the security industry, state and local law enforcement, tribal and territorial law enforcement agencies, along with trained security professionals, have repeatedly urged Congress to expand authorities to enable air domain awareness and drone protection in American communities and over our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, those requests have not resulted in any expanded new authorities, and limited authorities since 2018 have been periodically renewed only for short periods of time, creating uncertainty for law enforcement and the industry. To summarize, drone warfare abroad has evolved rapidly over the past decade. Regrettably, U.S. legislation, regulation, and policy has not. Today, we, we should acknowledge the topic of drone threats in our homeland is neither timely nor new. What we can say is that the threat is real, the United States is vulnerable, and that without bold and immediate legislative action, the American public will remain unprotected from a drone attack. The industry agrees an attack is only a matter of time, is not a matter of if it will happen. I strongly urge the subcommittee and the full committee to take immediate action in meaningful bipartisan legislation. The industry, public safety professionals, and American public are calling for 3 simple actions that can be taken now to make Americans and our skies safer. Expand authorities to state and local law enforcement and train security professionals guarding our critical infrastructure. Develop and implement a counter-UAS training program using federally accredited curriculum. And provide dedicated funding programs that enable critical infrastructure operators to procure, train, deploy, and operate counter-UAS systems. Thank you for your leadership and the opportunity to appear before you. I look forward to taking your questions.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Thank you, Mr. Feddersen. I now recognize Mr. Robbins for 5 minutes to summarize his opening statement.

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member McIver and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It's an honor to be with you here again today and to represent AUVSI and our member companies that are providing solutions in aviation and national security every day. We're at a pivotal moment in aviation history. Drones and advanced aviation are unlocking tremendous gains for safety, security, technology, and economic opportunity. And these technologies, they're no longer theoretical. They're delivering real-world value today across our economy and for our Armed Forces. Drones are enhancing public safety, enabling faster emergency response, improving infrastructure inspections, supporting precision agriculture, and expanding package delivery networks. And across the country, high-rate production facilities are coming online. Thousands of skilled manufacturing jobs are being created, and these innovations are expanding access to aviation careers. But all of that progress and the significant national benefit it represents is at risk today if we fail to address the growing security threats posed by the malicious use of drones. We've long rightly focused on aviation safety, but we can no longer afford to ignore the security side of the equation. I actually entered this industry in direct response to a drone incident. As mentioned by Ranking Member McIver, in December of 2018, London's Gatwick Airport, the second busiest in the UK, was shut down for nearly 24 hours because of a drone, or possibly multiple drones, spotted near the airfield. The government and the airport were paralyzed. Thousands of flights across Europe were canceled or delayed, and in the end, no one could say with certainty what happened, how to respond, or if the drones were actually ever even there. In the aftermath of that event, I formed and staffed the Blue Ribbon Task Force on UAS Mitigation at Airports on behalf of AUVSI and Airports Council International-North America. And our mission was simple: make sure a Gatwick-style shutdown never happens in the United States. And the task force made dozens of policy recommendations to Congress to help achieve that goal. Unfortunately, most of those have still not been acted upon. And in the years since, we've seen far more serious and frequent drone incursions at military installations, as mentioned, at Langley Air Force Base, at commercial airports and ports and power plants, prisons and disaster response sites, stadiums, and even the White House complex. And a Chinese DJI drone was even used in the attempted assassination of President Trump around this time last summer. We've seen mass confusion over drones, or what some mistakenly thought to be drones, in New Jersey last December, resulting in significant media excitement and very few answers. And we've seen drone warfare evolve at a blistering pace overseas, from Ukraine and the stunning spiderweb swarm attack last month to the Middle East and Africa, where small, low-cost drones are being used to overwhelm air defenses and carry out coordinated strikes with devastating efficiency. And despite all of this, US policy hasn't changed. Not meaningfully and not at the scale this threat demands. This is not a technology problem. AUVSI member companies, including the three at this witness table with me today, have built and deployed proven, effective solutions for detection, identification, and mitigation of rogue drones. This is a policy failure, and that failure is putting American lives, infrastructure, and national security at risk. There is a great deal of finger-pointing whenever unauthorized drones disrupt sensitive airspace. But let me be clear: Congress should not be pointing any fingers unless holding up a mirror. The last expansion of counter-UAS authorities was in 2018, 7 years ago, and the authorities granted are limited and clearly inadequate for addressing the evolving threat. This is an unacceptably long timeline. Furthermore, the lack of progress is unjust to local, state, tribal, and federal authorities, including Capitol Police, as well as infrastructure owners and operators who lack the tools and authorities to do much of anything in a drone disruption situation. We applaud the Trump administration's executive order issued last month restoring American airspace sovereignty, which begins to address these challenges. But executive action alone is not enough. Congress must act. We need legislation that expands detection authority broadly, especially to those responsible for protecting critical infrastructure and mass gatherings, and expands mitigation authority narrowly with strong training, oversight, and accountability.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

And

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

we cannot let perfection be the enemy of progress. We need to start chipping away at the problem with urgency and resolve. Congress can either shape the future with considered proactive legislation or be forced to react to the next crisis with confusion and regret. Every time a drone is used to spy or disrupt or threaten, it erodes public trust and jeopardizes the life-saving, job-creating, the future-defining promise of drone technology. The time for action is long past. Congress must act to ensure our airspace— to secure our airspace, empower those on the front line, and ensure that innovation and security are moving forward together. Thank you, and I very much look forward to your questions.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Thank you, Mr. Robbins. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 5 minutes of questioning, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning. Uh, a lot of the testimony, I think, hits, hits the point that we can either be reactive when it happens, or we can actually be proactive now and start to address this issue. Some 25 years ago, some manned aircraft systems were used to perpetrate the largest terrorist attack in American history. My fear is that in the not-too-distant future, unmanned systems will perpetrate the largest terrorist attack in American history using drones, obviously.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Um,

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

This is not something that's new to me. In 2017, I traveled to Israel. I was mayor of Miami-Dade County. We operate Miami International Airport. I went there with the explicit purpose of finding out from the Israelis what they did to protect their airports from drones, AI drones. I know we can protect ourselves from piloted drones, but AI drones. And their solution at the time was eagles, okay? And I just don't think we just have enough eagles to go around to do that. And so we haven't done much since then, and drone technology has just gotten worse—I mean, gotten more and more advanced. And I think the threat is expanding. We talk a lot about authorities, and so let me put an assumption to you. If a drone, an AI drone, were to interfere or incur into an airport, say, their airport space, would that airport have the authority to deal with it in a kinetic fashion, in a way to knock it down, in whatever way? If you can't do it through signal interruption, is there any way to—that that airport, does it have the authority to bring it down even though they may know it poses an unbelievable risk to their passengers?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

No, sir,

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

we do not have that authority.

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

No, sir.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Okay. Does anybody have that authority?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

in a very limited fashion. The Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Energy have the authority to mitigate a rogue drone, but it's not a standing authority. They can't just be doing that all of the time. The way Congress has restricted the authority at the moment has to go through a very specific approval process and requires a very high-level signature, usually at the deputy secretary level or higher.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Let me put an example to you. What happened in Ukraine, what the Ukrainians did to the Russians, it should be a wake-up call to us and a call to action. Because had that happened here in the United States, let's say a coordinated attack on major airports, yes, there would be loss of life, there would be injury, there would be a lot of damage. But there's something else that we're not thinking about: It's the economic damage that it does. In Miami-Dade County alone, Miami International Airport is the single largest economic generator of that county. 40,000 people directly employed by that airport, 300,000 people indirectly employed by that airport. If you had that kind of attack in the United States and say across the world, you could ground air transportation to a halt, to a halt, and that would cause irreparable economic damage. And so, I'm committed, and hopefully my colleagues on the other side of the aisle should be committed to confronting this head-on. We need to do this now. Because like you said, I live in Miami also, and we have things called hurricanes. Hurricanes aren't a question of if, it's a question of when. And I consider this threat by drones not to be a question of if, it's a question of when. The question is then, are we going to be proactive against it and try to mitigate that, or are we going to say, Oh, my God, and then do all kinds of stuff after the fact? What kind of legislation do we need in order to break through the barriers and actually give our state, local, and federal agencies the power that they need, the authorities that they need in order to protect the American public? Who'd be best to answer that? Mr. Walker?

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Thank you, Chairman. I think I would challenge the presumption that the immediate need is to be able to develop a reactionary device to— or a reactionary element to the strategy. I think a more important component is that right now we don't have awareness of the airspace, so we don't necessarily know whether the drone that's And recently, as you know, in Miami, a drone was spotted at 4,000 feet above the Miami airport. The question was, what was that drone? Who was flying that drone? What was their mission? And so we can't automatically make the assumption that just because a drone is operating within 3 miles or 5 miles of an airport, that is necessarily hostile. So we need to start with understanding what is in the airspace. Right now, we have no integrated airspace management solution that tells us who's operating, what platform they're operating, and what are their intents. And therefore, we also have no way to be able to authorize those flights and deauthorize those flights to be able to separate potentially hostile from non-hostile, or friend from foe. So we have to start with how do we identify what's in the airspace, is it a threat, and then from that point determine what we're going to authorize legislatively as the appropriate response to those threats. I think we have to start— we have to start there first.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

I will disagree on one point. I think we have to do all the above at the same time. We have to find out what's out there. But also, if it becomes— if we know it's hostile, we need to take action against it. So my time is up, and I recognize the ranking member.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much, and thank you all for your testimonies today. Mr. Robbins, am I saying that right? Robbins? Okay, Robbins. Robbins. Okay. I want to make sure I get it right. Thank

Rep. Timothy Kennedy (D-NY)SPEAKER_11

you, ma'am.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you for joining us today, again. As you are well aware, expanding counter-drone authorities to additional government agencies and potentially state and local law enforcement is a complicated task. Agencies must ensure careful coordination to avoid unintended consequences that counter-drone systems can have on airspace safety, especially in urban environments and near airports. In March, the Secret Service allegedly operated a counter-drone system without appropriate coordination with interagency partners, including the FAA. The system reportedly operated outside of the approved frequencies, resulting in automated alerts to the pilots of several aircraft flying around DCA Airport, which could have had an adverse impact to flight safety. With that being said, what can be learned from this incident?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Great, great question, ma'am. Thank you so much. First and foremost, I think it's important that there's a hot wash from that incident and that the lessons are understood and distributed to all currently federally authorized users to learn lessons from what occurred in that, in that incident so it doesn't happen again elsewhere in the nation. But I think one of the the elements that we can also take is is training and delegating authority to state, local, tribal, territorial law enforcement is not entirely new to the federal government. There are programs that exist now that include explosive ordnance disposal and and SWAT team training that are typically held at the federal level and then delegated down to the state level for through training programs, as well as with with federal grants as well. There's training facilities at Quantico, in Huntsville, Alabama, and other places around the country where state and local law enforcement go and they learn from our nation's very best operators, and then they are deputized to to go out and do these these kind of more, more difficult missions. Not necessarily every public safety official is therefore should be a counter-UAS operator, but some should be and and go through very rigorous training. And then it's incumbent upon Congress, in in my view, to to then provide oversight of that program and and how's it going, in the same way that that you're providing oversight on the Secret Service incident, providing oversight on on the the future authorities that are delegated down. Thank you, ma'am.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much for that. That was my part two question about what can Congress do. But thank you so much for that, because I'm always preaching about oversight, which is extremely important. Mr. Feddersen, I understand you have experience working within the executive branch, including at the National Security Council. What can we as legislators do to help ensure appropriate interagency coordination within the executive branch?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

I think the actual interagency coordination is ongoing and moving well. Obviously, there was a misconnection with the last incident that you mentioned. However, I'd like it to be known that out of the five-year pilot program for federal law enforcement, now seven years into the program, that was the first and only publicly broadcast issue that they've had. I know there's a concern with again moving that to private security or moving it to state and local law enforcement, but out of seven years, one incident, and it was deconflicted following the incident. And they have interagency processes in place to go ahead and deal with an investigation to follow up and correct those issues. So beyond that, I think it's just transparency between— I know some departments and agencies are a little slow to respond to congressional requests for reports, but I think that is, again, just transparency and communication coordination. I know that the interagency is talking about this issue. I know the interagency wishes that we'd have the expansion authorities. DHS, DOJ, and the FAA have all commented on expansion authorities. I think to wrap up that question, I think it's important to understand that there is no reason today why detection authorities and mitigation authorities cannot be expanded, so long as the individuals are properly trained.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you. Thank you so much for that. I'm short on time for my next question about drones flying over New Jersey. For some reason, they seem to love New Jersey. But with that, I'll yield back, Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Thank you to the Ranking Member. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, guys, for showing up today. Obviously, this is a very serious topic. I don't think that most Americans have the slightest idea how warfare is evolving, especially over in the Middle East and Europe right now when it comes to drones. And that greatly concerns me as somebody who sits on the Homeland Security Committee. A couple weeks ago up here in D.C., we were down in the SCIF getting a secret briefing from several of the agencies on our drone capabilities pertaining to many of these major events that are coming up in the U.S., like the World Cup, the Olympics, et cetera. One of the recommendations that I made was that we do everything in our power to make sure that these events take place in domes with roofs over the top, for obvious reasons. I think that would cut down a lot and seriously mitigate attacks from drones and the effectiveness that they could have in either dropping chemicals, dropping explosives, et cetera. One of the gentlemen in there said he would put that in his report, but he said he couldn't guarantee that it wouldn't be stripped out of the report. I did some research, and there are 10 NFL stadiums within the U.S. that have domes. I'll read those for you now. We got the State Farm Stadium in Arizona, Mercedes-Benz Stadium in Atlanta, AT&T Stadium Dallas Cowboys, Ford Field Detroit Lions, NRG Stadium Houston, Texas, Lucas Oil Stadium Indianapolis Colts, Allegiant Stadium Las Vegas Raiders, SoFi Stadium Los Angeles, U.S. Bank Stadium Minnesota Vikings, Caesars Superdome in New Orleans. Have any of you guys made any recommendations to the interagency or any of the other groups that are responsible for hosting these events about making sure that they do everything in their power to hold these events in domes? Go ahead, Mr. Hutton.

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

Thank you, Congressman.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Um,

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

would be happy to follow up in a classified session to talk about some of the things that my company and others have done to support federal law enforcement agencies at high-profile events. We have not made that specific recommendation, though it makes a lot of sense.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Why not?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

That's, that's been outside of our, our remit. It makes a lot of sense, and it's entirely possible that at the action officer tactical level that recommendation has been made, but as a company we have not. It's has not come across our path. However—

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Thank you for that. Let me ask you a follow-up, Mr. Hutton. And I know you can't give me a specific here, but what percentage do you think that that would cut down the threat if we were to host the Olympics and these World Cup games in domes when it comes to drone warfare?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

I think that would take a significant risk off the table.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Okay, can you—would you commit to pass that along and help me amplify that message to FIFA and everybody involved in homeland security and protecting Americans? Because I also looked up the average stadium size for the World Cup coming up, and it's between 64,000 to 105,000 Americans. If we don't think for a second that terrorists and other state actors who would be willing to commit an attack on U.S. soil doesn't see that as a fat, juicy, vulnerable target, we're out of our minds. Would you commit to helping me amplify that, Mr. Hutton?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

I'd be happy to.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

What about the rest of you guys?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Yes, sir.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Yeah. Okay. Um, thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Gentleman yields back. And I now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Kennedy.

Rep. Timothy Kennedy (D-NY)SPEAKER_11

Thank you, Chairman. And I want to thank you and Ranking Member McIver for holding this important hearing today. Up in New York, we have had many conversations about the impact on drones, both positive for the communities across our state, as well as the potential threats that are coming with the drones, in many ways in incursions into airspace. We know last year the worry, the concern, and the fright that it caused up in the Northeast, whether it be New York, New Jersey, and I'd like to know, especially being along the Canadian border, my district, the 26th New York, Buffalo-Niagara region, I have four bridges into Canada in my district. We are also aware that many of these foreign nationalists have used drones—when I say negative—to smuggle narcotics across the border. It is part of their network. How do we balance, as a government, the positive influence of drones in our lives, in the technology that society can benefit from, to the real negatives that an oversaturation of drones is bringing into our society?

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

I appreciate that question, and I think it goes back to what we were discussing earlier. And I appreciate the congressman's question about potentially moving everybody indoors for safety and protecting against that capability. But one of the things that you pointed out is probably the most critical point here, and that is we have both good and bad actors in the air, and right now we can't identify which is which, whether they're flying over a bridge for appropriate purposes, not flying, flying across the border for appropriate purposes, not flying. We have to start there. We have to start by having an awareness and seeing our airspace. The NFL, for example, has reported a 4,000% increase. And I know you pointed out that there's 10 stadiums. Ironically enough, there's 22 others, and they're mostly better teams, which I don't know if that has anything to do with being indoors or outdoors. But so we have to be able to identify what's operating in that airspace, be able to control and protect and restrict those operators from flying in those areas that we don't want, and then, and only then, should we be able to effectively initiate whether it's electronic or kinetic countermeasures. And I think that's where we have to start, and I think that fixes the problem. It also establishes public trust. Back to the ranking member's question about what happened in New Jersey, the bigger issue there, I think we all know, it turns out what was there was, if it were drones, was authorized. But we didn't know that at the time, and we probably should have known that at the time. And so, I want to just continue to re-emphasize that we need to understand what's happening. We need an integrated airspace management. We need to be able to be comfortable—you as regulators, policymakers, our Americans as a general public, and first responders and law enforcement.

Rep. Timothy Kennedy (D-NY)SPEAKER_11

Thank you, Mr. Walker. And thank you all for being here in your testimony. But, Mr. Walker, thank you for taking that question head-on. As a leader in the industry, what are your thoughts on it? How does the industry suggest that we regulate your own industry to make it safer and to prevent these bad actors from doing harm to our communities?

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Well, the industry is working, I think, aggressively to both grow the industry and create systems, technologies, and our own individual policies at the operator level that protect the general public. But we're operating in silos. We're fragmented, and we're awaiting a set of standards that we can mutually agree upon that both grant policies for how we operate and then regulatory authorities for how we leverage the systems that we've created. I think it's important, and I think Mr. Robbins said it earlier, I think everybody up here on this, that's witnessing now, the technologies exist. This is not a technology problem. We keep talking about it as though how do we solve this problem? We solve this problem by getting a congressional mandate, getting funding, and allow for innovative development programs to start testing these solutions. They've been around. And so how do we do it? The industry is ready to come together. I know we are. I know everyone else in our industry is. We just need direction, we need authority, and we need funding.

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

If I can add to that, sir, the issue is, like we said, the technology is there, and there is safe technology. The FAA has been testing, evaluating counter-UAS technology since 2019. Every one of our vendors, every one of the industry members, have to go through several levels of test and evaluation at every agency, every department, and every component. It's a burden on the industry to have to do that because the government can't share that information. But regardless, there are safe technologies out there that can detect, track, identify, and monitor airspace and give us air domain awareness, and it can be layered.

Rep. Timothy Kennedy (D-NY)SPEAKER_11

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for being here today. In today's world, technology is rapidly advancing, and with that progress comes new challenges for us in Congress, the federal agencies, and first responders at home. Unmanned aircraft systems become more prevalent in our daily lives. We must ensure that the safety and security of Americans are protected. This is particularly true for my district, which covers the greater New Orleans area, home to the Superdome. And I thank Mr. Crane for highlighting that we're a great place to have events, safe, secure. We recently hosted the Super Bowl, without incident, I might add. We have Final Fours, Sugar Bowls, countless conventions and festivals. I'd like Look, as I look forward and continue to work on this committee on bipartisan legislation that empowers federal agencies and local governments to counter the threats drones pose, and as my dear friend Mr. Kennedy just said, we know that there are great applications. We also know that there are nefarious applications. And so we must continue to work to endeavor to amplify those positive ones and discourage the negative ones. Mr. Robbins, my district and the Gulf Coast will soon be in the most active period of the of the hurricane season. How do unauthorized and unidentified drones interfere with disaster response activities such as search and rescue missions using helicopters or drones? And what are the potential consequences for survivor recovery and response safety given the new application?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Yeah, thank you for that question, Mr. Carter. And it's a it's a serious problem. Ranking Member McIver mentioned it in her opening statement as well as did Mr. Walker. The incident that occurred just a couple weeks ago down in Texas in a similar situation during search and rescue disaster response, an unauthorized rogue drone collided with a helicopter. We had a similar incident in California last year when a when a scooper airplane was doing water distribution on a forest fire also was struck by a drone. When that happens, it hurts public trust, it endangers lives, and it damages the reputation of responsible drone users across the country. And we have to do better. When there is an incident response, like a hurricane or wildfire or flood, there's a temporary flight restriction put in place. There is technology available that should be able to restrict the flight from occurring if the operator is responsible and looking at technology that the FAA makes available to to individuals who are operating these flights. And I also think it's important to distinguish between responsible commercial operators and those that are flying commercial off-the-shelf drones that maybe they bought on Walmart or

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

Are these Walmart-type commercial drones that are purchased capable of being retrofit to do harm?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

They absolutely are, sir. And the number one seller of those drones in this country is a Chinese company called DJI, which used to restrict their drones from flying in spaces like where there was a TFR in place or over an airport. And last December, DJI removed the geofencing on their drones, giving the operators—these are not typically commercial operators, sometimes they are, but oftentimes they're just random people who buy a drone and sometimes do stupid things with them. They've removed the geofencing, so now they can go into a zone, like the helicopter incident in Texas, that used to not be able until DJI changed their own rules.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

How can UAS intervention mitigate the dangers of drones, particularly with the Port of New Orleans or major sporting events, as I mentioned? We know that these drones, large-scale public events, street parties, Mardi Gras, I'm deathly afraid of what could happen. How do we detect and mitigate the dangers of that?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Yeah, as mentioned, it's not a technology problem anymore. All three of these companies, as well as many other AUVSI member companies, have technologies to provide a very complex, intimate portrait of the airspace to be able to distinguish between authorized drones and unauthorized rogue drones, and then as necessary, be able to take action, whether it's a kinetic or non-kinetic action against a drone to remove it from the unauthorized area.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

Real quickly, because I've got about 29 seconds, what can local and state government do to augment what we're doing at the federal level and what you're doing? We have local players, our state police, our state sheriff, local sheriffs, and police. Presently

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

not much. You can maybe, maybe find the operator and ask him politely to land the drone, but until Congress extends and expands detection and mitigation authorities and allows for delegation to state and local, local law enforcement. Unfortunately, those, those individuals, those great public servants, are left without many tools right now, and that's, that's unfair to them and it's unsafe to Americans.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

My time has expired, but I'd love to dig deeper into this, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. At another time. Thank you all.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Gentleman yields, and I recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Garbarino.

Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY)SPEAKER_02

Thank you, Chairman. Perfect timing, and thanks for holding this great hearing today. As the chair of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection, I'm especially concerned about the potential for foreign-manufactured drones to be exploited by adversaries to carry out cyber-physical attacks against critical systems. Many U.S. law enforcement and municipal agencies continue to use DJI drones despite security warnings from the Department of Homeland Security and CISA. Mr. Walker, Mr. Feddersen, from your perspectives, what are the cyber risks posed by these platforms, and do you believe agencies understand the surveillance or data exfiltration vulnerabilities they may be exposing themselves to? Sorry, Mr. Feddersen, if you want.

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Yeah, so I appreciate the question, sir. The cyber effect, obviously, we've seen in, in different formats, in different forms, capable of carrying a virus, injecting it to, you know, Internet of Things in different places. We, we've seen this happen. We know it's happened several times. Anything that can connect Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or anything that connect even on the LTE bands can inject some type of virus or some type of cybersecurity vulnerability into the system. This is something that I know the interagency is aware of. They're trying to address it, but when it comes from all the different threat vectors out there a cyber attack from a drone tends to fall low on the list. It's not that it shouldn't be up on the list or it shouldn't be considered, it's just a priority-based aspect of things. But we know the potential's there, we know it's been used in the past. Mr.

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Walker. Thank you. It's a really good question and it's a very important matter. Essentially, anytime that we have, uh, you know, interconnected devices, Internet of Things, on a broad scale like this, you have cybersecurity concerns. One of the things that we proposed in our written statement was that we need to have a digital flight authorization service that has cryptographic credentials for both the operators, for the platform, and for their intention, and that only when those 3 elements are fused together in an appropriate manner will we authorize that flight. That is just one approach that we believe is appropriate to ensuring that we are strengthening our cybersecurity wall against potential vulnerabilities.

Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY)SPEAKER_02

Mr. President, you, in your answer, you said that the interagencies are aware, you believe they're aware, um, and they're trying to address it. How wouldn't addressing it just be stop using the drones? Or, I mean, is there another way to address it?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Honestly, the simplest way to do it is to use detection and mitigation capabilities that are out there today. I mean, the technologies and vendors that are out there can identify and stop a drone from moving into an area that may be sensitive or protected. Again, when you talked about critical infrastructure, though, I think it's important for us to remember that critical infrastructure is protected by private security, not law enforcement. So when we talk about data centers, we talk about stadiums or anything else, or even power plants, even our own nuclear plants, are private security, not state and local law enforcement. So the authorities that we talk about must be expanded to them as well. If we're going to actually take care of our critical infrastructure.

Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY)SPEAKER_02

I've had this discussion with the NFL and a whole bunch of other people saying these authorities need to be expanded to local law enforcement when these issues arise. Mr. Walker, did you want to add something else? You look like you're about to. No? Any of the other two want to add anything? Okay. Mr. Feddersen, as we've seen, our adversaries have utilized unmanned aircraft system capabilities for various activities in conflicts around the world. Based on your work in the intelligence cyber operate— intelligence and cyber operations, how realistic is the threat of adversaries using unmanned aircraft systems for platforms to pre-conflict shaping activities such as mapping soft targets or collecting signal intelligence inside the United States?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Uh, it's already being used, sir. I mean, you just take a look at the borders, you take a look at the cartels, you talk, you talk to the cells that we know are inside the country. Um, we know the agencies are actively pursuing them and going after them, but the threat is here today.

Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY)SPEAKER_02

It's just not the border though. What, what else are they mapping out that we might not have— the public doesn't know about yet, or it's not, it's not on the top of their radar?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

It's pattern of life. I mean, they— so they watch agents, they watch, uh, officials, government officials going to, from their house. They figure out patterns that they can do surveillance and figure out patterns of airports, other critical infrastructure aspects of things. And we know in particularly prisons are being infiltrated every day with drones that are going back and forth. So again, it's being able to figure out guard shifts, patterns, different things like that.

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Yeah, I'd like to add to that, Congressman. I mean, there's been 3,000 drone flights, unauthorized and unidentified drone flights, over power plants and power installations in the last 24 months alone that we don't know who flew it, why they were there, and what their intention was and what data they collected. So sometimes it's difficult to answer your question on specifically what we're doing because we don't know who they are.

Rep. Andrew Garbarino (R-NY)SPEAKER_02

I had another question, but I've run out of time and I yield back. Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Thank you, gentleman from New York. I now recognize the gentlewoman from South Carolina, Ms. Biggs.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The FAA has reported over 1 million registered unmanned aircraft systems, more commonly known as drones, as of April 2025, with many more believed to be unregistered. Unauthorized drone incursions are increasing in frequency, particularly in proximity to sensitive sites such as military installations, nuclear power plants, which we just mentioned, and airports. Between 2022 and 2024, North American Aerospace Defense Command and the Department of Defense documented more than 600 unauthorized drone overflights of U.S. military facilities. Public reporting has also noted concerning incidents near critical infrastructure, such as the appearance of low-altitude drones over nuclear facilities and near commercial airport perimeters in multiple states. So, I think all of you are perfectly capable of answering my question, so I'll just leave it open. But my first question is, what are some of the direct impacts of unauthorized drone overflights at military facilities, airports, and maritime ports? And specifically for airports and maritime ports, could you explain the potential, the cascading effects that such incidents could or may have regionally or even nationwide?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Well, I'm happy to take that question, Congresswoman, and thank you very much. I think first and foremost, obviously, there's with each incident the potential for there being some sort of a catastrophic event. Thankfully, as mentioned, we haven't seen that in the United States as yet, but we have seen it overseas, as the topic of this overall hearing, how drone warfare abroad is changing the situation at home. But even without those catastrophic events, each time one of these incidents occurs, it erodes public trust as well. It also damages the public perception around the positive utility of drones. At AUVSI, we represent companies that focus on the defense against drones, but we also represent dozens of drone operators that are doing life-saving critical missions every day, whether it's for public safety or package delivery or other really important things for our economy and public safety. All of that could go away if there's a very terrible drone incident that occurs in the United States. And again, as we've talked about today, this is no longer a technology problem. The technology is in place. These three companies, as well as others, all have the ability to offer the protection to all the different sites that you listed. But Congress hasn't updated the rules since 2018. Obviously, the landscape and the threat environment has changed dramatically, and it's incumbent upon you as lawmakers to give federal officials more authorities and to be able to delegate those authorities, with proper training and oversight, to local, state, and govern— local and state police as well.

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

I think there's— I think there's 2 things to add back on there, and I think one of it is is really kind of a lexicon we've had for a while. We should get rid of careless and clueless. Just like a vehicle on the road in our highways, you either drive it legally or you drive it illegally. And the enforcement aspect of that needs to be understood. I think also when we say counter-drone or counter-UAS, I think sometimes that's a misnomer. Again, these systems provide air domain awareness. They are a safety tool. More than anything else, they provide safety to the general public. To any of the events that we have. The security element is there in mitigation, which is also necessary. It's making sure that you have the exact tools that you need to enforce what crimes are being committed and then take appropriate action through judicial process.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_01

Thank you so much for your insight. Mr. Walker, I have a quick question for you. From an industry perspective, what are the most effective tools available today to detect and neutralize these threats before they cause harm? And are private operators and owners of critical infrastructure equipped to use them?

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

That's a very good question. And so first you have to understand that there are a variety of technologies out there, from RF detection, acoustic— we could go down the list of the various different ways to to detect these devices. Everybody's technology is— everybody's system's an amalgamation of various different groups of those technologies. But, um, but no, not everybody has the availability that— and I've spoken with multiple law enforcement agencies who don't even know these technologies exist, much less have access to them. So I, I think back to what everybody here has been saying. First off, do we need to give— and, and I, and I really appreciate him pointing out that I think there's a fear about delegating counter-UAS authority down to certain agencies because everybody just assumes that that means we're going to be, you know, shooting down drones or taking down drones, and that's not necessarily the case. It is the identification of whether or not these are hostile or non-hostile. There's— again, I, I— we haven't said— we've said it enough, but I'm going to say it one more time. It's not a technology problem. They exist. Do, uh, the appropriate law enforcement agencies at all various different levels have access to these technologies. They don't, and they don't have access to the training for them either. So there's, there's a lot Congress can do to help make the situation a lot better and fast.

Rep. Sheri Biggs (R-SC)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

The gentleman yields back. We're going to go through a second round of questioning, and I'll ask each each of you to please answer answer this. Mr. Hutton, are you are you worried about a catastrophic drone attack happening in the United States?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

It's a very short space between the inconvenience, right, that we have seen to date— shutting down airports, raising alarm bells— and a catastrophe.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Are you worried about a catastrophic drone attack on the United States?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

It's very worrisome. Yes, the answer is yes.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Mr. Walker?

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Yes, sir.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Mr., uh, Feddersen?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Absolutely.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

And Mr. Robbins?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Yes, sir.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Would you consider that, um, that the— you're right that we've seen the enemy, and probably the enemy's right here, right? That, uh, we haven't given the authorities, and, and we have a, a fragmented defense system against, against drones. And, and it's— there's two, there's two levels really. There's the reckless Right? The reckless drone operator that puts life in danger not because they're nefarious, but because they're reckless. Okay? They're flying somewhere they shouldn't be flying. And then there's nefarious, and there's, and there's different ways to deal with each one. Do we have an— will you, will you help this subcommittee identify the different, different agencies, the different even committees, okay, of jurisdiction that we need to bring into focus so that we have a comprehensive, uh, policy in defense of, of our homeland. Would you commit to do that, uh, Mr. Hutton?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

Absolutely.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Mr. Walker?

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Yes, sir.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Mr. Feddersen?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Yes, sir.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Mr. Robbins?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

so recommend a Tiger Team so those jurisdictions can actually coordinate in a rapid manner.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

And Mr. Robbins?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Look, I put this hearing together, but I don't know every single committee that has jurisdiction on this. I'm sure the FAA is, which is part of Transportation and Infrastructure. Maybe Judiciary has it. But somehow, we've got a disjointed defense mechanism here, and we need to bring it together. This committee was formed in the aftermath of 9/11 to provide for the security of the homeland. We don't have all the jurisdiction to provide for that, and absent that, we need to make sure that we coordinate that with the other committees. And so, I'm afraid that, you know I'm afraid that—and I hope not, but I hope that we don't have to have an incident similar to 9/11 for us to come together as a Congress and say, These are the things that we need to do to counter this threat. These are the things that we need to do to counter cybersecurity threats that we have, that also could be quite devastating also. And so, I want to thank you for volunteering. The staff of this subcommittee will get with you all, and then we'll contact other folks what it is that said subcommittee, this committee, needs to do in order to coordinate this so that we do come up with a strategy and an adequate defense of the homeland, because as you can tell, I'm really scared about this. And I think it's just a matter of time since we've already— 9/11, you can say, Gee, nobody thought about that. Well, we've thought about this now, okay? And if we fail in this, it's our failure, and we can't say, Gee, we didn't think about it, okay? We are thinking about it, and we need to do something about it. I yield the rest of my time back, and I yield to the ranking member.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. This gives me the opportunity to talk about drones flying over New Jersey. As many of you know, last year we had the situation where there were tons of drones flying over different parts of New Jersey, which honestly sent people in a frantic. And you can understand why, even to this day, there are still drones flying over New Jersey. My sister was driving down the Garden State Parkway the other day, and she literally freaked out because she said she saw like a drone flying so close to the parkway. And it was just really scary, and honestly kind of gave people a feeling where it's like an aircraft out of space somewhere, and you're like, what is happening? Because people are not used to seeing drones just flying over them. And so it continues to be a problem in New Jersey. And we have been given information from the government about how these drones were not dangerous, they were okay, nothing. But honestly, I'm not even quite sure they understood where the drones— where they belong to, who they belong to, and can say that they weren't dangerous. We just don't know. And it doesn't seem confident that there is concrete, really good information coming from the government about these drones flying, especially when you have so many, and you can't really pinpoint where they are coming from. And so we spent the last hour and a half talking with you all, all of you sharing your expertise of what we should be doing, where we should be focused at. And hopefully we leave this committee to really put some meat to the bone on this matter and really come out of it. I think one of the things that one of you said was about the oversight, having oversight. But I just think we just need a more in-depth situation and process of how we are countering, especially these drones that we just cannot determine where they are coming from. So I would love to learn more, or learn more from you, for you to discuss. And anyone, honestly, I would love to hear from each of you of what we've learned from these incidents in terms of the government's domain awareness and the public's understanding, shall I say, with drone rules and regulations, because that's a problem too. Many people, if you see this thing flying over your backyard, people just don't even understand what is happening, what is the process, what is the procedure that these drones should just be flying, and who should they call, right? Like, who should I call if I see this drone? You know, first They're getting on Facebook, first of all, like tagging me and everyone else that they can think of about what is happening. But what is your input on that?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

I appreciate the the question. I'd like to start with the idea that these processes are already in place. Again, if anybody has issues in the community, they call their local law enforcement. If there's a security issue at a private site, the security knows who to call and kind of run into it. So again, if state and local law enforcement or private security would have had the technology in place at that point, the authority to detect and the authority to mitigate, they can identify drones and be able to call the FAA and find out whether or not they're authorized, not authorized. There's equipment, including ours, where you can whitelist drones, so you know whether a drone is actually authorized to fly in a certain area or not authorized to fly in a certain area. You can deconflict and focus your security efforts that way. But it has to be decentralized. It has to be pushed to the lowest level in order for the process to work.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much for that.

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

Now, here's what you didn't know, and this is part of the problem. Right now we have no integrated system which ties the operator and their qualifications and their certifications to operate digitally to the platform that they're operating and to their intent, where you can immediately identify who that is operating. That's the point that we've been trying to make for a long time, is, yes, it's great that we can go out and we see that drone, but to your point, you should have had no concern as a member of Congress or as a member of the general public that that drone is operating appropriately and is authorized. There should not be that fear. And if you go back to what happened earlier in New Jersey, the answer was nobody knew, because there was no system that provided the regulators and the airspace policy managers a way to determine whether the flights were appropriate or inappropriate. We have to start there.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much for that, Mr. Walker. Mr. Robbins?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Yeah, I'd just add to that, I think it also speaks to that erosion of public trust around drones. The drones that are still flying in New Jersey are more than likely doing some sort of important mission: infrastructure inspection, public safety, package delivery, things of that nature. Compare the erosion of public trust in New Jersey, though, to North Texas, where drone operations have been authorized in a trial program by the FAA to do significant operations in the North Texas area, and communities are fighting over who gets drone delivery next, whose public safety agency is going to get the drone operations to help extend the operational reach of their local police. So the inverse of that is when drones are authorized and the community becomes familiar with them, they become a huge asset to the community and a boost to public safety.

Ranking Member LaMonica McIver (D-NJ)SPEAKER_00

Thank you so much for that. And Mr. Robbins, I wanted to call you Mr. Robbins again. I'm sorry, and I'm out of time, so forgive me, Mr. Hutton. Thank you.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Ranking Member yields back, and I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pfluger.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this. And this is a continuation of multiple hearings that we've had and have been personally concerned about this for a number of reasons. But I'll start with just a statement about the fact that this— the weekend's and the last week's tragedies that happened in Texas, which we were involved in, had several local and state law enforcement officials reach out and say, What are we going to do? because the Chinese-made technology is allowing them to do things like search and rescue. But obviously we are concerned about that, and we have stated those concerns in this hearing room for at least two, maybe three or four years. So, not really a question so much as a statement of like, how do we go faster? How do we get to a point where we can keep up with that technology? And then I'll I'll go to Mr. Hutton on the conversation of Ukraine, which I've spent a lot of time studying. The iterative nature of the drones that we are seeing in that conflict is quite alarming, and I'm not sure that we're keeping up. So, it's kind of in the same vein as what I mentioned about some of our law enforcement needs. But what features of these drones raise concern of similar tactics, techniques, and procedures being used here against us, whether it be critical infrastructure, military bases, or the like?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

You put your finger on it, Congressman. Not just the technology, but also the tactics, techniques, and procedures are iterating at an incredibly fast pace. As has been mentioned already prior to your arrival, Operation Spider's Web in Ukraine, right, demonstrated the control of small UAS with kinetic payloads at 2,000 miles distance, indicating that you wouldn't even have to be in the United States or even on this side of the planet, right, to be able to conduct and execute a terrorist attack against U.S. critical infrastructure. We're there.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

So, with that statement, Mr. Feddersen, let's think about the truck, the 18-wheeler truck that the Ukrainians deployed against the Russian airplanes and fighter fighter aircraft. Is that a possibility here? Do we have a possibility of shipping containers being in our ports that have already those types of drones that are ready to to go pre-programmed?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

We do. It's a, it's a scenario that's been honestly discussed, um, kind of ad nauseam, uh, in, you know, in the community, uh, as to how it can happen. You know, it can be, it can be at the ports, it can be an 18-wheeler, but it can also just be a flatbed pickup truck or any other truck that's driving around.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

What resources do we need that we do not have right now to both protect against some sort of critical infrastructure, military, or even civilian type attack, uh, and, um, and what do we need to think about legislatively? And I'll open that up. We can just go down the line. We have a minute and 40 seconds, so

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

I'll move quickly. You need a common integrated air picture. 3 companies before you all make competitive products in this space. There is a supply of this capability.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

Who would run that air picture?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

Well, that, that would depend. Probably it would have to be, uh, delegated down to the operational users using a set of standards and certifications and validations provided or by the federal government.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

Mr walker,.

Mr. Tom WalkerSPEAKER_04

I, I think the other thing that you need to think about, sir, is the fact that it's easier to hide in a crowd. Drones in our airspace right now outnumber manned aircraft 4 to 1. That's going to double by 2027. That's going to double again by 2030. So as we're talking about the ability to defend against these threats, we have to equally be thinking about how do we quickly identify those threats. I mean, and I know I sound like a broken record on that, that's going to become much more concerning and much more of a challenge, because we have to remember, of those drones in the air, 99% or better of them are performing real valuable missions that are saving and protecting American lives.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

Mr. Feddersen, and will have 30 seconds to split it with Mr. Robbins.

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Yeah, real, real quick on the, on the whole concept, you know, it's integration. So we are collaborating to compete in space. We just need the policies to open up so that individuals can and figure out what they need. There is no one silver bullet, so all the systems tend to talk to each other and be able to cover each other in layers.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

Lastly,

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

yeah, as mentioned, the, the congressional rules have not been updated since 2018. Expand airspace awareness detection technology very broadly and expand the mitigation tools more narrowly with vigorous training and oversight of that program.

Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX)SPEAKER_07

Mr. Chairman, I've asked NORAD/NORTHCOM to to come and testify, and I think it's imperative that they do that. Because if we're going to delegate this, and we're going to integrate with the state and local level with a common air picture, which I agree with, then they're going to play a key role. And that positive identification is is absolutely key. Thanks for holding this hearing. Yield back.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Gentleman from Texas yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for the second round.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to follow up on the comments that my friend Mr. Pfluger started. You state in your testimony that swarms of small drones are prevalent, like those that were used in Operation Spiderweb in Russia, can be used to saturate enemy airspace, overwhelm air defense systems, and execute lethal strikes. How easy would it be for foreign governments to conduct similar attacks as Operation Spiderweb did here on U.S. soil?

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Well, I will say I have great confidence in our intelligence community and law enforcement that they're doing excellent work every day to keep us safe and prevent such an attack from happening in the United States. But from a technology perspective, as mentioned, the technology is there. It could be in this country already. And, uh,

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

How easy is it for that to be conducted? Is it something that is just far-fetched? Is it something, as our chairman has just suggested, something we really—let me kind of finish first—that we should not find ourselves flat-footed thinking, Oh, wow. We know this has happened before. Chairman Gimenez has said very clearly, Shame on us if we fall prey to another attack. And my suspicion is, as it was done there, causing some $7 billion worth of damage, we are one accident away from being a victim of it ourselves.

Mr. Michael RobbinsSPEAKER_05

Absolutely, completely agree with you, sir.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

So, and I know it's been said over and over again, what can we be doing? ISIS has actively encouraged lone wolf attack targeting public, to target public civilian spaces. And I know none of these are easy questions, and I know neither of you have easy answers for us, but because we are on a fact-finding mission to determine how we can better empower you and others to protect our homeland, what else can we do we can be doing? Any of you can jump in. Mr. Hutton, would you?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

3 of us here in front of you provide situational awareness and mitigation technologies. Those, uh, government agencies who would be our customers at the state and local level, and, and often at the federal level, cannot buy them. They cannot— they do not have a forum to, uh, to deeply learn about them and understand what capabilities are there. And if they did buy them, would not have the authority to employ them.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

Given that there's so many of them in the air, and you indicated, I think, Mr. Feddersen, that many of them are in fact providing useful tools, are we able to easily identify those that have nefarious actions versus those who aren't? The second part of the question is, we know that, you mentioned DJI, which is a Chinese owned and operated company that provides most of the commercial or, I guess, recreational drones. Do we know if those drones are able to capture photograph, images, videos that an independent person is using perhaps just for fun? Do we know if they have access with their technology to actually use that information unbeknownst to the operator?

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Every time they update the drone, every time it touches the internet to get a new update to it, new profile, all that information's in there. Going back to the the question, sir, about how easy is it: it's coding and algorithms, systems. People are doing it all the time with Raspberry Pis, creating their own 3D-printed drone. They're putting the control systems in there and figuring it out. And we see it with with drone light displays on a regular basis. I mean, the technology to do those swarm attacks and things are being used commercially in here. I think one of the things that we could all benefit from, especially after all the testing and evaluation that the U.S. government has done on systems like ours, is to publish a list of those that have already been deemed safe to operate, safe to use, so that individuals, especially critical infrastructure, can look at a menu of options as what they want, and we know that it's safe in the National Airspace System.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

46 seconds. Anybody else want to weigh in on that? Mr. Hutton.

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

Federal agencies have to have a level of certainty about the safety and reliability and effectiveness of the systems. Without the authorities to employ the systems, they don't get to the point at which they can determine whether those systems are safe, effective, and reliable.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

So the drone that looks like it's dropping off a package and the drone that looks like it's dropping off a bomb looks exactly the same, and that makes your job that much more difficult. My time's expired,

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

but that is why, again, law enforcement and trained security professionals who go through training for physical security and threat assessment are the individuals that should have these tools in their hands today.

Rep. Troy Carter (D-LA)SPEAKER_06

Well, I would encourage, Mr. Chairman, the, the joint committees that are working on joint legislation that we step up our game, because every minute that goes by that we are paralyzed by analysis, we are accident waiting to happen. And I want to be on record, along with, with our chairman in this committee, and, and urging the, the joint committees to really push forward. We cannot wait for the next accident, and American lives loss. I yield.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Fully agree. And the gentleman yields. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Um,

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

A couple months back, I pulled in asked for a meeting with several of the agencies that were in charge of protecting the Capitol for Inauguration Day. I was very concerned about the president after two assassination attempts, and I was also concerned about just a a drone attack here or another type of attack when you've got all the members of Congress, all the cabinet executives, etc. That's a huge, juicy target. One of the things I learned is that Capitol Police doesn't even have the authorization to mitigate and deal with drones. So we introduced a bill, it's H.R. 3334. I would love it if the chairman would consider supporting this effort to give Capitol Police the ability to take down drones. I realize there's the Secret Service as well that has the capability and the authorization to do so, but if we're not even willing to give authorization to protect the Capitol, I think that's that's a pretty key indicator that we're not prepared to protect the rest of the country, which I think needs to happen. And so I appreciate, Mr. Walker, you bringing up the integrated airspace management needed. I know you've been beating that drum today, and I definitely appreciate it. Back to Operation Spiderweb that we've talked about a lot today, where the Ukrainians flew drones over 2,000 miles—some of the reporting says 2,800 miles—to attack Russian bombers. Very sophisticated operation. And I'm glad, Mr. Hutton, you brought up the fact that some of our adversaries could launch an attack like that that mimics that attack from outside the US. Is that correct?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

Yes, it is.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

They could do that from a country like, or a city like Monterrey in Mexico, or Ottawa, or Calgary in Canada. Is that correct?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

That's correct.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Have you guys done any assessments on—I talked about the average stadium for the World Cup holding about 7,500 civilians. Have you guys done any analysis on what a drone swarm could do to that many, that many citizens just watching a soccer game?

Mr. Church HuttonSPEAKER_08

We know from lessons learned in Eastern Europe exactly what that would happen— exactly what would happen. You could put all of them at risk, every one of them.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Yeah, absolutely. Absolutely. Well, I appreciate you guys coming today. Again, I know I talked about this in my first round, but I want to publicly say that I think FIFA and Homeland Security should absolutely host all of these events coming up, for a short-term fix, in domes, because I think that that would greatly mitigate the threats that we're talking about today. Because when you host it in a dome, then you then you start filtering people watching the games through magnetometers. There's a whole new level of threats that you have to deal with, but at least mitigate much of the drone capabilities that some of these nation-states and bad actors have as far as targeting large populations of people, and we know that terrorist groups love to do that. So I want to make sure it's stated publicly. And Mr. Carter, I think he left, but I hope that my other colleagues on the panel will considering sponsoring my bill and working with industry leaders like yourself in making sure that we're proactive and not reactive, because as you guys know, this place moves at a snail's pace, and it almost seems as if most of the time we have to wait for a catastrophe to happen before we actually move on anything. So thank you,

Mr. Brett J. FeddersenSPEAKER_09

Sir, I applaud the bill that you and Mr. Perry put forward. We wholeheartedly agree that the critical infrastructure here inside the NCR should be protected. We would urge that we also protect the other 50 state capitols and legislatures that are there.

Rep. Elijah Crane (R-AZ)SPEAKER_03

Absolutely. Thank you.

Chairman Carlos Gimenez (R-FL)SPEAKER_10

Gentleman from Arizona yields. I think we've really put a light on the issue and and the fact that we as in Congress need to focus in. We're kind of spread out on on authorities, need to kind of focus this in. And and you have my my word that this this subcommittee and the staff of this subcommittee are going to work with you to identify those areas and those other jurisdictions and other committees of jurisdiction we need to work on in order to in order to really protect America, which is really what our job is. As you also can see, this is a a bipartisan effort. Both sides of the aisle see the threat, and both sides of the aisle are committed to to try to resolve this problem before anything anything happens. And so I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for for their questions. Members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned. Have a good day.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

You too.