A Dire Crisis in Sudan: A Global Call to Action

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Ms. Jacobs will be here momentarily. The Subcommittee on Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine the ongoing conflict in Sudan, its devastating humanitarian consequences, including widespread displacement, violence, and external involvement, and to review the conflict's root causes, developments, and the responses from the United States and the international community. I do recognize myself at this point for an opening statement. Over the decades, as especially our distinguished panel knows, the people of Sudan have been subjected to unbearable pain and suffering and loss of life, even slavery. Since the 1990s, I have been a vocal advocate for human rights, democracy, and stability in Sudan. And soon after Republicans took control of the House, I chaired a hearing in 1999 1996 on slavery in Sudan and Mauritania. Today, there's a dire crisis again in Sudan, necessitating a global call to action. I went to Khartoum, for example, in August of 2005 to to meet with President Omar al-Bashir and other government officials, a number of people from the faith community, to press for an end to the genocide in Darfur. The meeting was necessarily contentious. Bashir denied any wrongdoing or complicity in the killings, the Darfur genocide. In 2009, however, and I point this out, Bashir was charged by the International Criminal Court with committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. And in 2010, he was the first person ever charged for the crime of genocide by the ICC. After meetings with Bashir and other government officials, I visited two refugee camps, and many of you have done that, many of my colleagues have done that. Those two camps I went to in Darfur were Kalma Camp, and I stayed overnight at another called Mukjar in western Darfur, an experience that profoundly motivated me to do more to end the mass violence. When our helicopter landed at the remote Mukjar camp, thousands, and I mean thousands, a line was formed of these wonderful people, women and children dancing, clapping, singing beautiful African traditional songs. The people of Darfur have a remarkable generosity and spirit, and it was awe-inspiring. Just about everybody I spoke with, however, especially the women, told me personal stories of rape, senseless beatings, and massacres by the Janjaweed and Sudanese militias. I was deeply impressed with the dedication of the African Union peacekeepers, operating under extremely difficult circumstances, and urged international partners, including the United States, to better equip them. I was shocked to learn they were getting a little over a dollar a day. It was absurd. I went to Condoleezza Rice upon my return and said, please, we've got to augment that. We got to increase it. These soldiers are putting their lives on the line. They should not be so grossly underpaid and under not getting the kind of needs that they need in terms of munitions. In November of 2005, I chaired another hearing in the series on Sudan, and it was absolutely clear that the situation in Darfur was a genocide. At that time, over 400,000 killed and over a million displaced. We did stress, all of us at that hearing, the need for a comprehensive plan that can best contribute to peace and hold those who have murdered, raped, enslaved, and plagued the people of Sudan accountable. Meanwhile, Chairman Henry Hyde; Donald Payne, who was my ranking member from New Jersey; Frank Wolf; Tom Lantos; and a number of others, we pushed the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, that declared that the slaughter in Darfur was genocide, imposed sanctions on the malign actors, talked about helping the peacekeepers, and it was signed into law in October 2006. That law was built upon the Sudan Peace Act of 2001 and the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004. I also, and I wasn't the only one, called on the Arab League to leverage its influence over the Sudanese government by encouraging the government to end its military offensive in Darfur and accept a United Nations peacekeeping force, which was there under the auspices of the AU. They didn't do it. It was like crickets. We got almost no response at all other than, thank you, for raising it. So, here we are again. In January 2017, again on this committee, I objected to the Obama administration's decision to ease sanctions on Sudan. I know it had to have been a tough call. You know, we're always trying to look when the sanctions become counterproductive, so there was an argument to be made, but I thought it was the wrong one because Khartoum's government continued pervasive human rights violations. And we pointed out at the time the violent government actions against the Sudanese citizens in Darfur, Nubia, the Nuba Mountains, and Blue Nile alongside the persecution of Christians nationwide. I was also disappointed in 2024 by the decision to allow Sudanese warlord Abdel Fattah al-Burhan into the country for a meeting with the UN Secretary-General. Burhan, as we all know, has massive amounts of blood on his hands and should never have been allowed into the U.S. Yet the Biden administration delayed and denied robust sanctions against both Burhan and Hemedti, delaying such actions until the administration's final hours. So, we're glad when they did it, but we believe—I believe, and many of us believe—it should have been done sooner. There will never be peace in Sudan until there's accountability for the atrocities committed by the twin butchers of Darfur. Over 18,000 civilian deaths have been committed since 2023, with estimates as high as 150,000, and more than 10 million people displaced. These are not just numerical estimates, but it's the evidence of an appalling range of harrowing human rights violations and international crimes. Each murdered or displaced civilian is a person with dreams and hopes, family, person whose life has been taken or irrevocably changed by these atrocities. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces, SAF, and the Rapid Support Forces, RSF, are guilty of arbitrary killings, detentions, abductions, rapes, including the rape of children, repression of fundamental human rights, illicit gold mining, and child soldier recruitment. Illicit Sudanese gold, which the RSF struggles—smuggles, I should say, through the UAE, is crucial to preventing the continued funding of Hemedti's atrocities and perpetuating this bloody conflict. The RSF's main international backer is widely reported to be the UAE, which has supplied weapons and financial support. Other external actors such as Chad have been accused credibly of enabling arms transfers and have been implicated in supporting the RSF. Domestically, the RSF has allied with some non-RSF Janjaweed militias. It is clear that RSF is grappling with command and control, however, allowing its fighters to rape and to pillage, to target vulnerable women and children, and to attack civilian infrastructure. This is the opposite of capable government, and such behavior only confirms this to the Sudanese people. The SAF has received support from various domestic groups, including the Al-Baraa Battalion, known as the Popular Resistance, which openly espouses a militant Islamist ideology, and former rebel groups, including the Sudan Liberation Movement under Minni Minnawi and Mustafa Tambour. Externally, the SAF has received support from countries like Egypt, Iran, Qatar, and Turkey. Russia continues to pursue naval access to Port Sudan. I'd like to now welcome my distinguished colleague, Ms. Jacobs, for any opening comments that you might have.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Well, thank you, Chairman Smith. And thank you to all of our witnesses joining us today to testify and bring attention to the ongoing catastrophe in Sudan. Last month marked 2 years since the outbreak of war in Sudan. It is now the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Nearly 25 million people, half of Sudan's population, are facing acute hunger, and more than half a million people are facing famine. More than 13 million Sudanese have been displaced from their home since the conflict began, including nearly 4 million people forced to flee across Sudan's borders as refugees. And I have seen this suffering firsthand when I traveled to Chad and met with Sudanese refugees last year. And let's be clear, this is a war of choice. The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces and allied militias have waged this war, committing war crimes and holding the Sudanese people captive for their own selfish interests. And their external backers, particularly the United Arab Emirates, with their support to the RSF, in addition to Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia, have turned this war into a regional proxy war by supporting and arming either side, risking further regional destabilization. But despite this, the Trump administration is nowhere to be found. In fact, the administration's actions have only worsened the suffering of the Sudanese people. The Trump administration's sham foreign assistance review was really just a pretext to end most foreign assistance like food aid, disaster relief, global health programs, development and economic aid, and more. In Sudan, it's meant canceling millions of dollars in U.S.-funded life-saving aid. For instance, before it was illegally dismantled, USAID was supporting the heroic efforts of the Sudanese Emergency Response Rooms to open community kitchens and provide basic meals to Sudanese civilians throughout the country. Following the massive cuts to U.S. foreign assistance, which included USAID support to the ERRs, more than 80% of the roughly 1,500 community kitchens across Sudan have been forced to close their doors, cutting off vulnerable Sudanese civilians from life-saving food assistance. And the administration hasn't stopped there. Yesterday, they announced over $87 million worth of canceled humanitarian programs, including $30 million for emergency nutrition, water, and food aid in Darfur. The SAF and the RSF continue to commit atrocities against the Sudanese people, and the people of Darfur are facing a second genocide in 20 years at the hands of the RSF. Yet despite the clear need for the United States to play an active role in negotiations to end this brutal conflict, the Trump administration has failed to dedicate the resources necessary to do so. More than 4 months into President Trump's term, the administration has still failed to nominate an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, an NSC Senior Director for Africa, or a Special Envoy for Sudan, a position that the administration is required to fill by law. And just yesterday, during Secretary Rubio's testimony, he actually refused to say the word genocide and reaffirm his previous statements that the RSF is, in fact, committing a genocide. These actions, or lack thereof, show that Sudan is just not a priority for the Trump administration. And while the administration ignores the conflict and its human consequences, it chooses instead to provide weapons to the UAE, a country that is arming the RSF, fueling the war, and facilitating a genocide in Darfur. There is widespread and credible reporting that the UAE continues to funnel arms to the RSF, even though the UAE continues to deny this publicly. But instead of pressuring the UAE to stop arming the RSF forces currently carrying out a genocide, the Trump administration has chosen to blow through a congressional hold by Ranking Member Meeks and proceed with arms sales worth more than $1 billion, just as they did under the Biden administration. I believe that the United States needs to use its significant leverage with the UAE to pressure them to finally end their support to the RSF. That is why I, along with Ranking Member Meeks, introduced joint resolutions of disapproval last week to block the administration's arms sales to the UAE. If the United States wanted to, we could take tangible actions and make sensible policy decisions that would help bring an end to the war in Sudan and a sustainable peace agreement that ends military rule, establishes a civilian government, and provides a clear roadmap to democratic elections. Instead, this administration seems to be ignoring the problem and selling weapons that are fueling genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The Sudanese people have suffered enough. It is time for the United States and the international community to step up and focus on bringing an end to this war so that the Sudanese people can finally rebuild their country. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and with that, I yield back.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you very much. We are very pleased to welcome a distinguished panel of experts to provide insights on the ongoing crisis in Sudan and its far-reaching consequences before us today. We're We look forward to your recommendations in terms of policy. I do believe the Secretary of State said, both before the Senate and before our committee in answer to questions, that he would welcome a special envoy. We have a sense of the Congress resolution, because it is required by law, to do just that. I know that special envoys—and the key, as you mentioned a moment ago, Ken Isaacs, is he has to have, or she, direct access to the president. It has to be. It can't go through a bureaucracy, and it ends up somewhere over in Foggy Bottom. We've got to have that kind of access. And I'll never forget how well a person like Senator Danforth did, who had the gravitas and the ability to promote peace. Of course, peace remains elusive, but he did an amazing job, I thought, at the time, and as did some of the others who had those jobs. So I do think that's something that is evolving and will happen. It should have happened yesterday, but it will happen, I believe. So let me introduce, first of all, Ken Isaacs, who's Vice President of Programs and Government Relations at Samaritan's Purse. Mr. Isaacs brings over three decades of experience responding to some of the world's worst and most urgent humanitarian crises, from war zones to natural disasters. He is also a former director of USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, so he knows how it works on the inside of our government, and I deeply appreciate that kind of expertise. He led relief efforts in response, for example, to the Indian Ocean tsunami, the Darfur crisis before. And I remember a whole group of us responded to the tsunami, and if it wasn't for the work that was done by disaster relief, by our DART teams and everything else, so many more people would have died, even though it was a quick— I never saw anything like it. We had a bipartisan group who went to Sri Lanka and other places, and it was just— so thank you for that leadership. It's extraordinary. We'll then hear from Cameron Hudson, Senior Fellow of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Mr. Hudson has served at the highest levels of government, including as Director for African Affairs at the White House National Security Council and as Chief of Staff to multiple U.S. special envoys for Sudan. So what a perch you have to— oh, thank you— in order to say what needs to be done, and thank you for that. He also led the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum's Center for the Prevention of Genocide. And then Ms. Kholood Khair, founder and director of Confluence Advisory. Ms. Khair is also the host and co-producer of Spotlight 249, Sudan's first English-language political debate show created to engage a new generation in political discourse. I don't want to debate you, so thank you for being here, and please take such time as you— there's no clock. We really need to hear what you've got to say. So I'd like to now recognize Mr. Isaacs.

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Jacobs. This hearing has been long needed, and I'm grateful that even in spite of a late night that it was able to come together today. So I've been working in Sudan for 32 years. I've had the privilege to know all of its leaders and seen the inner workings of much of as what has happened. When I look at Sudan today, and I just want to ask the question: is Sudan in a crisis? Right now it is near collapse on all levels: political, security, economic, social, humanitarian, health, food security, and infrastructure. This war has been going on since 2023, and it is essentially between two armed groups, the Sudan Armed Forces and a heavily armed militia group, the Rapid Support Forces, which, it's worth noting, were previously the Janjaweed in Darfur. And they were reformed under security reforms that in the Khartoum Process, I think in 2015, was when they really started upping their game. And that came with EU funding. And a lot of people don't dial into that. But nevertheless, it is an experiment that didn't work well. And today, they have come to the level where they have now challenged the the Sudan Armed Forces, and there's a horrible civil war going on. The level of human suffering is horrible. Over 13 million people are displaced. 4 million have fled to other nations. The death rate, as you said, is somewhere between 28, 000 and 150,000 people. I think that those numbers are probably an understatement. 638,000 are in Phase 5 IPC. That's technically they're in famine. And we proved that through a detailed statistical analysis which was submitted and reviewed by the Famine Review Committee. There's an additional 8.1 million in Phase 4 food insecurity, that's near famine. It has been famine has been declared in both Darfur and South Kordofan states, and there are 17 additional locations at risk of falling into famine, and the total in all that is 24.6 million people are highly food insecure. The I have seen the effects of famine on individuals, communities, and nations, and the one point that I would point out about Sudan, it is totally a man-made failure. It is a man-made famine. And last year what we started seeing in March— well, actually it was in yeah, last year— hundreds of thousands of people were pouring into Kordofan State. And they were coming into a state that had a 41% decrease in crop production. But why were they coming there? They were coming there to get away from the fighting that was going on in the RSF-attacked areas. I know this because we had staff there. We interviewed them. It was a very exhaustive process. It took about 4 months. And those people's lives were in immediate risk. I have some photographs here. I don't know if it's attached to the paper, but this is what the famine looks like. These are photographs that the staff Samaritan's Purse took. And this is rampant. These are just two pages of photographs. I have hundreds of them. The Janjaweed was formed around in the early 2000s by President Bashir as a way to control insurgency in Darfur. What they're known for is chaos, brutality, and savagery, killing. They're a very brutal force. And that DNA has been carried over to some extent in the Rapid Support Forces today. Their mandate has always remained the same, although their geographical assignments have been sent reassigned from time to time. The current civil war has seen the RSF position itself against the very state that created it. I would concur with you on the command and control of the RSF. I think that it is so shaky that even if they entered into a peace agreement, it's not likely that they could enforce it, even with the best intentions. And as you know, tribesmen have come all the way across the Sahel and and joined the fighting. And I don't see any structure for pay other than whatever you can get is yours. So it's it's a very, very chaotic situation. What we have noticed also over the years over the last 2 years is that when you look at maps of displaced people and refugees, they flow out of the RSF areas, and they're going to SPLM-North area, and then they'll go into SAF areas when those areas are won back. In September of last year, I had an idea we we identified this one area in Western Kordofan. It's in the written testimony, but the malnutrition rate in household was upwards of 50%. And kids were dying, people were dying, they were starving to death. We had people that had eaten grass to the point where the raw grass couldn't be digested and it had ripped through their organs, and and they were dying. We came up with the idea of airdropping food, and it was that desperate of a situation. I had the opportunity to meet with President Salva Kiir, and I asked him if he would talk to General Burhan and ask for permission. He did 2 days later. Burhan agreed. And that led to a a protracted negotiation. It took us about 3 or 4 weeks. There were trips to Port Sudan, trips to Juba. In the end, we had a written agreement for 30 days to fly planes from Juba with food and airdrop that food in what's called Julud and Kadugli. It was challenging, but the program went well, and at the end of 30 days, the parties came together, and we extended it 60 more days. And in the end, we airdropped 2,502 tons of food. I will have to say that humanitarian access was fully given by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North and by the Sudan Armed Forces. Everybody abided by the agreement. The reason that I'm making this point is that agreements can be made. They are open to humanitarian access, and they at the same time have legitimate security concerns. When I was in Port Sudan, the government of Sudan asked me if I would go look at Gedaref, which is a city over in eastern part of Sudan. Gedaref was an interesting situation in that the population is normally 1.5 million. Displaced people fleeing the RSF fighting had come into the area, and the population was 3 million. The obstetric hospital was full. We were seeing three to five patients in a bed. So we set up an emergency field hospital there. This is Samaritan's Purse, and it was done with private money, not with any government money. And we treated thousands of people, and we were like delivering a lot of babies, and most of them by cesarean section. I think we delivered about 506. We had 9,149 patients and 562 babies. That work went very well, and I will have to say that the government of Sudan was very supportive. And you know, it was difficult getting visas and travel permit, and we're landing in Addis, and it's electronic. And a lot of the frustrations that they had, honestly, were limited bandwidth. And I didn't realize that until I drove through Port Sudan one day by the office of immigration, and there were over 2,000 people, I estimated, crammed into a little parking lot waiting to get into the building, and I realized, oh, they they have stepped away from whatever their administrative infrastructure was in Khartoum when they fled that city. So the security and the humanitarian situation in Sudan is truly a crisis, and, yes, an enormous amount of humanitarian assistance is needed, but the key issue is we cannot dig ourselves out of this hole or change this situation with humanitarian assistance. The war must stop, and that's going to require persistent, intentional political involvement. And that is really what's needed is to do that. You mentioned a special envoy. I second that notion. I think it needs to be an envoy that has direct access to the President of the United States, carrying gravitas. And why should America be involved in Sudan? An interesting question, right? What's our interest there? I think that if our foreign policy is built around governance of democracy, human rights, and humanitarian assistance, we have a weak foreign policy. We need to have foreign policy that's more forward-looking, and it needs to be transactional to the extent that we have some business relations, we have other relations besides wagging our finger and telling people what to do. When I met with General Burhan, he was very clear. He was expressly clear: he wanted American businesses to come to Sudan. He wanted American businesses to help on the Red Sea. He wanted American businesses in his petroleum and his mineral extraction industries. And he didn't pull any bones about it. He just said it directly. When I look at the Red Sea, and I think of real estate—location, location, location—the Red Sea is not so wide. On the other side are people that we're attacking right now, Houthis, because they're destabilizing that whole region. I think the argument could easily be made that anywhere on the Red Sea is of strategic value. The Russians are setting up some kind of military base. The Iranians have been there. This is north of Port Sudan. I don't know what those details are, but if the United States isn't involved, then it's a vacuum. And I think that if we find a way to be involved, and I think that we should find a way to be involved, I think it would be good. I have not seen sanctions work in North Korea, in Cuba, in Iran. They're just not working that good. And I think that we need to find a new way to bring peace to Sudan, and that is not going to happen if we don't have serious diplomatic intervention. That's the end of my words.

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Africa. Thank you for having me participate in today's hearing. It's an honor to be here, and I commend the subcommittee for focusing on this urgent and evolving challenge. And in particular, I want to thank both the chairman and the ranking member for your long history on this issue and for doing what you have done in recent months to shine a light on the drivers of this conflict. The views I express today are my own and should not be attributed to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, my employer, and I would like to request that the full text of my testimony be submitted for the record.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Without objection, sir.

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

Thank you. As the title of today's hearing lays bare, the ongoing crisis in Sudan is indeed dire and is worsening by the day. Now into its third year, we see in full relief the consequences of a distracted, disjointed, and anemic international response. We are faced with a conflict in which no corner of the country is safe for civilians, where battle lines now shift by the hour, where every single neighboring country is playing a role by both bearing the costs and reaping the rewards from this conflict, where civilians are sacrificial pawns in a game between generals and ambitious regional states, and where horrific humanitarian conditions now threaten the lives of more people than the fighting itself. Two months ago, Sudan's army retook the presidential palace in central Khartoum, signaling what many of us hoped would be a turning point in this war by retaking control of the capital. But in a war marked by momentum shifts, these army gains have been no sooner eroded and the very nature of this conflict transformed by the introduction of more advanced weaponry. Sudan is today an international arms bazaar, and the war itself has fully transformed into a battle for influence among a host of local and regional actors who seek economic, geopolitical, and strategic gain in the context of this war. This fight is existential for both sides, and we are seeing that both sides are prepared to do whatever it takes, ally themselves with whomever it takes, and purchase weapons from wherever they must in order to emerge victorious. To illustrate this point, in a matter of days this month, Sudan army drones purchased from Turkey bombed an RSF airbase in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur State, reportedly killing as many as eight Emirati military officers, along with mercenaries— local press reports—from Colombia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. This is in addition to mercenaries that have been documented as fighting on on the side of the RSF from Chad, Libya, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. The following day, the RSF countered this attack some 1,200 kilometers—or, sorry, miles away in Port Sudan, using their own long-distance and kamikaze drones. Drones from China transferred via the UAE through a field hospital covering as a military base in eastern Chad. This was a sophisticated aerial operation requiring planning, coordination, and targeting between forces based hundreds of miles apart on specific targets inside a crowded city. These are skills that we know the RSF does not alone possess and demonstrates that this war is no longer a conventional ground campaign with predictable battle lines. As troubling as the conflict and its humanitarian consequences are inside the country, its suspension and ultimate resolution are unlikely to come from the belligerents themselves. The parties remain unwilling to engage each other directly, and for a host of reasons, there is currently no civilian leaders that have emerged with sufficient influence to govern a new transition. Instead, we must directly engage the regional parties who are supporting the two sides to advance their own political, economic, and strategic ambitions. There is no single country better placed to do this than the United States, and it isn't too late to add Sudan to our agenda. However, rather than appointing a Sudan envoy whose efforts are focused inside the country, as some have suggested, we should also acknowledge where the power to end the fighting lies and realize that the Trump administration has already a fully staffed Middle East envoy team in place that is well positioned to take on this issue. As a first priority, the Trump administration must engage its allies in the United Arab Emirates about de-escalating and suspending their support to the RSF. It strains credulity for the UAE to continue to deny any role in this conflict. But make no mistake, the UAE are not alone in fueling this fight. And while suspending their support is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for ending the war. That's why the Trump team should initiate an honest conversation among all of our allies across the region about the risks and rewards they face in Sudan. Such a discussion would reveal that the United States, the UAE, and other regional actors active in Sudan, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, harbor many of the same concerns and share similar interests in Sudan: avoiding the country becoming a failed state, preventing Sudan from once again becoming a nexus for international terrorism, arresting a further degradation of Red Sea security, and avoiding a return of Islamist leaders to a position of authority in the country. I believe these are all shared concerns among regional allies. The people of Sudan deserve to see their democratic aspirations supported and the promise of their popular revolution fulfilled. But that conversation is unlikely to succeed until the guns go silent and those fueling this war are made to understand that an absolute military victory is simply not possible. If Washington does not use its influence that it has and initiate a de-escalatory dialogue with the region quickly, we will be left with little choice but to begin preparing a containment strategy for the forces that will surely lead to the breakup of Africa's third largest country. Thank you very much.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you so very much. Without objection, your full statement, as you asked, and same with Mr. Isaacs and Ms. Khair. Please, the floor is yours.

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Thank you very much. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Jacobs, honorable members of the Africa Subcommittee, good morning. I know you've all had a very long night, and your presence here this morning is a testament to your commitment to Sudan, and for that especially, I thank you. I'd also like to thank your staffers for their efforts in keeping Sudan on this committee's agenda. Congress has been a vital champion for the people of Sudan throughout decades of Islamist rule under dictator Omar al-Bashir, through the revolution and the transitional period, and was quick to condemn the 2021 coup that derailed the path to democracy and put Sudan on a trajectory towards this devastating war. In the interest of time, I'll be summarizing the points in my statement already submitted to the committee, and will focus on humanitarian situation and atrocities. This hearing comes at a crucial time. I think we all recognize that. Sudan is now the world's largest humanitarian, hunger, displacement, and protection crisis all at once. This apocalyptic situation is caused by this counter-revolutionary war led by factions of Bashir's security regime now at war with each other. As the heirs of Bashir, the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces are using every tool in the Bashir playbook, including ethnic mobilization, genocide, the use of chemical weapons, and the policy of starvation as a weapon of war, to capture the levers of Bashir's lucrative security state and position themselves to decide the political and economic future of Sudan. They are currently incentivized by their ambitions, their foreign backers, and their domestic political constituencies, in particular the broad church of Sudan's Islamists, to keep the war going for as long as possible in the hopes of eroding the calls for democracy, accountability, and civilian rule. All the while, humanitarian needs continue to mount, and Sudan is potentially facing another failed agricultural season. Famine announced months ago has not had the required international or national response. This is in great part because the Sudanese Armed Forces denies there even is a famine, and the Rapid Support Forces has systematically destroyed hard-won harvests and looted food stocks. The international community response has been criminally woeful, with the UN's humanitarian response only 13% funded, 1-3. To make matters worse, the UN's inexplicable decision to treat the Sudanese Armed Forces as the de facto authorities has made the entire international humanitarian system complicit in the starvation campaign that the SAF continues to wage. The deference has not paid off. Access blocks, movement restraints, holding up of permits, all hallmarks of the Bashir playbook, are all being used to devastating effect during this war, with only few exceptions. The only bright spot has been the volunteer-led humanitarian response rooms, the emergency response rooms, excuse me, and other mutual aid groups, who not only are providing the lion's share of the humanitarian response, in terms of providing food, medicine, safe spaces, and evacuations, but they're doing so with far fewer resources and under immense repression from both warring parties. The U.S. has been the largest humanitarian donor in Sudan, and the generosity of the American people has quite literally kept people and hope alive. With little clarity around what U.S. foreign assistance will look like after September, in particular with the shuttering of USAID, there will be a greater crisis and potential cliff-edge in terms of funding. The lifesaving work of these responders could see clinics and community kitchens, a lifeline for so many, close if no new or alternative funding is secured. This war has also seen many atrocities committed by both sides characterize much of the violence that we're seeing. The RSF, an entity created by Bashir's regime to violently clear people off land and to commit genocide, has been doing exactly that. In West Darfur alone, the RSF have committed acts of genocide not once, but twice against the Masalit ethnic group. The RSF have also run campaigns of terror, rape, and sexual slavery in Central Sudan, and recent testimony from the ground points to the systematic targeting of men and boys based on ethnic identity. Meanwhile, the Sudanese Armed Forces has been enacting systematic campaigns of indiscriminate bombings, often targeting civilians, with reports to use of barrel bombs, of summary executions, and the United States government has concluded the use of chemical weapons. Neither party has ever faced justice for doing all of this before, and that decades-long impunity continues to directly drive atrocities today. All of this has been facilitated by the steady gold-for-weapons pipeline that has gone into hyperdrive since April 2023, with ever more sophisticated weapons appearing in Sudan. Ground reporting from Darfur, especially Nyala, capital of South Darfur, points to flights likely delivering materiel to the RSF, often going through Uganda, Kenya, and Chad. Recent research and flight-tracker information shows that northern Somalia and Somaliland have also become transit points. All flights appear to come from the United Arab Emirates. Both frequency and volume of these has increased. The UAE's patronage of the RSF has drawn in Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in support of the SAF, with deepening rifts between these middle powers manifesting in their support to conflict parties in the Greater Horn of Africa, with huge destabilizing potential. As Cameron mentioned, recently we saw an escalation in the flights, in the drone attacks on both Nyala and Port Sudan. For me, the most important part of this is that we have seen foreign actors directly fire upon each other, with Turkish Bayraktar drone operators firing on Nyala, and the UAE firing directly back on these Turkish Bayraktar drone operators and injuring some of them. Shows a severe and very marked escalation in Sudan, following from last year's escalation between reportedly Egyptian military actors and the UAE as well. So, we're seeing an escalation here with no signs of abating. Middle powers, in particular the UAE, need to be pressured to do business differently in Sudan, as well as the broader region. Ending this war requires political agreements in place across all three levels of conflict: the local, the national, and the regional and international. This must take place within a framework that guides Sudan towards civilian governance, a system that could finally discourage competition for power through the gun. It is clear that this war represents something of an end of an arc of history. Bashir's regime is consuming itself whilst trying to survive this war of succession. In the meantime, many more RSFs are being created. What comes next depends entirely on how this war is resolved, with a view towards justice, reform, and civilian rule, or more impunity and power-sharing. Sudan's history shows that there is no military victory likely, and that given the right conditions, all wars, even ones on this scale, end in a political agreement. So what can be done? I'd like to highlight two recommendations. The first is for Congress to continue to put pressure on the UAE as it continues to supply weapons to the RSF used in their genocidal campaigns. Other U.S. allies in the region, such as Turkey and Egypt, responsible for weapon sales to the Sudanese Armed Forces, should also be pressured to stop flooding Sudan with weapons that are used in targeting civilians and that myriad militias can use to wage their violent campaigns. The U.S. must show diplomatic leadership instead of ceding ground to its predatory allies in the Gulf. This will require, amongst other things, a high-level White House envoy to take the lead on Sudan, to speak directly on behalf of the president with Gulf leaders—that's the only kind of level of envoy that they will respect—deconflicting their interests, and working with others to institute a holistic and inclusive political process that can pave the way for viable ceasefire talks. Secondly, and especially in light of the humanitarian and protection issues we've been discussing today, predictable and sustained funding for lifesaving work to mutual aid groups is imperative. Programming for youth groups in Sudan's war-affected regions is also key, lest the war be the only industry. Support to non-partisan media is also critical, particularly in efforts to counter hate speech. And finally, I'd like to ask this council to continue championing the wishes of the civilians in Sudan, who wish to see a Sudan free from the scourge of war, and with a political system that stops the continuous destructive cycle of war, death, disease, and conquest. Thank you for the opportunity to brief you today, and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you very much for your testimony and for your leadership. A few questions, and I'll yield to my colleague, then might have some additional questions as well. Mr. Cameron Hudson, I should say Cameron Hudson, the your point that we're now into the third year and we see the full-relief consequences of a distracted, disjointed, and anemic international response. We are faced with a conflict with no corner where no corner of the country is safe for civilians, where battle lines now shift by the hour, where every single neighboring country is playing a role. What can be done to put a tourniquet on—it's been three years. My distinguished colleague, John James, who was our chairman of the committee in the last Congress, got a very important resolution passed, H.Res. 1328. It was totally bipartisan. It condemned the RSF and the SAF atrocities, called for an end of the war, which is obvious. It urged the U.S. to take immediate steps at the UN Security Council to document the atrocities, support community-based organizations, and support tribunals to hold the RSF accountable. I'm not sure how much of that was done by this Biden, or now Trump is there, but he's only been there a few short months. We're hoping this hearing and the fact that our Secretary of State, who is tasked with so many jobs and is building out his own bureaucracy as we meet here, he has a lot of people he needs to get in place, but time is of the essence. There's been three years, as you pointed out, where maybe more could have been done. So I like when you said there's a desperate need of reinvigoration of a policy, and I think this is the perfect time for all of us to do that. I know that when the Secretary of State testified before the Senate and before the House, he was very clear that they are talking to the UAE. Matter of fact, my senator, senior senator from New Jersey, Senator Booker, pointed out that UAE is a vital ally to the U.S., and then he asked questions about what we're doing. And Senator Rubio said, we have expressed to UAE and other countries that they are turning it, Sudan, into a proxy war and destabilizing the region, that threatens to spill over and make it worse. We obviously have to do more, and your very specific recommendations on what more we need to be doing would be very helpful. I think you've done some of it, maybe a lot of it, in your testimonies, which we'll study very carefully, all of us. But I think this has to be the pivot point. If not, as you pointed out, by the hour, more people will die, more people will be maimed and abused, and at some point, it becomes even harder to put it all back together again because of the trauma and the PTSD and all the rest that follows such atrocities. So Mr. Hudson, if you want to start, and then I'll go to our two distinguished colleagues.

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's obviously a tall order—what more can be done? I think where I have focused my attention right now is as this war has evolved over the course of three years and as I reflect back on some of the initiatives of the Biden administration, right? I think we had a very traditional approach with respect to a special envoy for Sudan under the Biden administration. We've had over a dozen special envoys in the past 25 years for Sudan. So this is not a new exercise for the United States. But I think we have to think differently about how we approach this diplomatically at this stage of the war. We saw a special envoy last year, last summer, initiate what looked like a kind of traditional peace process or the beginnings of a peace process, trying to bring the parties around the table, trying to support civilian voices in the diaspora as an alternative to military rule. And I think that's a formula that we have that we have used before in Sudan. But I don't think that this conflict is right now ripe for that kind of traditional resolution. I think we have to focus on the drivers of this conflict outside of the country. There are a host of problems and a host of drivers inside the country that go back decades, that go back generations, that need to be resolved around the role of the state, governance, ethnicity, militarism, corruption, you name it, right? And Kholood talked a little bit about that this is the last gasps of the Bashir regime that are playing out in this country right now. But I think we have to focus, at least from a US perspective, because we're talking to the US Congress and we're talking about recommendations to the United States government. I think the United States government has a unique position to influence the regional actors in a way that no one else does right now, right? And I think that focusing on all of the states in the region that are playing a role, they are benefiting from this. They are also—it is also costing them because when you look at the refugee situation in places like Egypt, Ethiopia, South Sudan, it is a burden. Chad, it is a burden on these countries. But elites in those countries are also benefiting from smuggling, from this war. And so I think we can use our influence to focus on these regional actors in ways that we haven't done before. And I think that having worked on Sudan since the days of John Danforth and all the way through more recent envoys, I can say that 10 years ago, 20 years ago, we would not have been discussing the role of Egypt, of Saudi Arabia, of UAE. They were not a part of the conversation a decade ago, right? A decade ago, I traveled with President Bush to New York. He convened an international summit around the CPA and about the secession of South Sudan. He convened an international summit, as did President Obama, about the genocide in Darfur. There was a moment when the United States used its position on the world stage to convene the international community around the challenges that the world faced in Sudan. I think there is the opportunity for that kind of leadership from the United States. I don't know that it needs to be at the United Nations. I think that it could be within a group of Arab states and regional states within Africa and the Arab world that convene around this conversation. And as I said in my testimony, I think we have to acknowledge that all of these countries actually have legitimate concerns with the outcome of this war in Sudan. This is their region. This is their backyard. I think that they are in many ways undertaking the wrong set of policies to ensure that their interests are met. But I think that rather than, as Ken said, scolding countries for having these interests, I think we have to acknowledge that they do have these interests and acknowledge that we actually have shared interests in avoiding a worst-case scenario in Sudan. Yes, there will be things about the future governance of the country that we don't agree on. But I don't think that we can allow that to presuppose how we end this war, right? And I think we have to think about ending this war in stages. And I think we can all agree that we want a civilian democratic government to emerge from the ashes of this conflict. But until we can get to the ashes of this conflict, until we can end the fighting and silence the guns, I think it is premature to put out a resolution for some kind of civilian governance that is, I think, at least in the medium term, if not in the short term.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Ken.

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

I agree with Cameron. I think that you're looking at a society that has been ruled by militants. It's ruled by militants right now. And anybody that comes to power is not going to have success if they don't have the respect and the ability to contain the military to some extent. So what this may mean is that there will have to be a transition from the type of governance that it has now to the type of governance that can be seen in the future. But the number one thing I believe everyone should keep their eye on: end the war. Find a way to stop the war. And I think bringing a regional confluence of people together to share their views, see what their interests are, and to use our political clout— this is one of the things that I think is actually good about the development portfolio of USAID being moved into the State Department. These kind of things are uniquely political, and the State Department is going to be better prepared to handle those than outside negotiators. So end the war. End the war.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Ms. Khair, before you go to that, if you could also speak to—you obviously pointed out, as did our other witnesses, this is the world's worst humanitarian crisis, the world's worst hunger crisis. And you did point out and testify that the suffering is not incidental, and that the starvation is being used as a weapon of war. And this isn't the first time. Mengistu used it in Ethiopia with unbelievably telling effect. Even Aliyev with Nagorno-Karabakh used it in his genocide against the Armenians just recently. I convened a hearing right in this room where we had a prosecutor from the ICC say, This is genocide. They're using food as a weapon and wiping these people off the map either by moving out of Nagorno-Karabakh or killing them. And now we're seeing it happen again. So your thoughts—and again, Mr. Isaacs, you point out that there are 24.6 million people that are food insecure, 8.1 million in IPC Phase 5, technically famine, and 638,000—they were into 5—8.1 million in Phase 4. These numbers are just atrocious. And they didn't happen overnight. They've been growing over the last 3 years, or maybe longer, but at least 3 years. But if you could speak to food as a weapon

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Yeah, I'm happy to do that. I think one thing to notice that it's not the first time this has happened in Sudan either. Both Cameron and Mr. Isaacs will remember that this happened. The Sudanese Armed Forces and the government in Khartoum used this very effectively in what is now South Sudan, in Darfur, in Blue Nile, the Nuba Mountains, and other parts of Kordofan. So this is a very tried-and-tested policy by the authorities in Sudan to effectively kill as many people for as little amount of money as possible. Bullets cost money; starvation does not. There's another part of this, which is that the Sudanese Armed Forces in particular, with their authorities in Port Sudan, are using the limiting of aid as a way to assert a level of sovereignty, as a way to assert a level of sort of governmentality in the eyes of the international community. It is by limiting access to different parts of the country, it is by limiting aid, it is by limiting visas, it is by limiting permissions that they're able to assert the sovereignty. They're not able to show the sovereignty in any other way, certainly not in terms of responsibility. The RSF, of course, have been doing what they've always done, which is rape, pillage, and steal. And so we have here in Sudan no currently no entity that is actually wanting to keep people alive, unfortunately, other than the groups I mentioned earlier: mutual aid groups and emergency response rooms. Now, I think what is clear is that within the U.S. government, actually USAID understood this very well. USAID has had decades of engagement in Sudan, where it has come to the position where it's able to identify who the main actors are, particularly in terms of not just aid provision, but also to democratic transformation and other key areas that we're speaking of today. My fear is that with USAID being shuttered, all that knowledge throughout the decades will be lost, and any new team, particularly in the State Department, may not have that level of knowledge that is frankly needed to be able to read the scene properly. I want to very quickly comment on what you said about USAID—sorry, the UAE, and also a comment to what Cameron said. The idea that civilian rule is central to resolving the manifold issues in Sudan is not blue-sky thinking. This is not about a kumbaya moment where we instill a civilian government for the sake of civilian government. Having a civilian government in Sudan is the most practical way of changing the structure of the government such that it is not through the gun that you compete for power, but maybe through the ballot box. It is not by picking up guns that you get invited to the mediation table, but by having a political agenda. Unless that formula is shifted very sharply, we're going to continue to see the proliferation of armed groups. Twenty, thirty years ago, and Mr. Isaacs in particular will remember, there was only one rebel movement in Sudan. But because of the way that peacemaking has been done, effectively rewarding those with the guns by asking them to come to the mediation table at the exclusion of civilian groups, it has created a negative incentive structure that allows only for the people to really be represented through carrying a gun and through having an armed movement rather than a civilian agenda. So I think we need to flip this on its head, and actually now that this war has taken so much scope, that has reached every part of the country, this is the time to try to write that formula when it comes to, and correct that formula when it comes to, how peacemaking is done in Sudan. So sequencing is going to be very important. I don't believe we're going to get a ceasefire that lasts in any way unless we figure out what the political issues are going to be, unless we get a political solution. And when it comes to the UAE, but also Turkey, Saudi, Qatar, the UAE, these are all U.S. allies in the region that the U.S. is, as Cameron said earlier, uniquely positioned to engage. And I think unless that engagement happens, we're not going to get very far. They do agree on many things. Unfortunately, one of the many things they agree on is that they don't want to see civilian government in Sudan. But I agree with Cameron: They're going about this the wrong way. Civilian rule is the sine qua non of peace in Sudan. Without civilian rule, you're not going to get any kind of lasting peace in Sudan.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Just for the record, was the Biden administration as engaged in this as it should have been?

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

I think the short answer is no, but at least what we did see was some level of engagement with— on the subject. Unfortunately, we haven't seen that under this administration, but I am confident that we will be able to see at least some movement. And this hearing is a really good indication of that.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

That's why we're having it. Thank you so very much, Ms. Jacobs.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, uh, all so much. First of all, many of you know we had a very late night or early morning or whatever you want to call it of voting here in the House, and a couple of my colleagues were unable to make it here, but wanted to make sure their statements and questions were entered in the record. So, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the statements of Representative Jayapal and Representative Olszewski. Thank you. So, thank you all for testifying on this incredibly important topic. And I commend the Chairman for shining a light on the horrific war in Sudan that is not getting enough attention. I want to first turn to the dire humanitarian situation and highlight the heroic work Sudanese civilians have been doing in the absence of a functional government. Ms. Khair, you highlighted in your testimony the important work of the emergency response rooms. You just talked a little bit about them now, along with other mutual aid groups who have been providing emergency assistance and other essential services at a fraction of the cost of international NGOs. Following Trump's draconian cuts to our foreign assistance, 80% of the 1,460 emergency food kitchens have been forced to close. Ms. Khair, can you please explain to the committee why these kitchens were forced to close and the practical impacts of these closures?

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Thank you very much for the question. I think it's difficult to overstate just how devastating the cuts were to these kitchens. In part, it's because there hasn't been, unfortunately, enough of a shift internationally to understanding the value of these mutual aid groups. There's still very much this sort of orthodoxy when it comes to delivering humanitarian aid through large INGOs or the United Nations, which for reasons I mentioned earlier, particularly when they choose to consider one of the main belligerent groups the de facto authorities, they are effectively self-limiting and unable to deliver in the ways that they are. The emergency response rooms and other groups that arose out of the pro-democracy movement are uniquely placed because they are in communities to make these deliveries. But they have asked for three things. They've asked for recognition as humanitarian actors, they've asked for protection, because they are being targeted by both warring parties, and they've asked for partnership when it comes to delivering aid. Now, under the previous administration, there was a recognition of the unique role that they played, and there was a lot of engagement with trying to make sure that they're funded. But since the aid cuts have come in, sort of since February, we have seen an immediate closure of many kitchens in Khartoum particularly, but in other parts of the country, because the way that these groups work is that they need little and often rather than huge sums of money, as for example the UN might. And so when that sort of train of funding stops, of course it has an immediate effect. The difficulty now is, though some of that has been switched back on, and we have seen some aid be able to be delivered through these kitchens, the issue now is what happens after September? The issue now is, when it comes to these supply lines that are very urgently needed, especially in relation to healthcare and medicine, how do you maintain that when you don't know what's going to happen in the next few months? We're also seeing the supporting structure around these emergency response rooms, particularly in the INGO world and the UN, also being impacted. So effectively, it's an industry-wide sort of sea change that is happening, and that ecosystem is going to be massively impacted, and it is people on the ground who are going to feel that first and foremost. I'd also like to make very briefly another comment, which is that young people make up the majority of Sudan, so a lot of the majority of Sudan are invested in these groups, in these structures, as a way to basically sew back the fabric of this war, the social fabric of this war that is being ripped apart by this war. If you take away that work, if you take away these structures, not only are you going to be impacting the ability for people to stay alive, but these groups, these young people may also find alternative ways to engage in this war. And those may be, in fact, quite severe. They might be quite violent. They may be drawn towards other ways in which to engage in this war. So I think it's really imperative that these structures are maintained.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. I agree with you, and we'll keep fighting to get that funding. Mr. Hudson, as you laid out in your testimony, there is overwhelming evidence that the UAE is supplying the RSF with weapons that they are using to carry out genocide in the Darfur region. Would you agree that there is evidence to suggest the UAE has provided weapons to the RSF without the consent of the original supplier?

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

I can't comment on the relationship that the UAE has with China, or what the end-user agreement is. What I can say is that there is a UN arms embargo that exists that is nearly 20 years old on weapons transfers into Darfur, and I think it's safe to say that the UAE is in violation of that UN arms embargo. The only other country whose weapons have reportedly been found in the possession of the RSF are weapons from the United States. These are reports from the ground. They have not been verified because we don't have access to those to those weapons, but there are local reports and anecdotal reports of U.S. weapons having been found. I would encourage this Congress to do what it can to investigate the provenance of those weapons, to work with Sudanese authorities or other authorities on the ground to get the serial numbers so that we can trace how those weapons came to be in Darfur and in the possession of the RSF.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. Very concerning that there might be US weapons involved in this. Given the role that the UAE is actively playing in supplying weapons to an armed group carrying out a genocide in violation of a UN arms embargo on Darfur, with the potential that US weapons are themselves implicated, do you think it is appropriate for the US to be selling weapons to the UAE while they continue to support the RSF?

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

Again, I don't— I can't speak to our overall policy towards the UAE. What I would say is frankly acknowledge what Secretary Rubio said yesterday and the day before, which is we have a very full and complicated relationship with the UAE. We have a very full agenda with the UAE. And I think we have seen from the Biden administration over the past few years a rather pugnacious approach to the UAE. It did not move the needle with the UAE. I don't know that a threatening approach to the UAE, frankly, is even reasonable from this administration. I think Secretary Rubio made it very clear, and we saw from the president's trip to the UAE just 10 days ago, that there is a robust bilateral agenda. Will this administration decide to hold that bilateral agenda hostage to the UAE's support to Sudan or to the RSF? I doubt it. And so that's why in my testimony, I suggest, I think, a more realist approach. It might not be the preferred approach or the more optimistic approach, but it is, I think, a realist approach to acknowledge that all of these countries in the region, whatever role they are playing, they have an interest in what happens in Sudan. They have an interest in the outcome. And to lay bare the facts of that and to not pretend that these countries are not playing a role and to not pretend that their interests in Sudan matter less than our interests. I think we need to acknowledge very openly and freely what these interests are and look for a way forward that is not necessarily punitive, that is not necessarily congratulatory, but that is honest and realistic.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. And I think you're being a little diplomatic about the robust bilateral relationship when I think it's clear what President Trump is worried about is the $2 billion Emirati investment in his crypto company and the Trump Tower that will be building— be built in Dubai. But, Ms. Khair, same question to you. Do you think it's appropriate for the U.S. to be selling weapons to the UAE while they continue to support the RSF?

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

I think Sudanese people should not be held hostage to any U.S. allies in the region, and that includes the United Arab Emirates. I think Cameron's right. I think that we are very aware—we have been very aware under the Biden administration, but certainly now—that this is bigger than Sudan for the United States. It is about Israel. It's about the Red Sea. It is about other corridors, and Sudan in many ways is a very small part of that calculation. What I would urge is that the United States as a government system, including Congress, but also the administration, really look at the price of its current engagement with its allies in the region. And this is not just the United Arab Emirates, although that is the most acute case, but it's also the case with Egypt and Turkey as a NATO ally who are invested in this war. War is big business. Egypt is making a lot of money from Sudan, both through the gold and through the gum arabic that is smuggled there. The United Arab Emirates, of course, is making a lot of money from the gold, but also keeping options around Red Sea influence open. There are a lot of countries in this involved in Sudan. I think of it much more as a globalized war rather than a civil war. And unless the United States, as the key ally to all of these countries, really sort of grapples with—and I agree with Cameron—honestly has an honest conversation with these countries about what their interests are, not just in Sudan, but we're seeing this play out in Somalia, in South Sudan, in Ethiopia. Unless there's an honest conversation about what this looks like, I don't think we're going to get very far in terms of actually making life easier and better for people in Sudan and elsewhere.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. I think one of the important first steps is for the US to actually use the leverage that we have, and as the biggest weapons seller to the UAE, I think that is very considerable leverage. So, Chairman Smith and and any of my colleagues who are watching, I'd encourage you all to join my bill, the Stand Up for Sudan Act, that would block arms to UAE until they stop arming RSF, as well as the joint resolutions of disapproval that Ranking Member Meeks and I just introduced that would block over a billion dollars in arms sales to the UAE. And I have them here, Chairman Smith, if you'd like to take a look. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you very much. And Mr. Isaacs, you had You spoke about the emergency field hospital that at the request of the Sudan Ministry of Health you put set up for 87 days, staffed by 93 people. You had nine over 9,000 patients, delivered 562 babies, and you pointed out that that's a a neglected and vulnerable demographic, pregnant women and newborn children. Have there been other requests made? I think that's amazing that they would And not surprising, though, because they know that you go in, Samaritan's Purse goes in and just gets the job done and helps people who are most at risk: sick, disabled, or in this case, the obstetric hospital you said was had three to five women in each bed. That is overcrowding on like few of us can imagine. Yes. No, go

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

So, that particular hospital, the community population returned to normal as people started returning to safe areas. But I was with the president of our organization, Franklin Graham. We met with General Burhan. It was very interesting. General Burhan asked us, would we go to Khartoum and build a hospital? He's talking about brick-and-mortar, real hospital. And Franklin said, Well, we would if you would let it be a Christian hospital. And Burhan said, Yes, that would be fine. And so internally, that is something that we're planning on doing. We're waiting for the security circumstance to allow it. But they have indicated to us that they will give us humanitarian access where we need to go, where we want to go, and we look forward to doing more in the Sudan area.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Let me ask you, you said in March you met personally with a delegation in Sudan hosted by General Burhan. He made it expressly clear that he desired American involvement in his country. And I'm wondering, for American business diplomats, it's one thing. That's, they eat, sleep, and breathe conflict and trying to mitigate conflict and problems. But businesses want to go in and sell their product or whatever. Was he talking about those kinds of opportunities, too? And does he and others not realize that so long as there's this terrible conflict, it's almost impossible to have any kind of foreign investment?

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

My perception and interpretation of what he was saying at that time was expressing a deeply rooted desire to see the American country get involved in his country, whether that involved business, whether that involved politics, whether that involved military—not from the perspective of fighting, but military from the perspective of utilizing the port up north. And my sense was that he sees great advantage in American involvement, and he would like to see that kind of influence. In fact, we talked about when Chevron Oil left the country. I think it was in probably around 1994, 1992. And there was some reflection on what would Sudan have been like today had that not happened. So, I think he's very open. And specifically, he'd said, I don't want to buy things from the Russians and I don't want to buy things from Iran. I'd like to do business with America, but America won't do business with me.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

How would you— thank you. How would you assess that as an opportunity?

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

Say it again.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

That is an opportunity.

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

Well, I think it I think it's a clear opportunity. And I have to tell you, having worked in Sudan for so long, I entered in South Sudan, many times I have been in caves, under rocks, and running from bombs coming from Sudan Armed Forces. I told General Burhan this. I have not been a fan of Sudan Armed Forces. I have been a responder to the carnage that has come about as an act of the war. When I look at the situation today and what's going on, I think the country needs stability, it needs security, and I only see one entity there right now until there's a transitionary period where there can be a civilian-led government, and that's what I would ultimately advocate for. And I just don't see the command and control in the RSF for that to happen. I see the command and control for SAF to happen. Another interesting point that I will share with you is that the animosity coming from individual Sudanese citizens towards the RSF is enormous. The people that have been killed, the way that they were killed, the things that were stolen, the damage that has been done, I've never quite seen that kind of hardness of heart, and I just find it very hard to imagine that the RSF would be able to add a lot of value at this point after what's happened.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Let me ask you, how would you assess the World Food Programme and other UN major organizations on the ground in Sudan today?

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

Well, that's an interesting subject. I think all of the humanitarian actors on the ground could do more. There could be improvements in anybody's organizational structure. But what I do know is that when we had the situation in Kordofan State and South Kordofan and West Kordofan, we engaged directly with the parties, negotiated the air bridge, and then we had other agencies coming to us saying, How did you get that air bridge? Can we use your air bridge? How did you do that? And we kept it as a muffled— we didn't talk about it publicly, but it was highly successful. So I think in the future when I need access into an area, I'll probably attempt to negotiate it on my own.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

any of you assess the risks that the humanitarian aid workers take by operating in theater. I remember a couple visits with Salva Kiir in Juba when his own forces made life miserable for humanitarian aid workers. Not only did some of his private military go and— and these are the people that guard him— go and raid humanitarian stockpiles, but they also put people at grave risk. How big of a problem is that right now, especially with all the bloodletting that's

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

I would say Jim, everybody will have their opinions, but I would say, generally speaking, aberrant and unacceptable behavior frequently happens in war zones. That's just a part of the deal. You hope that doesn't happen, but the days of you have a white flag and you're protected because you're a humanitarian group, those days are gone. And I think practical, down-to-earth negotiations with armed actors is required to gain access. And then you have to have trust in there, and that trust, I can tell you, in Sudanese society comes from building relationships. So you would think, as a Christian, you're not going to make any progress in Sudan. It's the Islamic Republic of Sudan. But that's not at all what I have found. What I have found is that by demonstrating integrity, doing what I say I'll do, not surprising them, having private conversations behind doors, and speaking our mind has built trust, and we enjoy good relationships there today with people on all sides of the conflict.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Could any of you want to respond to this? And that, have the Sudanese authorities—why haven't they handed Bashir and other former officials wanted by the ICC over to the court? And we all recall that even when Bashir was planning on going to Turkey, Erdoğan made it very clear that he would not honor the request, which the EU was saying get him to The Hague for prosecution, and then he didn't go. China does the exact same thing in terms of inability to in any way enforce the indictment by bringing him to The Hague. But why has no one else—why? Do we know?

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

I asked this very question of General Burhan in December, and I can tell you what he told me, which was—I didn't accept the answer, but his response was that they wanted to try General Bashir in Sudan, that they wanted local justice. I made the point to him—and this was in the context of a conversation about the return of Islamists in the country, his reliance to some degree on Islamist militias to aid the SAF against the RSF, and the concerning trend that I saw at the time and continue to see today, that Islamists associated with the former regime would like to see their own return to power eventually, and see as a way back to power a kind of piggybacking on the army and becoming a useful instrument of the army. And so my demonstration, my request to him was to say, if you truly want to distance yourself from the former regime, if you truly want to demonstrate to the international community, as you have said privately and publicly, that you don't want to see the former regime return to power and that you want to put distance between the army and those elements, that the best way to do that, to demonstrate to the world, would be to turn President Bashir over to the ICC, and that would send a very clear signal. And his response was, Well, we would prefer to try him at home. And reading between the lines, my interpretation of that was that General Burhan is in a very, very difficult position trying to consolidate his own power in the country, the power of the army in the country. To a degree, he is responsive to and in need of support from those former regime elements. They are a distinct minority group, but a distinct and powerful group in the country. If he alienates them right now, then he risks seeing the fracturing of his own army. And so he is in a very difficult position, I think, with respect to Islamists, and that's why he has chosen not to poke the bear and turn President Bashir over to the ICC.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Yes, please. Of course.

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Thank you. I think the obvious answer is precedent. Burhan does not want to set a precedent that a head of state, which is—he says that's what he is, would be sent to the ICC, lest that same thing happen to him in due course. The other thing is that there was an opportunity for Burhan under the transitional period of 2019 to 2021 to try President Bashir. There was a sort of kangaroo court. I think they had him indicted on financial charges rather than genocide and all the other serious charges, which is basically the same as getting Al Capone on tax evasion. And what we're seeing here is there's no serious commitment to justice and accountability in Sudan at in all levels, including from Burhan. The reliance on jihadi groups, the reliance on Islamist groups means that the decisions are not always resting solely with Burhan. And so I would push back a bit against what Mr. Isaacs is saying, which is that Burhan will tell any interlocutor he faces what they want to hear to the great deal of extent. It's good to see that he is giving access to Samaritan's Purse. It's good to see that he's making these rhetorical commitments to supporting the work of Samaritan's Purse, and he says that he wants to get American businesses into the into the country, et cetera. I am sure that he's probably saying the same thing to the Russians. I'm sure he's probably saying the same thing to the Iranians. This is how he keeps himself alive. President Bashir at the time did exactly the same thing. This is the same playbook playing out. I wouldn't put that much stock in it. But also, the binary is not helpful, this binary between SAF and the RSF. We have to remember where these came from. Burhan and Hemetti 20 years ago were fighting hand in fisted glove against the people of Darfur. They were committing genocide together. This is not a case of two entirely distinct groups. There is a difference here without much distinction. And I think it will be very remiss of us to not to bear that in mind. The RSF is today's enemy for the Sudanese Armed Forces. In the meantime, they are creating many RSFs through, for example, the Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade, the jihadist brigade, through, for example, the Sudan Shield Group, which is becoming stronger. They've recently announced that they've grown in number, they have access to sophisticated weaponry. We're seeing the same thing that happened with the RSF play out there, in essence, an ethnic militia as well. So there is an incentive here for the Sudanese Armed Forces to keep this playbook going because it allows them to justify military rule, which is in the end their main objective. They want to stay in power. If there is peace in Sudan, why would you need a military government? So of course you keep a war going, you can justify your presence in government. WFP very quickly, because I do want to make sure I speak about this. WFP has been very slow to evolve to what the conditions on the ground. I'm very glad that Samaritan's Purse has been able to negotiate this access. I would love to see that sort of engagement being made available to other international actors. It would be great to see Samaritan's Purse, for example, work with WFP, which is one of the few organizations, despite their many failures, to be able to build up the scale that is required to respond to the humanitarian situation. So I think here we need to see less competition between different humanitarian deliverers and actually a lot more cooperation. Thank you.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you. Let me just go throw out a few other questions, and then any other questions that Ms. Jacobs might have. When you talk, Mr. Hudson, about the issue of doing a local court, ICC does not have a stellar track record of getting its man, even though Bashir was in the crosshairs, and probably will never go to The Hague. But we know from hybrid courts in Rwanda, especially the court for Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia. Charles Taylor never thought that he'd get 50 years for— and we've had David Crane testify several times, and Alan White as well, who were so instrumental in that, and for others who committed these horrific crimes. Is that something that we should be talking about, a tribunal for— if you leave it to the local, just let their own justice system handle it, good luck with that. I wouldn't want to be a juror on that, frankly, because it would be very dangerous to your health. So that's one question. Then if any of you would like to speak as to the relationship to Iran and China, what is China doing? Russia probably is more preoccupied with Ukraine, sadly. But Russia, I'm sure, does have some interests, like getting access to the port more. But China, we know, is ubiquitous in exploitation throughout Africa. They're everywhere, and they're exploiting Africa everywhere. So how are they moving in on this? And finally, on gold, we had a hearing, and as a matter of fact, a former staffer for our subcommittee, I hired him, Thierry Dongala, who has done amazing work on proving the relationship and fighting against the precious metal of gold and how it funds the procurement of weapons and all the other things that kill people. And so it's an area where we need to step up. We also focused on at that hearing how all of the— frankly, all of the cobalt for EVs is coming out of DR Congo through child labor and slave labor, 200,000 adults, upwards of 40,000, some say 25,000 to 40,000 children, all goes to Xinjiang in China, and it ends up in EVs, and 25% of all the vehicles in the EU now that are EVs are coming from China on the backs of these little children. So it's so lucrative for China to be here, but when you throw in the gold part, maybe you could speak to that. And I do have one other one, and that's on the refugee flows. Chad has nearly a million refugees. It's a refugee— it's just horrible what has happened. So many people are either IDPs or refugees, and that does not help the countries that are trying to help these people. It has a negative impact there. If you want to just speak to— all the more reason why there needs to be an absolute concerted effort to, as you said, Mr. Isaacs, end this war, end the war, but also step up the humanitarian side of it as well. So

Mr. Ken IsaacsSPEAKER_02

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So I come back to what I said. The war needs to be ended. Excuse me, the gold mining is very lucrative. And I think the RSF, after they were sort of officially enshrined, they had a gold mine, they sold it to the government, and I believe that they got that back. But the smuggling of gold that is going out of the country, I believe, is enormous. I think that the Russians are deeply involved in it. I think that the RSF is deeply involved in it, and I understand that's the basis of the business empire that Hemedti has has built is really around the gold. And my contacts tell me that gold is is going through Dubai. The issue of China and what they're exploiting, they're very ubiquitous. They're everywhere. And I had the opportunity in 2006 to go to Shanghai and Beijing with CSIS for a two-week and we just wanted to know: what is China's African development policy? What we found is they don't have one. What they have are Chinese national interests. But there was one comment that was made the last day in Shanghai by a very senior diplomat. He said, We have 800 million people with your equivalent of a high school education, and they make less than $1 a day. We're going to send them out all over the world. So when you go into a place, it doesn't matter where you go in China—go up to Port Sudan, or not in China, but anywhere—there's Chinese people doing trade on the on the sidewalk. There's Chinese people going into petroleum offices. So China has a way to assert soft power through transactional processes that gives them enormous diplomatic influence. And I don't think that the U.S. has a way That's not a level playing field for us. We can't do that for whatever reasons. And I think that that needs to be explored. I'm not a proponent of exploitative transactional diplomacy, but transactions and diplomacies I think have to go hand in hand with us, and I think that we would be better positioned to effect change then and bring the war about to an end. That's probably enough that I'll say about that right now.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Hudson or Ms cameron?

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

So, there were a lot of questions there, so let me just sort of hopscotch over a few of them. With respect to courts, I think we're in the situation we are in in Sudan right now to some degree because justice has never been delivered for any of the crimes that have been visited upon the people of Sudan. We've been talking about justice in Sudan for decades. I fear that the era that you refer back to of international tribunals to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. and UN-assessed dues, I fear that that day is behind us in the United States. I fear it also because we have lost our Office of Global Criminal Justice at the State Department that was spearheading these kinds of initiatives and shining a light on these kinds of institutions. And I think that the state institutions of Sudan have broken down. There are no courts in Sudan right now. So it's not realistic to think that anytime soon there will be any kind of justice delivered either internationally or locally. With respect to Iran, I want to underscore, we don't, I think, understand the full extent of the relationship with Iran and Sudan right now. And I think that both the army and the Iranians take advantage of this idea that, or seek advantage from this idea that, neither of them are isolated diplomatically. So there is value in having that relationship just to say that we have this relationship. The Iranians take value in having a relationship in the Red Sea and the potential on the horizon for potentially having a base there. I don't believe—I've heard in candid moments from senior leadership in Sudan that they don't get anything for free from the Iranians and they don't get a friends and family discount on weapons from the Iranians, that the Iranians play up their role in Sudan to be greater than it is for their own domestic political purposes and international geostrategic interests. So I think we to some degree, both sides are overstating the degree that Iran is a factor. I'm not saying it is not a factor, but I don't know that it is playing a determinative role in this conflict. It's certainly a factor. I think China we have seen much more of a factor in terms of the weapons that are being used on both sides of the conflict are largely Chinese weapons. The Chinese have a diplomatic presence in Port Sudan. There are only a handful of countries that have a permanent diplomatic presence in Port Sudan. China is one. So they have been able to play a diplomatic role, they have protected Sudanese interests at the United Nations, and they are benefiting, they're profiting from the arms sales that they have engaged in.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Mr. Hudson, do you know what kinds of weapons, AK-47s, what—

Mr. Cameron HudsonSPEAKER_03

There have been a whole host of light arms, more heavy material, and now more recently Chinese drones that have been active in the conflict, primarily on the side of the RSF, the Chinese drones. With respect to the gold trade, I think there's been a lot of reporting on this, public reporting on the extent of the gold trade. I think the only fact that I think is needed is to say that Sudan produced more gold last year in 2024 than it did before the war started. Right. So we have seen almost a doubling of Sudan's official gold exports since the war began. Right. This is what is being reported officially, right? Those numbers are in the range of $3 billion a year. We know that the RSF controls its own gold mines in South Darfur, in North Darfur. We know that in the eastern part of the country, the army is controlling gold mines there. They are doing business in those gold mines with Russia and with the UAE. The UAE is profiting on both sides of this conflict because all gold in the country is funneling, as Ken said, back to back to Dubai, which is again, I think, why why I'm I'm also skeptical of simply turning off the spigot from the UAE. The RSF is gaining and earning enough money that if it did not have privileged access to Emirati largesse, it could go onto the black market. With $2 billion, it can go and buy any weapons that it needs to sustain this war. So we have to think, I think, really holistically about not just kind of the drivers and the political support that the RSF is getting from outside, but we also have to think about turning off the funding that is coming from not just gold, but from gum arabic, from smuggling, from all of the rest. I'll end there.

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Thank you. I think a lot has been covered, so let me briefly say, just underscore a few points. In terms of local courts, there is currently no sort of government functionality at any level in Sudan. That's become very clear. And so expecting there to be any kind of fully fledged justice mechanism, especially because that's always been deferred, particularly at a moment like this without infrastructure, is I think, it's impossible really. It's not just Bashir. There are other ICC indictees like Ahmed Haroun, who has recently been made the head of one faction of Bashir's former party, the National Congress Party. So these characters are very much alive. They're very much engaged in the politics in Sudan. They're being protected by the Sudanese Armed Forces wherever they are in the country. We hear reports of them being moved around, etc. But there is no desire, there is no sort of will here, I think, from the Sudanese Armed Forces to see any of these characters face justice. They are too valuable currently for them in terms of, one, the constituency with the Islamists, and two, the connections that some of them have to international actors, for example, the Iranians and Chinese and Malaysians and Turks and others. Just very briefly on the gold: A lot of the gold, it's exactly as you described, Chairman Smith, in what is happening in DRC. Most of the gold in Sudan is mined artisanally, that is on the ground, mostly by very vulnerable people. And it is mined and then taken to the United Arab Emirates chiefly, where the world's gold markets are, and sold for large amounts of money. And so there are sort of many injustices that are happening here, not just because this gold is used then to buy weapons to bomb these very people, these very vulnerable people that are mining it in the first place, but because the working conditions for these people are horrendous. And the fact that the gold has gone up only indicates that the working conditions have become worse for these people. And the longer the war continues, the more the war economy will be entrenched, and the more the conditions for these people will become more desperate. So it's absolutely something that requires attention. There have been calls, for example, to set up a sort of a fund, very much like what the Europeans have for Ukraine, where a lot of the money that is being made out of gold enters into a trust fund that is then used to potentially rehabilitate and reconstruct Sudan later on. A lot more thinking needs to be done about how to do that. If some of these flows of money can be arrested and put into this fund for later use, that would be very, very useful. In terms of the refugee flows, I want to make sure we discuss this. The displacement has been, the world's largest displacement crisis is in Sudan, not just internally, where there are 11 million internally displaced, but also, of course, externally, in Egypt, in Chad, in South Sudan, effectively countries around Sudan that are themselves quite vulnerable and facing a lot of economic shocks. We're not seeing any kind of humanitarian support to these groups that is very sufficient. So, for example, in Ethiopia, we're not seeing UNHCR, the UN's humanitarian—sorry, refugee organization, really respond to the refugees there. We're not seeing the same by UNHCR in Egypt. And the reason for that is the governments of Ethiopia and Egypt, they're not granting the United Nations and UNHCR the ability to adequately respond to the refugee crises. Egypt is making a lot of money from Sudanese people who are in Egypt, spending, of course, a lot of money on rent, on food, etc. And we have even seen Egypt sort of send them back to Sudan, particularly as the Sudanese Armed Forces has been making gains, very much against international recognized refugee norms of non-refoulement. So we need to see a lot more protections for refugees in the region. In Chad in particular, we're seeing that the UN has not been able to fully support people there, and those people in particular are fleeing genocide. They're not just fleeing the war as people in other countries are. So I think an extra focus on this from the United States is absolutely required. Thank you.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you, Ms. Jacobs.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. And I actually want to build on the line of questioning Chairman Smith was asking. I am very focused on the UAE's role here because I think that it is large. But of course, the UAE is not the only outside actor that is supporting belligerents in this conflict in order to advance their own objectives. You all have talked about some already, right? We've got Chad serving as a staging area for weapons and shipments from the UAE. We've got Kenya hosting meetings of RSF leaders during which they declared the establishment of a parallel government in Sudan. Obviously, we have Russia siding with SAF. We've got Egypt continuing to provide military assistance to SAF. Reports suggest that RSF smuggles gold from Darfur through South Sudan, Uganda, and Kenya to help finance its operations. We've talked about the role of Iran, the role of China, just a small sample. Ms. Khair, can you describe how the influence of outside actors has prolonged the conflict in Sudan and exacerbated its consequences for the Sudanese people?

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Thank you for the question. I think it's impossible to believe that this war would have gotten to the stage that it has, the level of destruction and devastation, if not for the role of outside actors. Sudan has been extremely vulnerable to the predations of not just its neighbors, but also Gulf countries because it has never been able to set up a political system internally that is able to protect Sudan against this vulnerability. And so we're going to see, unfortunately, these countries pick at the carcass that is Sudan at the moment. And even as things get worse, they're not motivated by the humanitarian situation. They're not motivated by the risks to atrocities, genocide, et cetera. And so there's actually no sort of potential end. There's no turning point, potentially, at which these countries pull back from the support that they're giving. And they're giving very high-tech weapons. What started off with a very sort of reasonably low-tech war has suddenly become, with the use of drone warfare from many of these countries—Turkey, China, Iran, and of course the transit countries that facilitate this—this is becoming very quickly a very technologically advanced war, which means that we're going to see the impact on civilians go through the roof. For example, previously, a lot of civilians were fleeing war at the front lines of the battlefield. Today, RSF drones hitting key infrastructure, civilian infrastructure—for example, water stations, power plants, ports, et cetera—means that actually just any sort of normalcy and a sort of human normalcy and normal life that is able to exist is going to be impacted, which means, A, no place is geographically safe, and B, that actually it's going to be very difficult to eke out any kind of normalcy or any kind of normal existence for a lot of people. So the scale of this war would not be what it was—what it is without, I think, the engagement of these countries. But what we have to understand is that war is—we all know this very well—war is big business. And so all of these countries that you have mentioned are very much economically invested in this war. And so unless the formula is changed, unless this war becomes actually more of a liability than it is a source of revenue, we're not, I think, going to see any of these countries, as I say, motivated by any of the humanitarian situations enough to pull back.

Ranking Member Sara Jacobs (D-CA)SPEAKER_01

Thank you. Thank you all again for testifying and for everything you're doing for the people of Sudan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you very much, Ms. Jacobs. We're just about finished, but I do want to thank you so very much for your, for your just expert testimony. It gives us all guidance on both sides of the aisle as to what we need to be doing. We want to play a role, hopefully a very constructive one. So thank you. I can't thank you enough. Just let me ask you, if I could, Ms. Khair, is Ethiopia penalizing Sudanese refugees because of the territorial dispute over al-Fashaga?

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

So, I think it is broader than that. The Ethiopian authorities, the Ethiopian government has been in, as you say, in dispute over the al-Fashaga territory. This has been going on for decades. There was something of a gentleman's agreement between Meles Zenawi and Omar al-Bashir in the past that meant that al-Fashaga was sort of left unaddressed for the most part. That came to a head when there were changes in government in both Sudan and Ethiopia. Those tensions seem to have eased somewhat, but I think the issue is still on the table. But Sudan doesn't have these territorial disputes just with Ethiopia. It has them with South Sudan in the Abyei region. It has them, of course, with Egypt as well in Hala'ib and Shalatin. And there needs to be a formula for how to address these issues, particularly for countries around Sudan who get militarily involved in Sudan's conflict, including, of course, South Sudan to a great degree and also Egypt. So, we need to the solution, the resolution to Sudan's war is not just going to be about engaging internal actors, but also Sudan's neighbors. I think, fortunately, we have seen a de-escalation in the tensions between particularly the Sudanese Armed Forces and the government in Ethiopia. But depending on how things go between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the tensions there, and the likelihood, as we're seeing, of a ratcheting up of tensions and potentially an armed conflict, Ethiopia and Eritrea may be the first countries to be sort of pulled into the war in Sudan, and vice versa, that Sudanese communities, particularly those on the border regions, will be pulled into the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In fact, we're already seeing this during the Tigray conflict. We already saw lots of assistance, shall we say, from the Sudanese authorities in that war. And likewise, we're seeing a lot of Eritrean and Ethiopian engagement in the war in Sudan currently, particularly by the Eritreans. Recently, we saw the Eritrean Navy dock in Port Sudan. So, what we're seeing here is the overspill that many of us, including Cameron and I, have been warning about since the beginning of the war is already happening. It's already unfolding. And unless these issues around contested territory, but also regional interests of neighboring countries are dealt with, I don't think we're going to be able to sort of have a comprehensive resolution to this war.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Just so a little better understanding about why the refugees in Egypt, why Egypt would not want the UNHCR, is it because they're welcoming them? Karen Bass, who used to be my ranking member—when she was chair, I was her ranking member. We made a trip and we met with President Museveni, and we went to a refugee camp that it was extraordinary how the local Ugandan people were welcoming the South Sudanese people with with such concern and love. And he had it too. It was just amazing. And both of us were like our eyes were wide open about this is a good neighborly policy. Is that Is that what Egypt is doing, or is it something else?

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

That's not my understanding, no. Egypt and Sudan have a very contentious relationship, mostly because Egypt sees Sudan—

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

The people too? I mean, it's just—

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

Yeah, so Egypt sees Sudan as an extension of its southern border. It believes that it should be very much involved in deciding what the government in Sudan looks like. This is why they continue to support the Sudanese Armed Forces. They have done, let's say, for almost 70 years. There are issues with racism that Sudanese people face in Egypt, particularly previously the South Sudanese when they were in Cairo, particularly in large numbers during the North-South conflict of 20 years ago. Darfuris as well who have been displaced to Egypt have faced severe racism, but so have Sudanese of all types. There is also a rhetoric within Egypt, similar to what we saw with the Syrians, that the economic issues that Egypt is facing is in large part due to their hosting of refugee communities, including the Sudanese communities. That said, a lot of Sudanese people, particularly from the center and north of the country, have a lot of familial ties with Egypt. There is, of course, the shared language and, in many ways, a shared history and culture that has meant a lot of people who believe that Egypt is still the place to go. Now, but without the kind of refugee protections that you saw firsthand in Uganda, which I think are sort of an aberration, they are an exception, without those protections, people in Sudan, Sudanese people in Egypt, will be very vulnerable. Recently, the Egyptians came up with some legislation, and that has made it actually more difficult for people in Sudan to be able to register with UNHCR and therefore get the requisite support there.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

Thank you so very much. Anything else? Deeply appreciate it, and we will follow up. Thank

Ms. Kholood KhairSPEAKER_00

you.

Chairman Chris Smith (R-NJ)SPEAKER_04

And if we have some additional questions, we will get them to you. Particularly for some of the members who are not here but wanted to be. And without any further ado, the hearing is adjourned.