Hearing Entitled: U.S. Policy on Investment Security

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

The chairman is authorized to— Hey, thank you. Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial Institutions will come to order. Without objection, the chairman is authorized to declare a recess of the committee at any time. This hearing is titled "U.S. Policy on Investment Security." Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days within which to submit extraneous materials to the chairman for inclusion in the record. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I welcome our distinguished witnesses to today's hearing on U.S. policy on investment security, where we examine the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, CFIUS, and its critical role in safeguarding our national security. Today's testimony will provide a comprehensive overview of CFIUS's authorities and operations to protect American interests from foreign investment risks. Established in 1975 under the Department of the Treasury, CFIUS evaluates foreign investments posing a national security threat. The 2018 Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act, otherwise known as FIRRMA, expanded its jurisdiction to include non-controlling investments in critical technologies, infrastructure, and sensitive personal data. CFIUS must rigorously scrutinize foreign investments from any source that could undermine our technology, agriculture, energy sectors, and more, while enabling beneficial investment inflows that actually strengthen our economy. I commend President Trump's February National Security Presidential Memorandum, NSPM, directing CFIUS to intensify oversight of adversarial investments while streamlining reviews for trusted allies. CFIUS must operate efficiently to neutralize threats without burdening American business. However, reviewing inbound investments alone cannot fully protect our national security. Congress needs to enact a robust outbound investment bill with severe sanctions to prevent U.S. capital from supporting industries in adversarial nations that threaten our sovereignty. This legislation needs to provide clear, streamlined framework ensuring American companies can comply without overly burdensome bureaucratic obstacles. Such a bill will safeguard our innovation, farmland, infrastructure, and critical technologies while fostering domestic investments. This hearing will hopefully help illuminate how CFIUS and an outbound investment regime could secure our nation's vital national interests. I urge my colleagues to support an outbound investment bill, provide their input so that we can have stringent sanctions, a transparent framework to protect our economic and security interests from all foreign threats. I yield back, and I now recognize the ranking member for her remarks.

Ranking Member Joyce Beatty (D-OH)SPEAKER_00

Good morning, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for appearing here today to discuss investment security. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, plays a critical role in our national security framework, conducting reviews of direct investment investment transactions by foreign investors originating from both adversary and allied nations to identify potential national security risks. Although it's incredibly rare for CFIUS to recommend that the president block a transaction, only occurring 10 times to date, the committee's thorough vetting process is essential to ensure that foreign investment of all kinds in the United States do not endanger national security. Another critical area of focus is outbound investment, which I'm sure we'll talk about, flowing from the United States to foreign countries and companies of concern. The Biden administration took a significant first step two years ago by establishing the Outbound Investment Security Program at Treasury, which screens certain U.S. investments in China involving sensitive technologies and products that pose an acute national security risk. While we are waiting to see what changes the current administration plans to make to the program, several actions taken by President Trump has raised serious concern. A recent high-profile case, including TikTok and U.S. Steel, have demonstrated that the president is willing to disregard CFIUS recommendations and instead leverage foreign investment transactions in unrelated trade negotiations, creating uncertainty for the private sector and a dangerous potential for abuse. Further, President Trump seems to be engaging in his own corrupt business deal deals with foreign investors. For example, Trump's stablecoin is being used by Abu Dhabi investment firm to invest $2 billion into Binance, a crypto exchange that has pleaded guilty to money laundering and sanctions violations. Look, this type of transaction is exactly why CFIUS exists, and it's why we cannot afford to gut the very laws and resources that allows it to do its job. If my colleagues across the aisle are truly concerned about national security risks, they should be similarly outraged by the president's activities. Instead, they're trying to eliminate critical national security tools like the bipartisan—let me say that again—the bipartisan Corporate Transparency Act, which President Trump signed into law during his first term. Gutting the CTA will hinder CFIUS's ability to identify foreign threats by making it harder for the committee, the Outbound Security Program, financial institutions, and national security agencies to properly assess who truly owns or controls a corporate entity. We simply cannot play politics with our national security, and I think we will all agree on that. Democrats are committed to resisting efforts that would either undercut CFIUS or distort its purpose. I look forward to learning more about how our investment security framework is operating and exploring ways that we can strengthen and not weaken it. And thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to our dialogue and our questions with you. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you. Today we welcome the testimony of Mr. Jonathan Samford, President and CEO of Global Business Alliance; Mr. Brian Reissaus, Senior Advisor for National Security at Freshfields; Mr. Benjamin Joseloff, partner at Cravath, Swaine & Moore; and Dr. Sarah Bauerle Bauerle Danzman, Associate Professor of International Studies at Indiana University. We thank each of you for taking your time to be here. Each of you will be recognized for 5 minutes to give an oral presentation of your testimony. Without objection, your written statements will be made part of the record. I also ask unanimous consent to enter the ICI statement into the record. Without objection. Mr. Samford, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral statement.

Mr. Jonathan SamfordSPEAKER_10

Chairman Davidson, Ranking Member Beatty, members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here with you today. I'm Jonathan Samford, president and CEO of the Global Business Alliance. GBA is the premier advocacy voice of international companies in America. Our members represent about 200 of the most well-known international brands in the world that are globally headquartered overseas, but are major U.S. employers in their own right. On average, these companies employ about 12,000 U.S. workers, and importantly, all of them are headquartered in countries that are longtime friends and allies of the United States. Across America, more than 8 million workers earn a paycheck from a company that made a deliberate decision to invest and create jobs in the United States. Global investment is a key pillar of America's economic strength. International companies have invested over $5 trillion into the U.S. economy. They pay workers 7% more than the private sector average, drive 12% of all private sector R&D, and produce nearly a quarter of all U.S. exports. Manufacturing is the largest sector for investment, growing 29% over the past 5 years. In Ohio alone, given the representation of the Buckeye State, more than 320,000 Ohioans are employed by a global company, and half of that is in the manufacturing sector. This isn't just about economics, though, it's also a strategic advantage. 75% of all investment in the United States flows from just eight nations. These investments build local supply chains, fuel innovation, develop stronger workforces, and tie our allies' interests to our own. Meanwhile, Chinese direct investment in the United States is less than 1% in total, and has declined since Congress on a bipartisan basis passed FIRRMA by about 15%. Global investment has long been a bipartisan priority. Every president in the past 50 years has reaffirmed America's commitment to open investment. Congress did the same through FIRRMA in 2018, ensuring that CFIUS robustly protects national security while keeping the U.S. open to trusted capital. Just last month, the House passed the Global Investment in American Jobs Act by unanimous support. The inbound business community strongly supports a vigilant, national security-focused CFIUS process. CFIUS must stay squarely focused on genuine national security threats and not drift into broader industrial or trade policy. When reviews become unpredictable, it deters precisely the kinds of investments that grow American jobs and American manufacturing. Updated public guidance, improved interagency coordination, and a fast-track pathway such as the Known Investor Portal for trusted investors with proven compliance records would streamline the low-risk reviews, reduce administrative burdens, and allow CFIUS to prioritize high-risk reviews, enhancing both efficiency and investor confidence. CFIUS protects both our national security and our economic competitiveness. These are complementary results that have been forged through decades of thoughtful bipartisan leadership. In that vein, I want to thank Chairman Hill, Representatives Barr, Auchincloss, and Strickland for leading the Global Investment in American Jobs Caucus here in the House, and for this committee for advancing policies that strengthen America's workers and communities. Thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Samford. Mr. Reissaus, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral statement.

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Beatty, members of the subcommittee, thank you for offering me the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Brian Reissaus. I'm a senior advisor at the law firm Freshfields in Washington, D.C. My government experience, spanning roughly 15 years in three administrations, includes leading the executive branch's provision of technical assistance to Congress for the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, serving as the senior career official for CFIUS from 2018 through 2023, and contributing to the development of the executive order that is the basis for the Outbound Investment Security Program. Before getting into the substance of my remarks, I want to say that the views I express here today are my own and not those of my employer or any clients of my employer. I'm not here representing the interests of any other party. I would like to offer some observations on U.S. investment security policy. It is important to note that foreign investment overwhelmingly benefits the United States through creating jobs, funding innovation, and fostering economic growth. It also bolsters our national security. I witnessed this firsthand throughout my government service. At the Department of Defense, I oversaw foreign-owned defense contractors that supply cutting-edge technologies to our warfighters. And at CFIUS, I reviewed transactions involving friendly foreign investors that provided capital that was essential to funding U.S. innovation and emerging technologies. This has all been possible because of the longstanding, bipartisan U.S. open investment policy. However, Congress recognized that some foreign investment can pose national security risks to the United States. CFIUS serves as a critical safeguard against these risks. CFIUS does this through its singular focus on reviewing transactions for cognizable national security risks that could reasonably result from the transaction, which under the law requires CFIUS to identify credible evidence of a threat, a vulnerability, and a consequence. Certain principles of the CFIUS process are essential to maintaining an open investment environment while allowing CFIUS to fully resolve national security risks. These include statutory timelines that provide predictability to transaction parties; evidence-based decisions that require credible evidence that a transaction poses a national security risk; a tool of last resort—CFIUS only acts when there are no other adequate or appropriate authorities that can address the national security risk; proportionality—CFIUS's actions are tailored to the national security risk arising from the transaction, not issues unrelated to the proposed acquisition; confidentiality that encourages transparency from transaction parties and ensures CFIUS can conduct an apolitical national security analysis; and accountability—congressional oversight that ensures CFIUS operates consistent with its statute. This framework has allowed CFIUS to adapt to emerging national security risks while providing transaction parties confidence that their filings would be handled fairly and efficiently. The foreign investment landscape has shifted considerably since Congress passed FIRRMA in 2018. At the time, Chinese investment was at its peak, and CFIUS was grappling with an increasing number of transactions that raised national security risks yet were outside of its jurisdiction. This is not the case today. According to the American Enterprise Institute, the PRC's spending here has been negligible since 2018. Chinese investment around the world was stable at historically low level in 2024 and barely visible in the United States. Despite the drop in Chinese investment, the number of CFIUS filings withdrawn and refiled increased to historic heights from 2021 to 2023, exceeding the previous highs when Chinese investment was at its apex from 2016 to 2018. One can infer from this data that investors from countries that are U.S. partners and allies have been increasingly impacted by delays and mitigation. As Congress did when it passed FIRRMA, changes to the U.S. investment security policy should go through a similarly rigorous process that is: one, based on evidence of a defined national security risk; two, assesses the impact such changes will have on the investment that does not pose a risk to U.S. national security. The Outbound Investment Security Program could benefit from such a process. As currently structured, the regulations pose ambiguities that complicate compliance. Better alignment between the national security risks it is intended to solve and the definitions for covered transactions would provide much-needed clarity to the private sector. Given the negligible volume of Chinese investment into the United States today, any expansion of CFIUS's jurisdiction is more likely to disproportionately impact benign foreign investment. It could blunt CFIUS's effectiveness as a national security tool by reducing its ability to thoroughly review each transaction. Thank you for your interest in these issues, and I look

Mr. Benjamin JoseloffSPEAKER_11

forward to your questions.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Reissaus. Mr. Joseloff, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral statement.

Mr. Benjamin JoseloffSPEAKER_11

Thank you. Chairman Davidson, Ranking Member Beatty, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. It is an honor to join my fellow panel members in contributing to your work on U.S. investment security policy. My name is Ben Joseloff. I'm a partner at the law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. Today I am presenting my own views and not those of my firm or of any client of my firm. The perspectives I will offer today are informed by over 10 years of experience in both the public and private sectors working on matters relating to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS. The United States of America has long been known as one of the most welcoming economies for foreign direct investment. This is in large part because the U.S. government, through administrations of both parties, has recognized the benefits that come with foreign capital. But not all foreign investment is benign. Malign actors can and do try to take advantage of our general openness by using foreign investment to harm U.S. national and economic security. Thus, the United States has had, for 50 years, a mechanism to address harmful foreign direct investment. That mechanism is CFIUS. CFIUS operates within, and is a part of, the U.S. open investment framework. This means that CFIUS should not be seen as an exception to U.S. open investment policy. Rather, in my view, CFIUS is best understood as a mechanism that enables and perpetuates our commitment to an open investment environment. I believe that support for a robust, well-resourced, and efficiently run CFIUS not only helps preserve U.S. national and economic security, but also enables the continuation of our nation's longstanding, bipartisan open investment policy. This is the theoretical underpinning of CFIUS. But how does CFIUS operate in practice? In my written testimony, I provide details regarding how the CFIUS process affects U.S. businesses and their foreign investors. The key takeaway is that the CFIUS process can result in noteworthy timing and economic friction in cross-border transactions. And this friction has real costs and consequences. Of course, this is not necessarily inappropriate. As I noted earlier, CFIUS plays a critical role within the broader U.S. open investment framework, and some transaction costs are unavoidable in a system that relies on thorough, case-by-case assessments carried out by subject matter experts across the U.S. government. To me, the real question, then, is the following: Can we be confident that we have reduced the transaction costs imposed by the CFIUS process to those that are necessary and appropriate to protect U.S. national security? In my view, the short answer is not yet, but CFIUS is trying, and they're making good progress. The longer answer is that, in my 10 years of CFIUS-related experience, both in government and in private practice, my observation is that the individuals who administer the process are doing their best to accomplish their critical national security mission as efficiently as possible. This is true both for the dedicated career civil servants who undertake the day-to-day work of CFIUS, as well as the political appointees who ultimately make the difficult decisions. To conclude, I know there are various legislative proposals relating to CFIUS that members of the subcommittee may be asked to consider. Rather than opining on any specific legislation, I would encourage members to ask two questions with respect to any CFIUS-related bill that crosses your desk. First, will the legislation help the individuals who administer the CFIUS process increase efficiency without harming U.S. national security? Second, if the legislation will create new economic friction, is that friction truly necessary in order for CFIUS to achieve its mission? With these questions as a guide, I believe that the members of the subcommittee will be well placed to ensure that we continue to have an inbound investment security regime that supports both American security and American prosperity, and that CFIUS will continue to be regarded as the global gold standard for the national security regulation of foreign direct investment. Thank you again for the opportunity to participate today. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Joseloff. Dr. Bauerle Danzman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes for your oral statement.

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

Thank you, Chairman Davidson and Ranking Member Beatty, for inviting me to testify on evolving investment security issues of concern to the American people. It is an honor to speak with the subcommittee today. The views I express in my testimony are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Indiana University, or of the Atlantic Council, where I am a fellow. As Congress evaluates current national security regulation for inward and outbound investment, I encourage representatives to ensure that any additional congressional action aligns with the following five principles. First, investment security policy should be clear to U.S. companies and foreign investors. The compliance burden of investment regulation has increased tremendously in recent years. Investors need to understand what their obligations are and believe these restrictions serve a legitimate public good. Frequent updates to investment rules make the policy environment unstable and expectations for the future regulatory landscape uncertain. Retroactive application of law generates concern over future respect for property rights and should be avoided. Second, investment security should be consistently applied. Investors and companies should not be differentially treated based on personal relationships with or connections to administration officials. For CFIUS, this means parties before the committee should not receive favorable treatment if they are well connected to the administration or to a member of Congress. For the outbound investment security program, this means that the process for receiving an exception to prohibition should be clearly publicized, subject to a rigorous, regularized review process, and the outcome of such determinations should be quickly notified to the public. In the absence of oversight, CFIUS and the outbound program could become the site of special dealing that is inconsistent with the rule of law or the foundations of a dynamic, market-based economy. Third, investment security tools should be contained to a narrow set of clear national security concerns. Overregulation would reduce investment in the United States, negatively affecting jobs and innovation capacity. Congress should resist the urge to further expand CFIUS authorities to address broad national interest concerns. It should also reaffirm that mitigation agreements should be proportional to identified risks and should only be used to address national security concerns rather than expansive economic competitiveness issues. Any outbound legislation should focus on national security risks associated with a narrow set of technologies for which the U.S. holds an innovation lead. The likely innovation costs of restricting outbound investment in other technologies is too high to entertain. Fourth, investment security policy should be collaborative. U.S. power benefits from centrality in global innovation, finance, trade, and diplomatic networks. And our strategies should function to further embed us in those networks rather than insulate us from them. Building multilateral support and coordination is necessary for effectively countering PRC efforts to gain access to Western-developed dual-use technologies to modernize their military capabilities. Technology investment and know-how are very hard to control unilaterally. Acting multilaterally also reduces the costs of monitoring and enforcement, which saves U.S. taxpayer money and frees additional resources for investments in American families, workers, and communities. Finally, investment security policy should be curious. Many of the investment security policies that the United States has implemented in recent years are addressing problems for which there remains a great deal of uncertainty about the size of the concern and the costs of potential solutions. Consequently, policies in this area are risky. We have less certainty over their effect and their unintended consequences. Therefore, ongoing assessment of policy effectiveness is vital. Investment security policies should be subjected to cost-benefit analysis at regular intervals to better understand the trade-offs to economic dynamism and technological innovation that investment restrictions induce. If measures of innovation drop, Congress should be prepared to work with industry to better understand why and should be willing to reverse course if it becomes clear that a policy has failed or has unacceptable unintended consequences. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you very much. We'll now turn to member questions. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questions. I support President Trump's February national security presidential memorandum, which encourages foreign investment while protecting national security. Specifically, it states that, quote, "CFIUS will be used to restrict Chinese investments in strategic U.S. sectors like technology, critical infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, energy, and raw materials," and that, quote, "the United States will protect our farmland and real estate near sensitive facilities, strengthen CFIUS's authority over greenfield investments, and restrict foreign adversary access to U.S. talent and operations in sensitive technologies." Mr. Reissaus, in your testimony, your opening statement, you said CFIUS only acts when other tools aren't available. Would you concede that tariffs can be used for national security?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Interests? Uh Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question. When CFIUS looks at a transaction and identifies a risk, its first step is ultimately to look at those other authorities that are available and then determine whether they can actually address that concern. That could be something as simple as looking at export controls to determine whether that's sufficient to address the transfer of a particular piece of technology. But it could also be to look at other economic tools that may relate to the national security risk.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

One of those tools would be tariffs, right?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

The— during my time, I don't— I had not seen tariffs used as a potential consideration. However, I think tools that address broader strategic issues can be an effective measure to avoid transactions that do present.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Well, clearly President Trump views it as a national security thing, and when we design the tariffs, so you have 232 and 302 and other provisions in tariffs because sometimes it is a very efficient tool, and people can debate whether it should be used the way that it's being used, but clearly it is a tool that's available. And I just think, as we're looking at CFIUS reviews, it's worth considering it may be a fast thing to do is get into a negotiation, use tariffs to get the attention and get the underlying issue addressed. As we're looking at CFIUS, Mr. Samford, when your organization emphasizes the importance of foreign investments into our economy, how have CFIUS's expanded reviews under FIRRMA impacted multinational companies' investment decisions in the United States?

Mr. Jonathan SamfordSPEAKER_10

Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. As you're well aware, since 2018, international investment has actually increased precipitously from friends and allies of the United States. As I mentioned in my opening, eight countries constitute 75% of all investment in the United States. That's Japan, Canada, and European countries, all of them longtime friends and allies of the United States. The top investors in Ohio, for instance, reside from those countries as well. And so what we've seen through FIRRMA is that Chinese investment in the United States has dropped about 15% since then. The reviews are less through the CFIUS process around Chinese investment, as was mentioned earlier. But I think that companies continue to value the United States economy, America's workforce, and the opportunities to build and create things here in the United States.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Yeah, we've certainly seen a brisk pace this year. Hopefully we keep building on it and we do it efficiently so that we can get it done. And I think the tailoring that you have all referenced has got the attention, I think, in a bipartisan way. Mr. Reissaus, on the outbound investment security program, I strongly agree with you on how important clear definitions of covered transactions are in order to implement the program. Could you elaborate on how specific or narrow these definitions need to be for proper enforcement? For instance, what if a large corporation has some business that falls under covered transaction and some that doesn't? If you can think about Amazon in the United States has AWS, that might be considered sensitive if it was a Chinese investment, but you might do their air cargo business, and you're doing business with Amazon either way. So how do you parse that?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Mr. Chairman, that's an excellent question, and I think that's the exact challenge that many private sector parties are dealing with right now under the outbound investment security program, which is trying to understand what activities may be captured, which ones are clearly the ones that the government is concerned about and needs to be addressed. And so I think the key thing that does need to happen with the outbound investment security program is for it to go through a process that Congress put FIRRMA through. And the key elements of that, which allow FIRRMA to be successful in targeting the core national security issue, is first defining what that is that needs to be solved. And I think there's a lack of clarity in the private sector and amongst many to understand what exactly the problem is that's trying to be

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Yeah. Thank you, and I'd submit that OFAC does get pretty precise. So we'll look at how we can do that. My time has expired, and I now recognize the ranking member for her questions.

Ranking Member Joyce Beatty (D-OH)SPEAKER_00

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the witnesses. And thank you, Mr. Samford, for acknowledging Ohio and the 300-and-some thousand employees. I hope I get to talk to every one of them. We like numbers like that and people being employed. Let me go to my first question for you, Dr. Bauerle Danzman. And I'm probably going to, if I have time, ask everybody else if they have an opinion on this. In your testimony, you address the need for consistency in the CFIUS review process. Can you address some of the concerns associated with President Trump's response to certain high-profile CFIUS cases? And what are the broader national security risks, which I'll ask everybody else, of this kind of approach to investment security?

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

Thank you, Ranking Member Beatty, for your question. I would start by saying that national security is not a bargaining chip in any trade negotiation. If there's a national security problem, you need to address the national security problem, and it should not be traded away for other unrelated issues. The second thing I'll say without getting into specifics of any deal is that in general—and I did work on the committee in 2019 and 2020—that in CFIUS world, any day in which a CFIUS transaction is in the news is a bad day for CFIUS. We want the committee to be able to employ a rigorous fact-based assessment of every single transaction. And the point of the CFIUS process is to do that rather than employ a politicized review of the transaction. And so we should try as much as possible to keep the committee's work at the working level until it rises up to a presidential decision, and we should refrain from situations in which elected officials are opining on deals before the committee before they are determined.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Okay,

Ranking Member Joyce Beatty (D-OH)SPEAKER_00

Thank you. Anybody else have a comment that they want to ask on the broader national security risk of this kind of approach to investment security? Interesting. Experts in it and you have no comment either way. Okay, let me go to my next question. I'll come back to you, Dr. Bauerle Danzman. As you know, the Outbound Investment Security Program, which has been active for 6 months, we don't have any reporting from Treasury on that process yet. What factors or data would you expect to see demonstrate that the program has been successful? What question should this committee ask of Treasury regarding the activity?

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

So of course we're in very early days of the outbound program. I think when you think about the sorts of information that you'd like to have Treasury provide, that would be information on what types of transactions are going before the committee, how—well, actually, excuse me, for outbound, there's a notification and a prohibition, so understanding how many transactions are being notified, what is the process of looking for non-notified transactions that should have been prohibited, have any been found. As the program matures, understanding how this is affecting things like innovation capacity is really important. So doing reviews over time about what is happening to the innovation ecosystem around these technologies that are scoped into review is an important thing that the committee should be assessing.

Ranking Member Joyce Beatty (D-OH)SPEAKER_00

Thank you. Let's try this again with the other members. Is there anything that this committee should be asking of Treasury regarding activity?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

One recommendation I would have is trying to understand the number of transactions that Treasury is looking into from an enforcement matter and the percentage of those that end up being either failure to notifies or were violations of the prohibition. I think that would provide a clear indication of what is actually occurring, or is this creating a significant burden on parties on the enforcement side despite the lack of evidence of non-compliance.

Ranking Member Joyce Beatty (D-OH)SPEAKER_00

Okay, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mrs. Beatty. Now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lucas, who's also the chairman of the Monetary Policy Task Force.

Rep. Frank Lucas (R-OK)SPEAKER_06

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'd like to start with Mr. Joseloff and Mr. Reissaus. In your experience, would it be helpful to finally place the Secretary of Agriculture as a permanent member on CFIUS for ag-related transactions, like my bill, the Agricultural Risk Review Act, would? How does having subject matter expertise in specific industries help inform the CFIUS review process?

Mr. Benjamin JoseloffSPEAKER_11

I'm happy to start. Thank you for the question. I think it's absolutely critical that the Department of Agriculture be involved in CFIUS reviews of transactions that involve agriculture or food security issues. In my experience, when I was on—when I was serving in government, the Department of Agriculture was involved in transactions that raised those issues. I think the committee does a good job of recognizing the different subject matter expertise around the U.S. government and calling in that expertise as appropriate in reviewing transactions.

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

And I would agree with Mr. Joseloff. And in my experience, the Department of Agriculture not only was consulted on those transactions, but often served as a co-lead, so certified to Congress at conclusion of those deals. And so it is very important that USDA is included in those matters. And I think I understand there was an MOU signed between the Department of Treasury and the Department of Agriculture that memorializes the process to ensure that continues.

Rep. Frank Lucas (R-OK)SPEAKER_06

Absolutely, and I thank you both for those comments. And my bill passed the House this month, and based on your testimony, maybe my friends, our friends in the United States Senate, will actually take it up. Mr. Reissaus, Mr. Samford has recommended a fast-track pathway for trusted investors to go through the CFIUS review process. What guardrails would be appropriate for a program like that so that we're reincentivizing the right type of investment?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Thank you, sir, for your question. I think the first one is the committee needs the ability to still assess both the threat, so receiving the intelligence community's assessment of the, the particular investor, and And they still need to be able to look at the, the context of the deal itself. So what is the U.S. business and what does it do that's important for national security so that it can act if it needs to? I think what needs to be focused on, though, is how do you streamline the process so that the committee is focused on those narrow issues and isn't looking into unrelated matters? So how can it be more targeted in the questions that it poses parties? How can it streamline the submissions of information so that that can happen more quickly? And how can it improve its decision-making so that those timelines are much shorter to then facilitate that benign investment?

Rep. Frank Lucas (R-OK)SPEAKER_06

Absolutely. Mr. Samford, in your view, are national security and an open investment climate inherently at odds, or can we encourage foreign direct investment without compromising our security interests? And why is it important that we have policies that support both of those values?

Mr. Jonathan SamfordSPEAKER_10

Absolutely, Congressman. Thank you for your leadership in this space. I think they are complementary objectives, and I think CFIUS is a good example over its transformation since its inception in the '70s to today. Congress has met the challenge through the framework of CFIUS as threats have emerged and changed, and I think your leadership in this space is reflective of that with your legislation. I think that it is important to remember that the vast majority of investment into the United States comes from longtime friends and allies, and it's into sectors and businesses that are wholly unrelated to national security. These are great-paying jobs, many of them in the manufacturing sector. About 40% of all FDI jobs are in U.S. manufacturing. And so having the ability to provide good-quality jobs, high-paying jobs that don't require a mountain of debt and college debt is a benefit. One of the things that international companies bring to the U.S. is not just the capital they need to operate here, but they also bring world-class know-how. And so importing that best practice is not only beneficial to the companies, but also the communities where they operate.

Rep. Frank Lucas (R-OK)SPEAKER_06

Thank you, and thank you to the panel, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Lucas. The gentleman from California, Mr. Liccardo, is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I represent a significant portion of Silicon Valley, and we've got an awful lot of folks who are very frustrated with the CFIUS process and would like to see many reforms aligned with what has been discussed here. So I appreciate the testimony of everyone here, and particularly as we think about consistency and some of the challenges Mr. Joseloff referred to with regard to defining jurisdiction. I understand something that consumes an awful lot of time and legal analysis, and that creates a lot of sand in gears. And I guess the question I have is really, are there specific proposals out there, either that have already been introduced or language that you see organizations working on, like the Atlantic Council or others, that could help us better define jurisdiction so at least parties can get to the question more quickly of whether this is governed by CFIUS or not?

Mr. Benjamin JoseloffSPEAKER_11

Thank you very much for the question. As I said in the written testimony that I submitted, I think one of the key things one of the key improvements that could be made to the kind of jurisdictional process would be a review of the definition of critical technology, specifically as it applies in kind of mandatory filings, to see if there's a way to reduce the burden on companies of having to perform export control analysis, which can be timely and costly, on things that they don't actually export. So that's, that's one concrete idea.

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you. And do any other Any other witnesses have any specific suggestions?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Not necessarily from a legislative standpoint, but I think what I— from my experience, especially in the government, I did recognize that there were challenges in the VC space because the need for companies to receive capital quickly. And so I think focusing on whether it's even from congressional oversight to ensure that the committee is processing transactions quickly so that essentially benign capital through VC investment can occur within the timelines that are often very short for for those types of transactions is a way to kind of help ensure that the committee is not unnecessarily impeding, I think, that important investment.

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you. Um, I'm sorry, Doctor,

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

I'll just add as well that outreach is very important here. Treasury already does outreach to the venture community, but I think continued outreach and really emphasizing educating venture on their obligations is an important part of the puzzle here.

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you. Dr. Danzman, since you just spoke, I'm curious to follow up on the concerns about consistency. Are there specific examples under this administration where you're seeing considerations outside of national security playing into a negotiation

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

Well, I am not privy to the inside negotiations on CFIUS, and I hesitate to opine too directly on specific transactions, but I do think that there is a sense that in some transactions there has been a desire to also put in place obligations that have more to do with economic competitiveness as opposed to national security specifically, and the use of mitigation agreements that have a lot of various components to it that seem quite far away from national security, especially if a transaction is not related to an entity that is directly integrated into the defense industrial supply chain. And so I would be worried and cautious about those kinds of mitigation terms.

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

And Doctor, I know a colleague of yours at Atlantic Council wrote a piece back in February specifically expressing concern about limitations in cross-border investments imposed by the NSPM in this administration. Are there other elements that you would point to, other concerns in addition to the ones you just raised?

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

With respect to inbound or outbound?

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

In this case, it was— well, I guess it was cross-border, so that would be either.

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

Yeah, so I think that there are two things. First is that we should be really cautious about putting too many restrictions on outbound investment in technologies for which the U.S. is not at the cutting edge, because by investing abroad, that is a way for us to bring back technology to the United States that that is important and that we could use.

Rep. Sam Liccardo (D-CA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Doctor.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Liccardo. The gentleman from Kentucky, chairman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, Mr. Barr, is now recognized Recognized for 5 minutes.

Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)SPEAKER_08

I want to start by picking up right where Mr. Liccardo left off and where Ranking Member Beatty, where she was in her line of questioning about the importance of keeping the CFIUS process and a prospective outbound regime depoliticized. And that's precisely why I was so concerned about the prior administration's politicization of the Nippon Steel deal. And I'm respectful of the fact that the ranking member represents Ohio, where Cleveland-Cliffs is. But this was a deal that was highly politicized right before a national election, where the United Steelworkers came into the Oval Office and helped the prior president kill a very beneficial investment that advanced American national security. Remember, Nippon Steel is a company, a very technologically advanced steel company, domiciled in an ally nation, Japan. This was an investment that was providing competition and preventing a monopoly in the United States on steelmaking. It strengthened U.S. Steel and enhanced U.S. national security. So the fact that CFIUS did a rigorous re-review away from politics, made the correct recommendation, and then the president followed the career advice of CFIUS was a rectification of a politicization in the previous administration. So I think the points that made by my friends on the other side of the aisle of keeping politics out is very, very important. And I think we should take a lesson from the politicization of CFIUS from the prior administration here. So I appreciate the current administration fixing that. Let me ask a question about outbound because we should learn from the virtues of CFIUS and also maybe some of the shortcomings of CFIUS as we work on an outbound regime. And so, Mr. Reissaus, let me ask you, last year the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition with China found that five venture capital firms funneled more than $1.9 billion to AI companies supporting China's human rights abuses and military modernization. At least $1.2 billion went into the PRC semiconductor industry. Clear controls are needed in respect to outbound investments into Chinese entities, and that's why I appreciate President Trump's National Security Memorandum, America First Investment Policy, and it's why I introduced the FITE China Act, which takes both an entity and sensitive technologies-based approach. Do you agree that using all of the tools in the toolbox, time-tested sanctions and forward-looking prohibitions on sensitive technologies, is the best way to ensure we are spreading the net wide enough to prohibit investments that progress Chinese military and surveillance ambitions, but not too much to impede benign and beneficial outbound investment?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate the question. It is an important one. And I think the answer to understand whether or not you're using all of the tools necessary is first understanding what is the problem that needs to be solved. Is it the fact of an investment, or is it, I think, what President Biden's order was attempting to address, which was smart money? And I think once we can understand what that is, the appropriate tool or tools will then, I think, flow from that, which is is it a sanctions-based approach, an entities-based approach, or is it a transactional approach that was taken by the Biden administration?

Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)SPEAKER_08

Mr. Samford, as a fellow Kentuckian, it's no surprise that a Centre College graduate has risen to such influence as you. So congratulations on your new position. You're going to do a great job there advocating for beneficial foreign investment in the United States that makes the United States competitive. How can we make it easier for U.S.—and as we think about the outbound investment regime, how can we make it easier for U.S. investors in terms of making these decisions through a red light, green light system, easier than maybe even CFIUS is for companies to navigate the CFIUS process? How important is it to have a red light, green light clarity as opposed to uncertainty that sometimes comes with CFIUS?

Mr. Jonathan SamfordSPEAKER_10

Thank you for that question. To be succinct, I think CFIUS provides a nice framework. CFIUS is designed to look at specific threats in specific circumstances. I think those same principles could be applied to the outbound. Obviously, the Global Business Alliance, we represent US subsidiaries. Most of our focus is on the inbound business, the insourcing of jobs to the United States. Very few of our companies outsource or are investing abroad from the subsidiary here in the United States, but I think for those that are US companies investing abroad, CFIUS provides a framework in that it looks at deals on a case-by-case basis, looking for specific threats and working to mitigate those specific concerns.

Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)SPEAKER_08

Thank you. I yield.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Barr. The gentleman from Illinois, who's the ranking member of the Financial Institutions Subcommittee, Mr. Foster, is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL)SPEAKER_07

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And I appreciate the bipartisan concern over trying to keep depoliticized the things that ought to be purely national security concerns. I think it's a very useful principle, and I look forward to my colleagues' public comments on, say, the tariffing of Canadian steel and aluminum, which doesn't seem like that is really—which was done on allegedly national security grounds. And so this is, it's something that we'll have to continue talking about, and I think in the end, Congress is going to have to be more explicit given the behavior of the current administration. Let's see, one specific thing that came up, are China's capabilities in, say, integrated circuit manufacture limited in any way by the amount of capital, or is it simply technology that limits them right now? My feeling, it's just technology. They're putting so much capital that they don't know how to spend it sensibly. Does anyone agree or disagree with that?

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

I'd say that China is very good at the extensive margin and less good at the intensive margin, and so yes, they can throw a lot of capital at a problem. One of the points of the outbound program was that along with along with capital, at least outbound foreign direct investment and venture capital comes with know-how and technology alongside that capital, and that is the reason why that that is really what China wants from U.S. capital markets and U.S. companies. And that is the reason why outbound was focused not on portfolio flows.

Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL)SPEAKER_07

Yeah, no, I understand. It's just we should keep our eyes on the technology. It's not money that limits Chinese progress in many things. Let's see. Several members have emphasized the need for technical expertise, both inside CFIUS and in the agencies it partners with. Do you believe that the recent attacks on civil servants generally and steep budget cuts in staff of CFIUS-member agencies are going to support the efforts of this, or is it going to be a negative in recruiting people going forward? Comments from anyone? Dr. Bauerle Danzman, I guess.

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

I'll start by saying that it is always hard to attract subject matter experts in emerging technologies to work in the U.S. government. And during my time on the committee, that was, uh, you know, a concern that came up often. And so we need to do more to attract those subject matter experts to be willing to, um, to bring their bring their gifts, bring their talents to, and their expertise to the U.S. government.

Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL)SPEAKER_07

Any other comments?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

I'd like to point back to FIRRMA, and I think Congress did two really important things in 2018 that greatly expanded the committee's ability to address this issue. One is it provided direct hire authority, so the committee and members could directly recruit these types of people. And two, it provided significant resources to do that. And so over the years, what I saw was, one, the committee could leverage expertise from individuals within the Department of Defense that are very familiar with sensitive technologies, experts and PhDs at national labs. But what you were seeing, and I think you continue to see, is there are more experts, technical experts, PhDs that work in, for example, the Department of Treasury, because of these resources that Congress provided.

Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL)SPEAKER_07

Yeah, and I'm very familiar with national labs having worked there for 25 years, and I can tell you they're hemorrhaging talent because of the actions of this administration. It is really bad, and when you reach out to partner organizations, you will find in many instances that the experts you used to deal with there have quit in disgust. It's really bad out there, at least in the— for sure in the Department of Energy that I'm very familiar with. Dr. Bauerle Danzman, the U.S. has long been an attractive location for foreign investment. I believe this is in large part due to our stable economy and financial markets, talented workforce, and commitment to promoting fair and orderly business dealing. The U.S. has been also historically a leader in anti-corruption efforts. The Corporate Transparency Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act are two pieces of legislation that really aim to crack down on corruption in illicit finance, but since taking office, President Trump has demonstrated his willingness to backtrack on anti-corruption efforts and rolling back on enforcement of both the CTA and the FCPA. Is this going to cause long-term problems for the enthusiasm for investment in the United States?

Dr. Sarah Bauerle DanzmanSPEAKER_01

So if we're talking specifically about the CTA, I think that the CTA would provide really important information to investment screening professionals so that we could actually move forward with review, including by increasing the pace of UBO discovery and so forth. The

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

gentleman's time has expired. I'd ask for further comments to be submitted for the record. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. Kim, is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Rep. Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_04

Thank you, Chairman Davidson and Ranking Member Beatty, for holding today's hearing. Thank you, witnesses, for joining us. Foreign direct investment has been a key part of making America one of the greatest countries in the world, and it has ensured that Americans remain employed. And FDI-related employment in the United States is really highest in the state of California with 15% related to that. And I just appreciate the FDIs coming into our country, but we also want to also ensure that our FDIs, American direct investments going abroad, is also protected. But none of that could occur without the balanced role that the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States plays in shielding national security while still facilitating our foreign investment. So first question to you, Mr. Joseloff: For those who have not gone through that CFIUS process, could you detail how that process works and how and what kind of information companies are expected to provide?

Mr. Benjamin JoseloffSPEAKER_11

Thank you. Yes, the process usually starts at the very earliest stages of a cross-border transaction, with the parties thinking about whether their transaction would be within the jurisdiction of CFIUS; if so, whether it would trigger a mandatory filing requirement, or if the parties are at liberty to choose whether to file voluntarily. And then ultimately, they have to think about, will their transaction likely raise national security concerns? If they do file with CFIUS, either because they have to or because they've chosen to do so voluntarily, the committee requires a wide range of information from both the foreign investor and the U.S. business. That information on the foreign investor side touches on who are the ultimate owners of the company, what's their business, where are they located, what connections do they have to other countries. On the U.S. business side, it looks at what type of technology do they have, do they have government contracts, where are their facilities located—a whole range of information on both sides trying to get at this question of, does a national security concern arise from the transaction?

Rep. Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_04

Thank you. I want to do a follow-up question to you, Mr. Samford, and ask what do you see the Known Investor Pilot Program fitting into the CFIUS mandate of balancing national security while securing the greater investments from our allies and partners?

Mr. Jonathan SamfordSPEAKER_10

Thank you for that question, Congresswoman. I think that this has tremendous potential. That was one of the facets of FIRRMA when it was passed in 2018, was to create a mechanism for those that are frequent filers of CFIUS to be able to expedite the process. There have been a couple of iterations on that. This proposal, I think, is still being worked through in terms of what it will look like, but I think anything we can do to ensure that resources are used efficiently, that is to say that CFIUS is focused on the highest-risk transactions and where you have well-established, well-known investors, frequent investors, that those can be handled efficiently.

Rep. Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_04

Improvements like that known investment program are what we need to continue to see CFIUS to ensure the strong foreign investments and national security. But I fear that under the previous administration, we saw the mission of CFIUS thrown into the side, and instead the committee was close to becoming a political tool. So, how does US become less competitive for foreign investments The CFIUS, you know when CFIUS become a political tool?

Mr. Jonathan SamfordSPEAKER_10

Well, there's no doubt that the world watches what happens with CFIUS reviews, and I think you're referencing the Nippon Steel, U.S. Steel acquisition. That was a situation where you had a well-known investor, a company that's operating in the United States from our largest country investing in Japan, a country with whom we have a mutual defense treaty. And so I think that deal was largely handled outside of the CFIUS process, where you had the previous administration weighing in prior to a formal review taking place.

Rep. Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_04

Thank you. I do want to make a last comment and highlight the outbound investment security program. When President Xi Jinping first rose to power in China, he stated that the CCP's foundation within the private sector was weak, and he outlined an economic philosophy where private sector existed to carry out the party's work and and enhance the party's philosophy. So, I just wanted to point that out, because in 2017, nearly three-quarters of private enterprises had an established CCP cell. And by 2021, the CCP achieved complete coverage of all 500 of the nation's largest firms. So, as we consider investment security, it is important that we not just look at the investment dollars that are coming into America, but also the dollars going out to China. So,

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

gentlelady's time is up.

Rep. Young Kim (R-CA)SPEAKER_04

I just wanted to make that point. And thank you so much for allowing me to go over time. And I yield back.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

The gentleman from Texas and also the chairman of the Small Business Committee, Mr. Williams, is now recognized for 5 minutes.

Rep. Roger Williams (R-TX)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for being here today. As the global economy becomes more competitive, especially in advanced technologies like AI and semiconductors, American investors are trying to position capital where it matters most. Under the Biden administration's outbound investment rule, U.S. firms are now required to self-determine if a transaction might raise national security concerns without clear guidance or a published list of restricted entities. This creates legal uncertainty, compliance risk, and could drive up the cost of doing business abroad. Meanwhile, state-backed competitors from China and the Middle East face none of those constraints and are aggressively expanding. So, Mr. Reissaus, if a Texas-based investor wants to put capital into a tech firm overseas to stay globally competitive, how do these new outbound rules impact that decision, and are we at risk of forcing American investors to sit on the sidelines where others move in?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Congressman, thank you for your question. And I think the challenge with the outbound investment security program as it's has currently been constructed is it didn't fully account for those types of cost considerations when the rules went into place. And so I think it's really important that a policy process, and one that Congress could lead, could consider these types of issues to ensure that the costs of implementing this type of regime doesn't, you know, make our businesses, our U.S. investors, less competitive in the long run.

Rep. Roger Williams (R-TX)SPEAKER_05

Okay, thank you. When U.S. investors participate in overseas ventures, such as emerging technologies, they often bring more than capital. They bring standards, accountability, and transparency to markets that would otherwise fall under the influence of authoritarian regimes. Again, we see that under the Biden administration's outbound investment framework, we may unintentionally undermine this leverage. So we've already seen U.S. firms spin off or walk away from foreign investments that once helped shape tech ecosystems. And in that vacuum, others like Saudi Arabia and China are stepping in and aligning markets— win markets with their own values and strategic objectives. So again, Mr. Reissaus, with the outbound rules tightening, are we giving up our ability to influence the standards, culture, and direction of foreign tech firms and letting regimes like China and Saudi Arabia take that seat at the table?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

I think that, that is another key cost, which is, you know, the ability for the U.S. to project its values into, into businesses. Uh, when that, when that is restricted. I think another piece of that is also, uh, our ability to learn things from those investments. I think a lot of investors are able to bring expertise back or get access to technology, and that's equally potentially lost depending on how, how broad the regime is.

Rep. Roger Williams (R-TX)SPEAKER_05

Okay, one more question. Texas plays a massive role in U.S. energy security, as we know, from refining capacity and export terminals to pipeline systems and electric grid infrastructure. Those sites are critical not just for the state, but for the entire country's energy independence. With foreign-backed firms seeking to acquire assets or real estate near these facilities, the threat is real. I have it in my district; I see it. As our adversaries become more sophisticated in exploiting economic access points, we need to ensure our investment screening tools are capable of identifying and acting on those risks early, largely when the infrastructure in question supports national defense and economic resilience. So, Mr. Reissaus, again, how is CFIUS adapting to the growing risk of foreign actors seeking strategic footholds in our energy sector?

Mr. Brian ReissausSPEAKER_02

Thank you, Congressman, for your question. I think, first, in my experience, energy security has been a critical area of concern that the committee has focused on. And, in fact, the Department of Energy leads a significant number of transactions to look at that specific issue. So trying to assess whether, in any particular deal, the transaction may pose a risk, whether to energy production, resource extraction, or even present vulnerabilities to critical energy infrastructure, whether it's supply of power or distribution of power. And so, DOE, when it looks at this, it's obviously looking for problematic investors, but are trying to assess whether the transaction could result in vulnerabilities being inserted into those types of assets and protecting against that. And the Department of Defense also will look at those deals closely to assess whether or not proximity to defense facilities or test ranges is also factored in when a foreign investor acquires, say, an oil field and is looking to do resource extraction. Okay.

Rep. Roger Williams (R-TX)SPEAKER_05

thank you for that. And, uh, with that, I yield my remaining time back.

Chairman Warren Davidson (R-OH)SPEAKER_09

Thank you, Mr. Williams. I'd like to thank all our witnesses for your testimony today. Without objection, all members will have 5 legislative days to submit additional written questions to the chairman for the record. Questions will be forwarded to the witnesses for response. The witnesses, if you get them, please respond no later than August 21st. This hearing stands adjourned.