Securing the Skies: Addressing Unauthorized Drone Activity Over U.S. Military Installations

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

This hearing of the Subcommittee on Military and Foreign Affairs will come to order. I'd like to welcome everyone. Without objection, the chair may declare a recess at any time. I recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening statement. Thank you for joining us today as we discuss one of the most complex and serious threats to our national security: the unauthorized use of unmanned aerial systems, or UAS, over U.S. military installations and sensitive sites. In recent years, we've seen a surge in drone incursions over military installations across the country. In 2024, the Department of Defense stated that there are more than 1 million drones registered in the United States and estimated that there are more than 8,500 drones flown legally across the country every day. I've even seen some of these drone incursions firsthand during my time in the South Carolina Air National Guard. However, these incursions are not from hobbyists being blown off course. The multitude of drones reported flying over bases in the past several years revealed a coordinated effort by our adversaries to collect valuable intelligence and surveillance of some of our most sensitive military equipment. These incursions often are designed to disrupt important trainings and create chaos for a number of reasons. Number one, base commanders have inadequate or nonexistent monitoring capabilities; two, a near-total lack of counter-drone capabilities; three, unclear standard operating procedures to guide base commanders' responses and decision-making; and finally, four, ambiguous legal authorities both on and off base. This threat is magnified by the complex regulatory and prosecutorial framework that was patched together by the previous administration in what I would argue is a poor attempt to address this issue. Right now, the Department of Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, intelligence community, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security are all involved in some aspects of the counter-UAS efforts. As a result, there is no agency with primary authority on countering drone incursions, leading to confusion and, more importantly, gaps on how to identify and mitigate this threat. This interagency failure was on full display last winter when hundreds of drones were spotted in the skies above New Jersey and other parts of the Northeast. After several temporary flight restrictions and mass confusion among state, local, and federal partners, the Biden administration provided the public no answers what was happening above them. However, with only a few weeks of the current administration taking office, they revealed that the drones over New Jersey were actually authorized by the FAA. This instance raises multiple questions as to why the previous administration left the American people in the dark for over a month when they knew the simple truth. Another notable incident occurred at Langley Air Force Base in December of 2023. Over 17 days, unidentified drones repeatedly breached our sensitive military airspace, one of America's most critical installations. The F-22 Raptor squadrons were moved to alternate bases to lessen exposure, and discussions were initiated on installing physical countermeasures. These are not isolated incidents. In February, the commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM testified to Congress that there were over 350 detections of drones at 100 different military installations last year alone. Additionally, since 2023, two Chinese nationals have been arrested for illegally flying drones over military installations to conduct surveillance. One of these individuals was caught attempting to flee the U.S. and return to China with sensitive footage he had recorded. Today, this committee will hear from officials from the Department of Defense on what the Trump administration is doing to help combat this issue and bring an end to these illegal drone incursions. We must demand full accountability, expedited technological upgrades, and enhanced oversight to safeguard our sovereignty and ensure that our military remains unexposed to foreign surveillance and potential threats. I'm hopeful that our witnesses here today have suggestions on how Congress can help empower the right federal agencies to combat this problem and secure the skies above our military bases. I now recognize Ranking Member Subramanyam for the purpose of making an opening statement.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this important hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today, for your service to our country, and to making our airspace safe. It's clear that UAS is an issue right now. It's the future of warfare, from the war in Ukraine to our own military bases in the continental United States. We're seeing in real time that UAS are redefining how battles are fought and how intelligence is gathered. And I believe it's been 350 drones that have been reported in the last year over 100 different military installations. That's 350 different potential national security breaches that we know of. These include highly sensitive sites such as nuclear facilities and major military bases, and that's a huge threat to our national security and the lives of our service members. And unfortunately, our lack of coordinated, effective response needs to be addressed immediately. And I know everyone here today wants to work on it and is planning on working on it. And so, we're familiar with this issue in my home state in the Commonwealth of Virginia. In December 2023, service members at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia saw drones hovering over their airspace for 17 days. And Langley, for those who don't know, is home to key national security assets like the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, and it plays an important role in keeping us safe here in our nation's capital. And so, we also have some important naval assets in that area, too. These drones demonstrated complicated aerial maneuvers and didn't just broadcast on known frequencies, suggesting that they weren't just a local hobbyist making an innocent mistake. As far as we can tell in Congress, there was and still is not a cohesive or coordinated plan for how we're going to deal with this. But maybe we can learn more today about what's happening now and what we can do moving forward. Our job on this committee is to find answers to questions, and I have a lot. Who is piloting these drones, for instance? These criminal actors? Are these foreign adversaries? Are they simply local hobbyists with advanced capabilities? I'm not sure about that, but maybe that's the case. And what are they doing? Are they gathering intelligence? Are they probing for weaknesses? Are they planning an attack? And finally, what is our plan for dealing with them safely and effectively? Because these UAS are a clear and present danger to our national security, and we need to have a plan to counter them. There are several areas I'd like to focus on today. The first is counter-drone authorities. Right now, the U.S. law allows the Department of Energy, Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security to detect and respond to drone activities in certain situations, such as nuclear facilities, for instance, missile defense assets, or other covered facilities. But only around half of all military installations actually fall under this definition of covered facility, which is why I think this may be something we should look at for change. The second is counter-drone technologies. It's not just as simple as shooting them down, as we know. There are homes and businesses and parks near bases like Langley, and people live there; children play there. Shooting down drones could endanger people in these communities, especially if we don't know what payloads the drones may carry, and a miss shot could also pose a threat to commercial air traffic, as well. And so, we need to find a way to safely counter some of these incursions. And we have other technologies at our disposal, like jamming and disrupting and even taking over unknown or hostile drones. But there's a lot of work to do to develop these capabilities, and some of that work actually takes place in my district in Northern Virginia. With that said, I don't know of a silver bullet, and so it's going to take a coordinated effort, I think, at the state, local, and federal level. And so, we're all going to have to work together because everyone's got different jurisdictions. And I'd like to, on that front, see if we can work together and maybe have some sort of task force in place so that information is easily gathered and where everyone's up to date on the latest technology, as well as the best practices. And so, this is a very timely hearing on an important issue, and I want to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to come up with a plan to protect our military bases and protect the American people. So, I yield back.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you for that. I'm pleased to welcome an expert panel of witnesses for today's discussion. I'd first like to welcome Rear Admiral Paul Spedero, the Vice Director for Operations, or J-3, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I'd also like to welcome Mr. Mark Ditlevson, who is the current Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs. Due to unforeseen circumstances, the FAA is no longer testifying at today's hearing, but they have committed to answering in writing any questions that our members have. If any question— if any member has questions they would like to submit to the FAA following this hearing, please get them to staff for the FAA to answer. Now we're going to administer the oath to the witnesses. Pursuant to Committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses will please stand and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Thank you. Please seat— please take your seat. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. We appreciate you being here today and look forward to your testimony. Let me remind the witnesses that we will have read your your written statement, and it will be it will appear in full in the hearing record. Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes. As a reminder, please press the button on the microphone in front of you so that it is on and the members can hear you. When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After 4 minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the red light comes on, your 5 minutes have expired, and we would ask that you please wrap up. I now recognize Rear Admiral Spedero for his opening statement.

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Good afternoon, Chairman Timmons, Ranking Member Subramanyam, committee members, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and thank you for your support and your oversight. Admittedly, several of my opening comments will echo those of the chairman and the ranking member. The rapid emergence, proliferation, and employment of unmanned systems has fundamentally changed the way that both professional militaries as well as terrorist organizations conduct warfare. Over the last few years, we have seen the employment of unmanned systems, in particular, unmanned aerial systems, in every major conflict, from the Russia-Ukraine war to Iran's attacks on Israel and attacks against U.S. bases and ships across the Middle East. And most tragically, an Iranian-supported militant group successfully employed a one-way attack drone on Tower 22 in Jordan, killing three U.S. service members and wounding 40 on January 27th, 2024. Here in the homeland, as Assistant Secretary Ditlevson will note in his opening remarks, the mass drone incursions over Joint Base Langley-Eustis in December 2023 reminded us that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And should our adversary choose to employ drones for surveillance or even attack, we would not be prepared to adequately defend our homeland and only marginally capable to defend our military installations. The incursions over Joint Base Langley-Eustis were not the first, they have not been the last, but they were the longest and the largest series of incursions that we have seen to date. And the comprehensive review of that event, as well as in the actions we took in follow-on incursions, like those that occurred over Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, and over Picatinny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earle in New Jersey, have resulted in improvements, but more action is needed. And the joint force has made counter-UAS a priority line of effort. We are now better prepared to respond to incursions, with the designation of Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command as the operational synchronizers in their respective areas of responsibility. Last year, and within weeks of being assigned this role, General Guillot, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command, released a comprehensive commander's assessment that has served as a roadmap to building the necessary command and control and standard operating procedures to address the drone threat. Over the last year, we have also invested in education and training against this threat. NORTHCOM has been the central driving force for the work being done by several organizations, in partnership with industry, to deliver the domain awareness and counter-UAS systems that we require. And lastly, we are progressing well in our completion of the counter-UAS tasks assigned to us in the fiscal year '25 NDAA. We appreciate your continued support and your oversight. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I will now pass to Secretary Ditlevson.

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Chairman Timmons, Ranking Member Subramanyam, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. The events of December 2023 at Joint Base Langley-Eustis served to focus and energize DOD's counter-small UAS efforts in the homeland. During the event, DOD struggled to address the incursions in a timely and effective fashion, owing at least in part to challenges within the DOD and our ability to implement a relatively untested interagency coordination process. To some extent, those challenges from JBLE still exist. However, we have worked since then to improve and refine our processes and coordination efforts, and we have seen improvements in subsequent responses. I can assure the committee that the department is as frustrated by these events as you are. However, we can't simply focus on looking back and waste precious resources. As a department, we act, we review that action, we adjust, and we move out. Today, I'm here to tell you that we are continuing to move out. I'm confident that we are in a stronger position to defend DOD installations today than we were in December of 2023. We are fighting this threat on three fronts: internal process reviews, generating better domain awareness, and clarifying commanders' authority and legislation. Internally, we must focus on the ability to provide response at the speed of relevance. The designation of USNORTHCOM and USINDOPACOM late last year as the counter-UAS operational synchronizers in their respective areas of the homeland was an essential step. We've developed more streamlined interagency coordination consistent with Section 130i. We are also conducting a comprehensive review, as requested in the FY '25 NDAA Section 925, and where necessary, consolidating and updating DOD policy. This is an effort long overdue, and it provides us with direction and momentum. Lastly, working with our interagency partners, like our colleagues from the FAA, we have enabled DOD to sponsor facilities which provide a critical mission to DOD, but are not directly DOD facilities or assets. Second, generating better domain awareness is essential to developing an understanding of what is flying in our airspace and how to separate the negligent from the nefarious. This is the fundamental issue we saw at Langley and New Jersey. DOD is working through venues like the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, the JRAC, to rapidly acquire the right equipment and to give commanders better tools to understand the operating environment and the ability to effectively conduct non-kinetic and kinetic mitigations. Commander, USNORTHCOM phrased it this way in his posture hearing in February: You can't defeat what you can't see. On the legislative front, we continue to engage with members of Congress to seek modest but important refinements to DOD's counter-UAS authorities under Section 130i. Our legislative proposal is intended to allow the department to protect additional locations and missions, add greater stability for long-term planning and resource allocation within the department, and facilitate improved understanding and cooperation among the U.S. interagency and local partners. Ultimately, I believe we need to address all these issues with end users in mind, our installation commanders and the security personnel charged with the duties to protect our installations, our operations, and ultimately, our personnel. Lastly, the President of the United States has issued several executive orders directing the Department of Defense to take all appropriate and lawful measures to ensure the complete operational control of the border. The department, in turn, is responding by preparing the path for employment of counter-SUAS activities along the border, both in support of DOD interests and in support of DHS as the lead federal agency. As the operational environment, legislation, and threats evolve, policy must adapt to ensure DOD's ability to continue to advance our national defense objectives remains. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Subramanyam, and distinguished members of the committee, in conclusion, the homeland continues to face increased and evolving threats from UAS. To address these challenges requires a whole-of-government approach and a unified effort. We must modernize ability to assess the threat, determine its weaknesses, and acquire and deploy countermeasures. Thank you for the support of Congress and for your continued commitment and support of the Department of Defense. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. Rear Admiral Spedero, how many drone incursions have taken place over U.S. military installations over the past 2 years? We got the number last time we had a briefing of 350, but have they grown, or what's the current data you're willing to share?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, so the exact number I'd be happy to share in a classified setting, but I can tell you that it has grown.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

I'm actually curious, why did we get the 350 number in an unclassified setting? That was one of the questions I had.

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

It's a great question, sir.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Okay, yeah, fair enough. All right, well, let's do this. Can you discuss procedures that DOD has in place for a base commander when the base commander gets reports of an unauthorized drone incursion?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, so currently there is a standard operating procedure that's been published by the commander of US Northern Command. So each base has been provided that standard operating procedure. The expectation is they will respond in accordance with the—

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

When was that created?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

It was just published here recently, within the last month. Finalized and published.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

So what percent of base commanders have any technology to actually track drones as opposed to just, ooh, I saw a drone and then you report it?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, so the capabilities at each base is varied. Again, the specifics for the, for the individual locations would be better in a classified setting, but it is not comprehensive, I can tell you that. It is not sufficient, and again, again, varies from base to base, from, from very little to somewhat more comprehensive.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Is that something that Congress can help with authorizations and appropriations to get additional resources? Because I think that I would feel that most bases should have the, at the very least, the ability to track, whether they have countermeasures is a different thing. But is that something that y'all need? You need additional money?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yes, sir, absolutely. I think the development, fielding, the acquisition, distribution of domain awareness sensors is a critical first step. It's not the only thing. Obviously, we need a method to exert command and control so that we can build a common operating picture, because it will take layers of different sensors, because one sensor may be better against certain UAVs and certain flight profiles, and you may have to rely on different sensors to round out the picture. So being able to fuse all that together to get the complete picture will be necessary. And then, as you mentioned, getting to a point where we can actually respond, that's an entirely next investment that needs to be made. So, so yes, we do need more sensors. We are addressing the shortfall right now with the fielding of flyaway kits. So these will be kits that will be available for bases that have very limited capability to detect on their own and build domain awareness. And should they have an incursion that they're unable to resolve, they would solicit the help from Commander, U.S. Northern Command, and this flyaway kit, as well as expertise and additional resources that would be required, would be immediately deployed to that location.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

So I guess resources are probably fairly easy, and y'all are going to work on telling us what you actually need from a, from a technology perspective. But the other side is the authority. So I mean, does a base commander have clear authorities what they can and can't do relative to whether the drone is in their airspace or just outside the airspace? Is that as big or bigger of a problem?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

So all of our installations have the authority that's afforded them under the standing rules of engagement and the standing rules for the use of force. You know, in that, in those rules, if they are, can establish that there's hostile intent or hostile act, then they, they not only have the authority, but they, they have the absolute right and responsibility to respond appropriately to protect themselves forces as well as DOD property. So those, those are standing rules that they have. Now, being able to discern hostile intent and hostile act, as referred to in the opening comments, may be very challenging. Is this negligent activity being conducted by someone just flying a drone irresponsibly, whether that is a recreational enthusiast or it is someone that's using a drone for commercial aspects? So it can be a challenge here in the homeland to determine that.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

So a base commander has the authority to, for example, arrest a Chinese national that's a quarter-mile off base?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

He does not have the authority to detain someone that is off base. He would have to coordinate with local law enforcement to apprehend someone that is operating a drone outside of the base. Now, I know Secretary Ditlevson will talk about 130i authorities, which is something that we really do want to talk about today because I think it's important. But under 130i authorities, there is some additional room to respond. For a covered facility, merely the presence of that drone conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected of conducting unauthorized surveillance or interfering with operations, as you referred to in your opening statement about the interference with F-22 operations, that would meet the standard for response rather than having to determine hostile intent or hostile act.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you for that. My time has expired. I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Subramanyam, for 5 minutes.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to go back to something I mentioned a couple of times, which is, what is a covered facility and a not-covered facility? And, Rear Admiral Spedero, if you're not a covered facility, what does that mean? Does that impair your ability to respond? And what do covered facilities have that non-covered ones don't?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

And so if you're, if you're not covered, you can request to be covered, but you'd have to meet the criteria to become a covered facility. And that, that is one of the, one of the problems with the 130i authorization is meeting the criteria for covered. An example of this would be Luke Air Force Base, where F-35 training takes place for roughly three-quarters of those that fly F-35s, and it is not a covered facility because training facilities are not covered. So it'd be problematic to actually get approval for Luke Air Force Base to be a 130i. Now, as I mentioned earlier, under 130i, if a drone is conducting unauthorized surveillance or suspected even of conducting unauthorized surveillance, then the base commander would be able to respond to that. Unauthorized surveillance may or may not meet the criteria of hostile intent, which would give you the authority to respond under the Standing Rules of Engagement and the standing rules for the use of force. So it, it relieves some of the burden on that base commander to determine that there is an imminent threat. If this is interfering with our operations, if this is giving a potential adversary a look at our base and our sensitive activities, then we have the authority to respond.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

And, um, mentioned before having to reach out to local jurisdictions if someone's operating UAS outside of a base and What kind of coordination is currently being done with state and local jurisdictions? Is it sort of ad hoc, or is this— is there like a process in place right now? And does federal law limit the extent of engagement with state and local, and how can we make that better?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, thank you for the question. So each base commander, one of his imperatives is to build relationships with the local community. That would include law enforcement agencies. It is covered extensively in all of the base commander courses, so part of their training and their education program before they assume command is building how to build those relationships, the importance, what the limitations of those are. So each individual base commander is responsible. There are additional lessons learned and protocols and best practices about how to engage law enforcement on this particular threat, but those occur at our bases and did occur at Joint Base Langley-Eustis. They had a very, very tight relationship with local law enforcement, with sheriffs, police departments, as well as other federal agencies, law enforcement agencies that have capability in that area. And they did respond in concert together to try to apprehend individuals that were responsible for that drone activity over the base. So that, it does occur and it is very important.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

And as far as technology and mitigation. What— I don't know if maybe we need— this is the right forum for this, but broadly, do you think there's technology gaps currently? And do you think that there's progress being made towards kind of filling those gaps? And what can we do both in Congress as well as private industry to help kind of fill the gaps when it comes to technology for trying to address both kinetic and non-kinetic solutions?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, in general, the technology to field systems has far outpaced the technology to defeat those systems. It's a much wider, broader, deeper market for drone application for commercial and recreational purposes. So hence that technology has evolved very quickly from radio-controlled drones to now fully autonomous drones that may or may not even rely on reception of a GPS signal, which would make it very challenging to intercept. So on the counter-drone activity, you have to come back to agencies that would be interested in that, like Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, FBI, law enforcement agencies. So we have to partner and we have to create that demand within industry to get technology back on pace to counter this ever-increasing emergence of drone technology.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

Do you feel like we have the personnel right now to— and the expertise in the country to be able to do this?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

I think we've seen a good response. I'll defer to Secretary Ditlevson. He can talk about DIU and other organizations that have really made a solid partnership with industry to advance this technology.

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Thank you, Admiral. Yes, there's several different organizations within the DOD that are looking at this issue and moving out rapidly to acquire new capabilities, such as the JRAC, the Joint Counter-UAS Office, and DIU. All of those, this is a focus area and one of their primary lines of effort.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. McGuire, for 5 minutes.

Rep. John McGuire (R-VA)SPEAKER_07

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses. Admiral, thanks for your service. I want a yes or no from both of you: Are you aware of the August 2020 advisory? It's an advisory on the application of federal laws to the application and use of technologies to detect and mitigate unmanned aircraft systems. Are you two aware of that?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, no, sir, I'm not specifically aware of that.

Rep. John McGuire (R-VA)SPEAKER_07

If and when appropriate, I have a copy And I'd like to admit that into the record.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Without objection, so ordered.

Rep. John McGuire (R-VA)SPEAKER_07

So, I believe that's the source of a lot of the problems that we have. In the military, we have something called paralysis by analysis. Obviously, the commanders at Langley and other bases have seen drones, and they failed to act because—and I believe the source of those problems is this August 2020 advisory, and I think I have a solution for it. I was recently at the southern border where I met with Tom Homan, I met with Border Patrol, ICE agents, mayors, sheriffs, business owners, 10th Mountain Division folks that are protecting our border from San Diego all the way to Texas. And I asked them, Are you seeing drones come across the southern border and surveying our troops? And the answer was yes. And I said, Is 130i working for you right now? And I know what they said, but Admiral, what do you think? Is 130i right now working for us?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

So they don't have 130i. That's the first piece, and we're working to resolve that. So, for instance, in the National Defense Areas that have just been established as an annex, does not have 130i.

Rep. John McGuire (R-VA)SPEAKER_07

Now, I'm going to get to a point. Yeah. And do you have an opinion on 130i right now, as of today?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Yes, Congressman. If we can get 130i implemented in these areas where Joint Task Force Southwest Border is operating, it should enable the commanders on the ground to have those expanded authorities that allow them to interdict and mitigate these UAS threats.

Rep. John McGuire (R-VA)SPEAKER_07

And I know you said you're working with Congress on legislation, so I'd like to talk to you about an idea on a piece of legislation. It may be something that involves Judiciary and FAA, but let me run this across you. So, we currently have troops on the border facing the cartels and our critical infrastructure. Now, of course, we've got Langley Air Force Base and other critical infrastructure as well. And of course, we've got bad actors that are next have bought land next to our military bases, and and they're surveilling us on a daily basis. And it's only a matter of time until we have our next 9/11 terrorist attack. The problem is bureaucracy prevents action, but this time we know about it and we can fix it. And right now with 130i, the way it's proposed, you have to be observed or attacked and then ask for permission, and that takes delays. I've got an idea that might speed that up. 18 USC, US Code 32, is treating remote-controlled airplanes—is which I call a drone. So 18 USC 32 is treating remote-control airplanes or drones as if they're passenger airplanes. And they're not. Basically, the problem is the government has created complex statutes to let a few act bad actors possibly take action if you jump through 1,000 hoops: 130i. This is not good enough. We owe it to our military and our citizens to fix this. The United States provides better protection from UAS to Saudi Arabia than we do to our own citizens. And so my idea for a bill is you change the word from aircraft to manned aircraft, because I think every commander is afraid that if I shoot down a remote-control airplane or a drone, I'm going to be—no one's going to back me up. I think I remember hearing the Langley commander say, Are you guys going to back me up? Are you guys going to back me up? and no one answered. That may not be 100% true, but Admiral, do you have any comments on that idea?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, this is the burden of command, and you need to understand that if there is something that is assessed as a threat to your forces or your installation, then again, you not only have the authority but the responsibility to act. I would counter that they have authority right now on the southwest border to engage UAS. We have in the last few days alone reaffirmed that under the standing rules of engagement and the standing rules of use of force, when you take in the totality of the facts and the circumstances at the time, you have the authority. We know that cartels have used UAS for unauthorized surveillance to assess our troop size, our movements, to solicit and enable attacks from other vectors. We know that they have used drones and kinetic attacks against

Rep. John McGuire (R-VA)SPEAKER_07

With all due respect, I just returned from the southern border, and I asked the commander from Texas to San Diego if he has authority to shoot down drones that he's looking at, that's looking at his troops, and he still is not sure. I just left the southern border, and I think it goes back to that advisory. That advisory has created a stigma, and I think that we can mitigate or overcome that if we just change the word from aircraft to manned aircraft, and then they won't have such a huge penalty if they shoot down a drone. And certainly if someone wants to prosecute somebody for shooting down private property, there are plenty of laws on the books for that. Well, with that, I have no further questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA)SPEAKER_08

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the witnesses for helping the committee with its work. I do have to say that I would prefer that we were reviewing the facts of the Signal chats that were conducted by Secretary Hegseth and the Trump leadership team in order to get to the bottom of that. However, I will I will at a later date in full committee enter a resolution of inquiry to ask the administration to provide information to this committee, to the Oversight Committee, regarding how that happened. It was bad enough the last time we were here, we just knew that that the initial Signal chat had happened and that inadvertently they had included the editor of The Atlantic, who was not approved for clearance, and that the chat included specific information about those attacks against Yemen, and which could have put our sons and daughters in uniform at grave risk.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

Now,

Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA)SPEAKER_08

That was then. Now we know that this, this chat also went to Secretary Hegseth's brother, his sister, I don't think his mom was in on it, she's about the only one in the family who wasn't in on it, and then the, the, the, the family attorney was in on it as well. So, so that's a whole set of, of people who were not authorized to be on that, that chat, again, that disclosed, you know, classified information and, and actionable intelligence about an impending U.S. attack in Yemen.

SPEAKER_UNKNOWN

So,

Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA)SPEAKER_08

And then beyond that, now we find out that Secretary Hegseth is using his Gmail account and using a phone that was listed on his sports betting app and available to the public. So this just keeps getting worse. I know that is not the fault of these witnesses, and they probably cannot illuminate the circumstances, but I will be filing that resolution of inquiry asking for the White House to provide that information, because that is important. It's not not partisan politics. It's just what the Oversight Committee should be doing to keep military personnel safe, like what we're doing here. We're having a hearing on drones being flown in the area of U.S. bases, and that presents a danger to our sons and daughters. Well, so does so does using a nonsecure platform to discuss actionable intelligence against our enemy who has antiaircraft and antinaval vessel capability. That that's really important, too, and that presents a a clear and present danger. I know that there were reports in the press that the White House said that was childish, that was childish that Secretary Hegseth did that. I agree with that assessment. I think it was totally immature, and it demonstrates an unfitness and a lack of seriousness about protecting our sons and daughters in uniform. We all nominate young men and women from our district to the Military Academy at West Point and to the Naval Academy, and dear God, you can't you can't put a family in that position, put one of our best and brightest in that position, and then leak information to our enemies while while they're going into battle. Okay. So this committee, myself included, investigated an attack, a 2020 attack by al-Shabaab at Manda Bay in Kenya. That was a drone attack. Several recent base attacks overseas, in fact, have involved the use of drones. So, Admiral, how how has our profile, countermeasures against drones, how has that changed since those initial attacks back in 2020 that resulted in in U.S. casualties?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, so since that time, we fielded a number of new systems across a variety of the spectrum, electromagnetic as well as electro-optical and infrared sensors to build our domain awareness. We've also fielded a number of kinetic systems that shoot interceptors or use some sort of munition, and they are deployed at our most vulnerable and most likely to be attacked facilities overseas. That is where the bulk of our counter-UAS capability is actually located, is overseas, and hence the problem here in the homeland is we have very limited and sparse and distributed capability across, you know, the multitude of installations we have.

Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA)SPEAKER_08

Thank you, Admiral. Thank you for your courtesy, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Biggs, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to briefly comment about the previous questioner. Once again, going with the woke media story and not bothering to mention the success of the strikes, which restored freedom of navigation, protected shipping lanes, kept Americans safe. Nor did he bother to mention that the the encrypted service that was being used was one recommended by the previous administration, DHS guidance. But my questions with regard to this this topic is is for both of you, and you could just this are just This is the context. So can can we, do we have the technology to to discover that there is UAVs in our in the neighborhood of our bases?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Yes, Congressman, we do.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Okay, and, um, can we track— can we— if a UAV's there, can we track it? We have the technology to track it?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Yes, Congressman.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Okay, and then you could interdict it if you chose to at every base?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

We have different options for interdiction, Congressman, across a spectrum, right, for the commander to use their best judgment.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

But you could interdict if you so chose, and you have authorities under 130i, perhaps depending on the command chain there, right? You could make that point, right?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Depending upon the installation and whether it's a covered installation, Congressman, you would have the 130i additional authorities. But as the Admiral has said, there's always the ability to respond if there's hostile intent for that base commander.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

But you have to determine hostile intent, and that's the problem, right? Admiral Spedero, could you explain how unauthorized drone activity, even when it's caused by recreational or commercial users, diverts critical security resources away from responding to legitimate national security threats, please?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, Congressman, thank you for your question. If we go back to New Jersey and, you know, that activity, once the the FAA put the temporary flight restrictions in place and there was, you know, very broad and comprehensive coverage of that by the media, many of you spoke about it, many of the members of Congress talked about the anxiety that was building in the community due to the high level of sightings. Once that word got out, that public messaging about responsible drone use, once the word got out about the flight restrictions, we saw a rapid decline in the number of sightings. The drone activity essentially went away. And we don't want it to get to the point we have to do that every time. If we can message to the public that responsible commercial and recreational application of your drone is an imperative to prevent diverting our attention and our resources, both from investment, training, and response, we're going to be better at defending the homeland. But if we have to continually be aware of negligent drones flying into our base, it is going to divert attention. That's not to say that we don't need to address this threat, because as was brought up by this committee and we agree with, our adversary has demonstrated that they will use this type of activity for unauthorized surveillance, for espionage.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Yeah, and let's add to that for a second, and that is the coupling of AI, which is moving rapidly forward and providing autonomous navigation, obstacle avoidance, deep learning, computer vision, easier to become weaponized, real-time image recognition, target identification, So I would like briefly, if you could, either one of you want to talk about the threat of AI going to, coupled with drone technology, to become an increasing, actually exponentially increased threat to our national security?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Congressman, it's a great question. Thank you for that. On the policy side, we need to make sure that our regulations internally at the DOD are streamlined to the extent that we stay at pace with the threat that we face outside the fenceline of our installations. We need to make sure that we are giving the commanders on the ground clarity on what they have for authority and providing them the capabilities to counter those threats. Now, I think the admiral can speak better as far as what is actually being developed at this time and how far ahead we are in counter-UAS technologies. But as far as the policy purview is concerned, I know from the Secretary of Defense front office down, we need to give the warfighter every capability they need to keep our servicemembers safe.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

I know that I'm not going to have time to hear your answer, Admiral, sorry, but with regard to the policy, I would ask that you work with the chairman of the subcommittee on on policies that need to be rewritten, perhaps through legislation, that we can do to facilitate defending against this this combination of of AI and and drone technology, which is advancing very rapidly. And Mr. Chairman, to that extent, I have some unanimous consent requests if possible. Yes. Yeah The first one is Autonomous Ascent: How AI Is Reshaping the Future of the UAV Industry. Another piece, Mystery Drones Swarmed a U.S. Military Base for 17 Days. The next one, What We Know About the Langley Air Force Base Drone Incident.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Without objection, so ordered.

Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ)SPEAKER_05

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cloud, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Michael Cloud (R-TX)SPEAKER_01

Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for bringing up this very important topic that's very timely, and thank you, thank you, Admiral, especially for your service and those in uniform behind you for what you do to protect and serve our country. It occurs to me that we're discussing this issue, but it seems to me like it's as much a symptom of some of the bigger issues we've seen at the Pentagon in regarding our stance just on the world stage, in the sense that I wish we were talking today about how advanced we are and how forward-thinking we've thought about this and that we've invested in these new technologies and that we're leading the world in it, and when we look at drones and drone incursions. But yet for me, I've considered that funding our defense is our number one constitutional duty in Congress. My biggest concerns have been that sometimes we are funding legacy systems that are outdated as opposed to investing into where the puck is going, so to speak. And while the funding for this is in lots of different buckets, my analysis looking through a bunch of it seems like we're spending about $22 billion-ish in the last budget on fighter jets and maybe $1 billion on drone and counter-drone technology together. That may be off a bit because, again, it's in a lot of different pockets, but it's that that concerns me in the sense of we're talking about military incursions over our base, we're talking about one drone coming and what we can or can't do about it. I think from the American taxpayer who's sitting at home going, We're spending $100 billion, $800 billion roughly on defense and we can't shoot a drone down, it's just a frustrating experience because we want to think that we can do that. So as has been mentioned, us needing to do our job to make sure that you have the capabilities to do it, but I would also wonder how much of this is a little bit of a reactive stance in command being more concerned about CYA, so to speak, as opposed to protecting the assets and the intelligence and the information that is available on that base. You mentioned that you recently developed the SOP, I guess about a month ago. That was news to me. Could we get a copy of that sent to this committee?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yes, sir, I don't see a problem with that. I'll coordinate with Commander, U.S. Northern Command.

Rep. Michael Cloud (R-TX)SPEAKER_01

Okay, that would be much appreciated. And we all remember the, what I would call Biden's balloon blunder, where we had this balloon come across. We sat here and watched it for for days. I was went to a meteorologist at one of the local news stations, and he was tracking it and predicting where it was going to go, and yet we were watching it go over bases and not doing anything about it. How much is this is just not the will to act versus legitimately you being prohibited legally from doing things? There's a difference between not having a clear authority and being prohibited from doing something, I guess, is what I'm trying to

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Yes, Congressman, that's a great question. For us on the policy side, we seek to clarify the authorities for base commanders so that they understand exactly what they are able to do. And as you pointed out, sometimes there may be a little bit of confusion because of how the language is given out or guidance is pushed down to the lower levels. During our review of counter-UAS policies, as prescribed in Section 925 of the FY '25 NDAA, we've gone back and we've reviewed all of our counter-UAS documentation. For example, Section 130i, it was at about 130 pages. We've cut that down to 20 pages now. So we're looking to streamline our processes as much as possible so commanders understand what they have for authorities.

Rep. Michael Cloud (R-TX)SPEAKER_01

That's certainly very helpful. And I guess, you know, if I could convey kind of the angst of the American people, we're looking at this and thinking, okay, there's drone incursion into the United States. You know, there's bad actors within our borders now. Who have the ability to even attack infrastructure. And we're talking military bases, but it could be electric power lines, it could be pipelines, it could be anything at this point. And we seem very— like we're approaching this from a very bureaucratic standpoint as opposed to something that literally could be a problem next week. And I'm wondering what we can do and what we can help you do in the sense of the sense of urgency that could be needed You know, we, again, we have bad actors even at state level within our borders because, you know, we had open borders for the last 4 years. So the terrorist activity that's now in our country, bad actors from other states that don't have the best interest of our country in mind are here with this kind of capability. And what can we do to speed up this process so that it's handled with the urgency as opposed to kind of like this curious bureaucratic question that needs to be resolved? That's a question. What can we do to speed it up, both from DOD and from Congress's standpoint, to support what you need?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Thank you for the question, Congressman. We have a legislative proposal working through the Pentagon right now focused on three areas where we could improve Section 130i. In the department's opinion, we don't want this provision to sunset. We want to make sure that the authorities continue forward. There is an expiration date on 130i authorities next year. We also want to expand the locations and missions covered under 130i. As we've discussed today, the bases are not all covered. Not all installations qualify as one of the nine mission areas under 130i. So we'd like to expand that to cover all installations. And then we'd also like to facilitate data sharing, because right now data sharing from the DOD side is limited only in the pursuit of a legal case against a particular individual or group. We're not able to share data with our interagency partners to improve our tactics, techniques, or procedures. And to your point, Congressman, earlier about driving cost efficiencies, being able to share data to produce better technology would help us be more efficient with taxpayer money.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you for that. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Luna, for 5 minutes.

Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL)SPEAKER_00

Thank you, Chairman. Here's what every American needs to know that's watching this currently. In 2024 alone, 350 drones were detected flying over our military installations, over 100 to be exact, and that came straight out of the mouth of General Gregory Guillot, commander of NORAD and U.S. Northern Command. These were not just toys. These were intelligence-gathering, signal-jamming, and potentially weaponized drones. These incursions happened while the Biden administration sat on their hands, allowing bureaucracy and interagency dysfunction to run the show. I see a lot of military here right now. You guys all know that bureaucracy many times can be our worst enemy. Now that President Trump is back in office, thank God, we finally have strong leadership again. But cleaning up Biden's national security blunder is no small task. Our military installations are still extremely vulnerable. As sitting here from some of my colleagues, we have the CCP, Iranian proxies, Mexican cartels, they all know this. We are here today to fix that. And let me be crystal clear, as I'm sure many of you would agree: If you are flying unauthorized drones over military installations, you should expect it to be shot down. Don't expect Uncle Sam to pay for it either. My opinion is play stupid games, win stupid prizes. Now, Admiral Spedero, I heard directly from General Guillot in February, 350 drone incursions over 100 military installations in one year. I know that this is not your fault directly, but this is a massive security gap and an utter failure. Under current authorities, what is preventing base commanders from neutralizing these immediately, in my opinion, going out there with a shotgun and shooting these things down?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Well, thank you, ma'am, for the question. Um, I, I wish it were as simple as shooting it with a shotgun, um, but it's not

Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL)SPEAKER_00

depending on elevation. But what's stopping it? Is it still the bureaucratic red tape and sign-offs? Because in my opinion, if you're flying something like this that can collect jam communications, maybe carry explosives, collect surveillance on classified systems, I don't think that you should have to be required to make a phone call. I think that if you see it, you should shoot it down.

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yes, under 130i, unauthorized surveillance would meet the standard for engagement. If it were interfering with your operations, it would meet the standard for engagement. If you're not a 130i, then, again, back to the rules of engagement and establishing hostile intent or hostile act. But you may get there, so just the presence of that drone over your base may meet hostile intent or hostile act. There is not a set of circumstances I can tell you in every case and go down a checklist, Okay, you've met it. Go ahead and shoot.

Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL)SPEAKER_00

Sir, I mean, I think you might agree if you are flying a drone in any capacity, I don't care if it's civilian or not, over military installation, I don't even think you should have to go to a checklist. I think that it should automatically be taken down.

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

Yeah, and that's the preference to invoke 130i, is to relieve that burden because we do agree that unauthorized access to our bases poses a threat. Even if there aren't sensitive activities, it does provide surveillance of our force posture, our weak points, our vulnerabilities, descriptions, geographic details of the base, all

Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL)SPEAKER_00

of the information, right?

Rear Admiral Paul Spedero Jr.SPEAKER_06

They can gather intelligence piece by piece by any means necessary. So we do we do want 130i protection because we'd like to relieve that burden. Now, engagement still needs to meet the standard, a responsible standard. You have to do a collateral damage assessment before you can engage.

Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL)SPEAKER_00

I have a feeling with this administration and the members on this panel, I think that you'll probably get there. So help is on the way in that regard. Mr. Ditlevson, hopefully I said that okay. Do you believe that foreign adversaries like China and Iran exploit the jurisdictional chaos under the previous administration to increase their drone activity over U.S. territories?

Mr. Mark Roosevelt DitlevsonSPEAKER_04

Yes, Congresswoman. I think our adversaries take advantage of every weakness that we have in our system, and they're constantly probing, trying to find an entry point.

Rep. Anna Paulina Luna (R-FL)SPEAKER_00

Okay, well, let me just be crystal clear for the record. If you fly a drone over an American military base, it should be blown out of the sky. I don't think that this is a controversial perspective to have. No phone calls, no paperwork, no permission slips. But under the Biden message, I think it was more or less the message of fly wherever you want, we'll kind of deal with it later. But be crystal clear, under this administration, the message is FAFO. For decorum's sake, we won't interpret that, but just mess around, find out. You guys all know what that means. We have the technology, we have the capability, but what we had lacked up until now is the courage to act without apology. This isn't about drones. It's about deterrence. It's about restoring the kind of unapologetic strength that keeps our enemies at bay and our warfighters safe. I yield my time. Thank you guys so much for being here today. You guys look great in uniform, and you do too, ladies.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. In closing, I want to thank our witnesses once again for their testimony today. I now yield to Ranking Member Subramanyam for closing remarks.

Ranking Member Suhas Subramanyam (D-VA)SPEAKER_03

Uh, thank you, Mr. Chair. I think, um, But let's keep it brief that I, um, I think we have some good ideas that we can maybe turn into legislation, um, and we can hopefully make sure that we empower, um, bases, uh, to both have the right technologies to address this as well as to make sure more military installations are covered under statute potentially, uh, make sure there's better coordination with state and local and federal and, uh, and make sure that overall we have a workforce and the capacity to be able to address these challenges. So I'm glad we are all on the same page on that front, and I look forward to working on this together. Thank you. I yield back.

Chairman William Timmons (R-SC)SPEAKER_02

Thank you. I now recognize myself for closing remarks. It seems that we're a bit paralyzed here in Congress to deal with emerging technology. I've been working on cybersecurity legislation for the last 6-plus years, and the bill that we need, a comprehensive bill, would have to go through at least 10, maybe more, committees of jurisdiction to get it right in the House, and probably another 5-plus in the Senate. And we are just unable to do what we need to do to address real national security issues in the realm of cybersecurity. And I'm I fear that it's going to take some tragedy to cause us to act in that capacity on cybersecurity. I don't think drones are much different, both because of the complexity, the challenges that we face from a legislative perspective, whether it is authorizing, appropriating the money to purchase the necessary technology to monitor, to then engage with and disarm drones that are posing a threat, or whether it's the authority side to address the legal concerns that are very real. And it's probably not going to get done in one bill. It's going to probably be a number of bills, and there's going to be a lot of interest surrounding how we do it. As I think about this issue, the Chinese New Year drone was one of the most amazing things I've ever seen, and it also was very troubling, that display of, I guess it was an AI-enabled drone swarm that was basically providing entertainment. But while it was very entertaining, it's also terrifying. And I think that the capabilities of our adversaries and seeing how war has evolved in Ukraine and how the Russians and the Ukraine military are largely relying on drones, a huge portion of that conflict is being used as technology as opposed to traditional warfare. So we've got to get moving on this. We have to enhance our capacity. Congress has to act. But a lot of this is the private sector getting up to speed. A lot of this is our Defense Department telling us exactly what they need. And we don't have time to waste. We've spent enormous amounts of resources to make sure that we have a 24/7, 365 air alert mission for fighter jets to be deployed, and I'm not sure how good that capacity is right now considering that a couple dozen drones could severely impede our ability to get jets off the ground. So, this is a huge, huge challenge, and we need to act before it is too late. I appreciate y'all taking the time to come here today. It seems that we are moving in the right direction, and I appreciate your work to help get us where we need to be. And I look forward to working with my friend, the ranking member, to craft some legislation. With that, I will yield back. Thank you again for being here today. Without objection, all members have 5 legislative days within which to submit materials and additional written questions for the witnesses, which will be forwarded to the witnesses. If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank you.